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Abstract  
 
This thesis examines the role of EU in shaping national minority policies in 
Macedonia and Croatia since the launching of the first forms of EU conditionality 
in relation to the Western Balkans in the late 1990s. Research on EU conditionality 
has developed foremost in the context of the Eastern enlargement, largely 
neglecting the former Yugoslav countries. This dissertation contributes to filling 
this gap by studying the dynamic interactions between the EU and the national 
level in relation to national minority policies. The thesis utilizes primary document 
analysis and open-ended interviews in a combination of comparative case study 
method and process tracing. It tracks and explains the construction, application 
and implementation of EU conditionality in relation to minority policies between 
1997 and 2012. The study employs before and after approach in relation to 
2004/2005 when Croatia and Macedonia applied and became official candidates 
for EU accession. As national minority policies are not part of the EU acquis, the 
research studies how the EU institutions, especially the EU commission have used 
international instruments (such as the Framework Convention on the Protection 
of National Minorities) and national legislative provisions as elements of EU 
conditionality. In addition, the research examines in depth the policy of 
employment of minorities in the administration as a novel segment of EU 
conditionality in the two case studies. The analysis demonstrates the lack of 
consistency of this mechanism, its development and change over time as well as 
its potential for polarisation. Primarily, the thesis fills an existing gap in literature 
concerning the study of the role of conditionality in national minority policies in 
Croatia and Macedonia. On a conceptual level, this research sheds light on 
dynamic relationship between Europeanisation by conditionality and democratic 
consolidation in the conditions of post-communism.  
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“The European Union is founded on the value of 
respect for human dignity […], equality […] and 
respect for human rights, including the rights of 
persons belonging to minorities”.1 
       
1. Introduction  
 
1.1  The EU and the national minority question in post-communism  
The accommodation of national minority rights through the formal state 
institutions is considered a litmus test for democracy. Diversity has in fact 
persisted firmly on the political agenda both in cases of ethnocultural neutrality or 
full recognition of national minority rights. In this context, globalisation and the 
European integration processes in Western Europe have not resulted in 
overcoming minority nationalisms. In fact, the national minority question has 
manifested itself through a wide spectrum of demands, including, but not limited 
to cultural and language rights, local self-government, autonomy and secession. 
The continued perseverance of this issue has confirmed that “minority questions 
are among the most contested issues in political life because they speak to an 
inherent tension in human affairs between competing desires for freedom and 
belonging” (Jackson Preece, 2005 p.5). Thus, any democratic order is faced with 
the challenge of treating its citizens equally, while at the same time respecting the 
demands of national minority groups in various areas of public and private life.  
This dilemma originates in the traditional European shared understanding 
of the nation and state, “which has been subsequently exported to the rest of the 
world” (Keating and McGarry, 2001 p.1). In contemporary Europe, the national 
minority issue gained further prominence with the dissolution of the former 
Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia in the democratisation wave of the 
early 1990s. As a result of the fragmentation of these multinational socialist 
federations, the political space in Europe and Asia was reconfigured by leaving 
“millions of people outside ‘their own’ territory” (Brubaker, 1995 p.108). The 
redrawing of borders in the post-communist world resulted in the building of new 
multi-ethnic entities with (old and new) majorities and minorities. The succeeding 
independent states faced the challenges of building nations and/or states while 
                                            
1 Article 2 of the consolidated version of the Treaty on European Union, Official 
Journal of the European Union C115/13 of 9.5.2008. available at: http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2008:115:0013:0045:en:PDF 
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respecting the rights of national minorities in them. The dominant tendency in all 
of these countries was towards (re) nationalisation denoting the building of states 
of the titular majorities, in many cases for the first time (See Brubaker, 1995). In 
response, the processes of nation and state building in many of these new states 
were accompanied with difficulties in integrating national minorities or even led 
to inter-ethnic conflicts. In fact, the (re) gained independence of many of these 
states revealed the tensions between the processes of nation and state building 
and delineating national minorities’ rights. 
In light of these tectonic changes on the political landscape in Europe, the 
national minority issue was recognised as a matter of the international society 
(See Jackson Preece, 1997, Kymlicka and Opalski, 2002). International 
organisations such as the Council of Europe (CoE), the Organisation for Security 
and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the European Union (EU) and the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) explicitly included the protection of minority 
rights in their democracy promotion agendas. For the new independent states 
membership in these international organisations was the most important foreign 
policy goal and was perceived as recognition of their new status as sovereign 
actors on the international scene. Thus, their requirements were an important 
factor in the development of the domestic national minority polices.  The 
strategies and mandates of these international organisations were nevertheless 
different. On the one hand, the CoE and the OSCE had a strategy of socializing the 
post-communist elite from within, i.e. following the countries’ accession. 
Schimmelfennig describes this as an inclusive strategy, through which “the 
organisation first admits outsider countries and then teaches them the 
community rules” (Schimmelfennig, 2002 p.8). The EU and NATO had the opposite 
strategy of socializing countries from outside, through stipulating conditions for 
the respect of minorities for the purposes of accession (Schimmelfennig, 2002). In 
any case, the involvement of these international organisations  amplified their 
role in the democratisation of the post-communist world (Pravda, 2001, Smith, 
2002).2 As a result, literature widely recognised that political developments are 
                                            
2 Starting from the premises of the transition theorists of the 1960s and 70s, the 
early literature on post-communist transition and democratisation focused on the 
domestic factors as crucial for the democratisation processes, without a major 
examination of the role of external actors OFFE, C. 1997. Varieties of transition: 
the East European and East German experience, Cambridge, Massachusetts The 
MIT Press. 
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the result of interactions between domestic and international actors (Schmitter, 
2001).  
The inclusion of minority rights in the accession criteria in all the above 
mentioned international organisations has developed against the background of a 
missing consensus on common standards or approaches in this policy area. 
Kymlicka (2002a) points out that “Western countries differ amongst themselves in 
their approach to ethnic relations and attempts to codify a common set of 
minimum standards or best practices have proven difficult” (p.1). In this set of 
organisations, the CoE and the OSCE were formally vested with the monitoring of 
minority rights in their mandates, foremost in relation to the new independent 
post-communist countries. The former in 1995 became a host of the Framework 
Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (FCNM) which remains the 
only binding document in this policy area. The CoE, however, and its instruments 
were largely seen as an entry point for all of these new independent states to 
membership in the EU. Thus, the EU was politically by far the most significant for 
the elites and the public in these countries, increasing the qualitative potential of 
the Union for influencing the domestic transformation processes (Grabbe, 2006, 
Pridham, 2005). 
The EU also included the respect for and protection of minorities in its 
accession criteria in the still ongoing absence of an agreed definition of a minority 
and common standards for the EU member states (De Witte, 2002). In fact, “a 
definition of “minority” is nowhere to be found in the *...Union’s...+ documents, 
leaving it to the candidate countries to determine whom the Commission was 
asking them to respect and protect” (Kochenov, 2008 p.30). The lack of a common 
standard is most striking in the old member states France and Greece, which do 
not recognize the existence of ethnic minorities on their territories (See De 
Schutter, 2010). However, the “absence of minority protection from the acquis 
and the non-existence of a common Member States’ standard in the field did not 
prevent the Community (and especially the Commission) from giving minority 
protection full priority over other issues during the pre-accession” (Kochenov, 
2008 p.2). More specifically, at the Copenhagen summit in 1993, the EU member 
states decided that in order to join the EU, a new member state must first ensure 
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the stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights 
and respect for and protection of minorities.3   
The linking of the fulfilment of specific requirements by international 
organisations to the objective of membership has been widely referred in the 
academic and policy arena as conditionality (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 
2004, Hughes et al., 2004, Kelley, 2004b). This instrument structured the 
relationship between the EU and the acceding countries in the Eastern 
enlargement and continues to do so in the subsequent enlargements. Using 
conditionality specifically in relation to national minority policies, the EU became 
an actor that directly participated in the processes of nation and state building of 
the acceding countries. However, due to the lack of common rules in this policy 
area the EU has relied on assessments of other organisations, most notably the 
CoE and the OSCE in the devising of its requirements. In addition, the EU has also 
used national legislation or its respective implementation as part of its 
conditionality in relation to national minorities.4 Over time, the Union has evolved 
into a hub of conditionality in relation to national minority policies. As a result, 
since the 1990s the EU has progressively gained more and more significance in 
relation to national minority policies in the context of the candidate countries for 
accession.5 
This role of the EU in shaping national minority policies through 
conditionality has been the subject of significant academic interest foremost in 
the Eastern enlargement. The conclusions of these studies vary and are 
dependent upon the context and the specific policy area. Two main trends can 
nevertheless be determined. On the one hand, research has supported the EU’s 
role in relation to  democratisation in the conditions of post-communism 
specifically with respect to national minority rights (Vachudova, 2005, Kelley, 
2004a). In the opposite direction, Hughes, Sasse and Gordon criticized the 
tendency of enlargement literature to “mythologize the positive relationship 
between conditionality and enlargement” calling for more empirical based studies 
of the application of conditionality (Hughes et al., 2005). Ensuing empirical studies 
focusing on implementation put into question the success of the role of the EU as 
                                            
3 The second and third criterion concern the functioning market economy and 
ability to take on the responsibility of Union membership.  
4 Author’s interview with European Commission official, Brussels, 8 December 
2010. 
5 Author’s interview with Croatian Ministry of foreign affairs official, Brussels, 10 
November 2010. 
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a democratising force responsible for the improved minority policies (Hughes et 
al., 2005).  This latter strand of research also concluded that in some cases the EU 
has fostered inter-ethnic cooperation, whereas in others it has increased 
polarisation (Tesser, 2003, Schwellnus et al., 2009, Sasse, 2009). Taken as a whole, 
one cannot make a general conclusion on the EU’s role because of the significance 
of the contextual factors and the need to examine conditionality in light of its 
interaction at the national level. 
Whereas most of the research on the role of the EU in the accession 
process and minority policies has focused on Eastern enlargement, nowhere has 
the minority issue been as prominent as in the former Yugoslav countries. This 
region was plagued by wars and conflicts for the entire decade of the 1990s. The 
status and rights of national minorities stood at the core of the Yugoslav wars 
between Serbia, Croatia and Bosnia in the first half of the 1990s as well as the 
Kosovo and Macedonia conflicts of 1999 and 2001 respectively. Moreover, with 
the continuous increase of the number of the post-Yugoslav states, most recently 
with the independence of Montenegro in 2006 and Kosovo in 2008, the 
significance of the minority issue in this specific region has been further amplified. 
In response, academic literature has been in agreement that the democratisation 
of this region depends on the management of minority issues (Gordon et al., 
2008, Blitz, 2008).  
At the same time, the EU has been continuously involved in the national 
minority policies of this region. In fact, minority protection was required for 
recognition of the independence of the former Yugoslav states even before the 
formalisation of the 1993 Copenhagen criteria through an international 
arbitration Commission (i.e. the Badenter Commission). This Commission was 
vested with a mandate to “rule by means of binding decisions upon request from 
valid Yugoslavian authorities”, on the basis of rights of minorities (Pellet, 1992).  
De Witte (2002) questions this request that “came from the side of a group of 
countries [i.e. the EU] that had never before taken, as a group, any internal or 
international action in the field of minority protection” (p.141). As a result, it has 
been commonly argued that the “concern for minorities *in the EU+ is primarily an 
export product and not one for domestic consumption” (De Witte, 2002 p.139). 
In addition, since 1997 these countries have also been subject to 
extensive EU conditionality in relation to minority policies through the EU’s 
Regional Approach as a mechanism of structuring conditionality towards the 
Balkans. Over the years the shape of conditionality changed through the 
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introduction of the 2001 Stabilisation and Association Process (SAP), the 2003 
Thessaloniki Agenda and the recognition of the countries in the Balkans as 
potential candidates for EU accession in 2004/2005. Specifically in relation to 
national minority policies, the EU in the Western Balkans enlargement further 
formalised its conditionality through the establishment of a separate chapter in 
the accession negotiations in 2005. Chapter 23 in the accession negotiations deals 
specifically with judiciary and fundamental rights, the latter including national 
minority rights as well. Besides engaging through its enlargement architecture, 
the EU was also involved on the ground in these countries by acting as a co-
signatory or a guarantor of peace agreements, especially in Bosnia, Macedonia 
and Kosovo. This comprehensive type of the EU conditionality has been described 
in academic literature as a “a multidimensional and multi-purpose instrument, 
geared towards reconciliation, reconstruction and reform” (Anastasakis and 
Bechev, 2003 p.3). As part of all these various forms of engagement, minority 
issues were given prominence in the criteria for EU accession.  
In light of the significance of the national minority issue in the Western 
Balkans and the EU’s involvement in this policy area, this thesis examines the role 
of the EU in shaping minority policies in Macedonia and Croatia since the 
launching of the Regional approach in 1997 until 2012. The two countries are 
instructive cases as both have had recent armed conflicts involving the minorities 
on their territory and were the first official candidates for EU accession in the 
region since 2004/2005.6 Due to this qualitative change in their status, the thesis 
will focus separately on the role of conditionality before and after 2005 in the 
empirical analysis. By focusing on EU conditionality in the Balkans, the dissertation 
builds upon the findings of the literature on the Eastern enlargement which have 
stressed the need for contextualised analysis of the EU’s impact, especially in the 
candidate countries for accession (See Rechel, 2009b, Sedelmeier, 2006). While 
the study of the role of the EU in minority policies in the candidate states has 
originated and evolved in the Eastern enlargement, the Western Balkans as a 
region next in line for accession has received much less attention in this regard 
(See Gordon, 2009). This thesis aims to fill this gap and to provide a thorough 
analysis of the on-the-ground operation of conditionality in this region. 
Theoretically, it contributes to debates on the link between Europeanisation by 
conditionality and democratic consolidations in post-communist countries.  
                                            
6 For more see section 1.5 Countries and case selection.  
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1.2  Why this study? 
Despite the numerous studies of the wars and conflicts in the Balkans, 
including academic and policy analyses of national minority policies from the 
perspective of post-conflict reconstruction, the particularities of the region’s EU 
accession have remained under-researched. Specifically in relation to the case 
studies, most of the literature in relation to Croatia is linked to the Yugoslav wars 
and post-war reconciliation processes. Recent examples include a 2010 special 
issue of Europe-Asia studies entitled Croatia after Tudjman: Encounters with the 
Consequences of Conflict and Authoritarianism, which in relation to minority 
conditionality deals solely with the return of refugees which are not in the focus 
of this thesis (Djuric, 2010). Similarly, the unique consociational system in 
Macedonia established with the Ohrid Framework Agreement (OFA) has put the 
country in the spotlight of power-sharing and conflict resolution studies (Bieber, 
2005b, Ilievski and Taleski, 2009). Moreover, in a special issue of 2011 Europe-Asia 
Studies dealing with EU conditionality the authors examine various aspects of EU 
conditionality in the Western Balkans, but not minority policies specifically (See 
Bieber, 2011b). Letschert has analysed the two countries as case studies in 
relation to the work and cooperation between three mechanisms in the field of 
the protection of national minorities; the OSCE High Commissioner for National 
Minorities (HCNM), United Nations (UN) Working Group on Minorities and the 
CoE Advisory Committee on Minorities, without dealing with the EU (See 
Letschert, 2005).  
In comparison to the extensive research conducted in relation to the 
2004/2007 enlargement the region’s EU accession processes have been largely 
neglected. Studies on the Europeanisation of different policy areas in both 
countries have appeared recently, however, they do not deal with the specific 
policy area under consideration of this thesis. In a recent volume edited by 
Elbasani (2013), the Europeanisation of the Western Balkans is studied in a variety 
of policies, from a broader perspective, without a detailed examination of 
national minority policies. Chatzigiagkou (2010) has examined  the 
Europeanisation of the judiciary, civil service and regionalisation in Croatia in light 
of EU accession. Trauner specifically deals with examining the routes of influence 
of the EU in relation to the visa liberalisation policy and justice and home affairs in 
the two case studies focusing on rule adoption (Trauner, 2009a, Trauner, 2011). 
There is general work on the development of EU political conditionality in relation 
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to refugee return and regional reconciliation processes, which is not in the 
primary focus of this thesis (See Petričušid 2004, Djuric, 2010). Recently, the role 
of the EU in conflict transformation has been studied by Braniff (2011), focusing 
on the cases of Croatia and Serbia. Koinova (2011) has studied the changing 
nature of EU conditionality in Macedonia solely focusing in general on human 
rights. However, the role of EU conditionality in minority policies in the two cases 
has not been studied, hence, this thesis foremost fills this identified gap in 
literature.  
Second, while extending the research agenda on conditionality to the 
Balkans, this thesis studies this instrument in a qualitatively different setting in 
comparison to the Eastern enlargement in several ways. As explained in the 
previous section, in the Western Balkans enlargement the European Commission 
included conditionality on minority policies as a formal part of the accession 
process in a separate chapter of the negotiating structure. In the Eastern 
enlargement, national minority policies constituted a part of the political criteria, 
which were assumed to have been fulfilled before the start of the negotiations. In 
2005, however, the Commission established a new chapter in the negotiating 
structure which deals with judiciary and fundamental rights, including national 
minorities as a result of the experience with the Eastern enlargement and the 
nature of the candidates in the Western Balkans (See EC, 2005c). With this policy 
change, national minority policies were given prominence in the negotiations for 
EU accession.7  Against this background, studies separately the pre-2005 and post-
2005 period. Croatia is especially instructive for this purpose, having in mind that 
it was the first country to negotiate under this new structure of the acquis. 
Relying on primary data from fieldwork in Croatia obtained at the time of the 
negotiations of this specific chapter, this thesis provides findings relevant for the 
accession negotiations with the other Western Balkan countries.  
Third, besides establishing this new chapter, the Commission also 
introduced the tool of benchmarking in the accession of the Western Balkans. 
Benchmarking involves setting of both legislative requirements and evidence of 
their implementation in the negotiations, which was not the case in the 2004 
enlargement. In the region studied in this thesis (as well as Bulgaria and Romania), 
the minority policies conditionality has been extended further than “adoption” of 
                                            
7 Recognising this idiosyncrasy, the presented analysis follows a temporal logic, 
i.e. the role of the EU in this policy area is analysed pre and post 2005 in separate 
chapters of the thesis. For more, see methodology chapter. 
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rules and policies into establishing an implementation record.  As Hughes et al 
argue, we need to “distinguish better between the transposition of the acquis8 
into domestic law, which the EU’s own Regular Reports tend to equate with a 
successful outcome of conditionality, and the actual implementation of policy” 
(Hughes et al., 2005 p.11). At a general level, the region has been considered to 
respond with ‘fake compliance’ both at the level of rule adoption and 
implementation (Noutcheva, 2007). On the other hand, the European integration 
and minority policies have usually been studied through research projects which 
were in most cases limited to the legal dimension of minority protection, without 
extensive use of the conditionality paradigm as is the case in this research (See 
Lantschner et al., 2008). Incorporating the study of implementation, this thesis 
will also link the findings to the literature arguing for the notion of shallow 
Europeanisation (See Goetz, 2005). Hence, in addition to the extension of the 
‘minority criterion’ to the underlying policy areas as mentioned above, this thesis 
will study the implementation of minority policies.  
Fourth, the dissertation extends the analysis of the role of conditionality 
in minority policies to new policy areas which have become elements of EU 
conditionality in the Western Balkans accession process. Already in the case of the 
eastern enlargement Pridham (2007) concludes that “political conditionality 
[including minority policies] has become broader in its scope, [and] much tighter 
in its procedures” (p.468). As a result of this wider scope of political conditionality 
the Commission has pursued a more interventionist attitude in comparison to the 
previous enlargement, a tendency noted already with respect to Bulgaria and 
Romania (Phinnemore, 2006, Pridham, 2007). For example, in Croatia and 
Macedonia the EU has dealt with novel policy areas which were not included in 
the previous enlargement. These have involved policies such as representation of 
minorities in the public sector, setting up and functioning of councils for national 
minorities etc, related to the implementation of the domestic legislation in these 
countries.9   
Fifth, the thesis brings insight into the operation of conditionality in 
countries with organised minority representation, which was not the case in the 
previous enlargement (Sasse, 2009 p.27). While in the Eastern enlargement the 
                                            
8 Acquis communautaire is a term referring to the European community legislation 
and case law. In this thesis it will be referred short as acquis. 
9 Refugee return and cooperation with the ICTY have been separate areas of EU 
conditionality which have been analysed in detail in literature and will not be 
examined in this research, except when relevant for the context setting.  
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EU contributed to the creation of domestic political space for minority 
participation such as in Romania and Slovakia (Sasse, 2009 p.27), in the Western 
Balkans the minority parties are a feature of the political space (Bieber, 2008a). As 
a result, the organized minority interests, especially the political parties are active 
agents in the implementation of conditionality.  Recently, research has identified 
their significance for the study of conditionality and minority policies. Sasse 
(2009), thus argues that “the EU’s encouragement of ethnic power sharing as part 
of regime change and domestic political references to the EU’s minority condition 
can fuel political mobilisation, especially (but not only) in the presence of 
ethnopolitical parties” (p.28).  At the same time, both countries examined in this 
thesis provide insight into different types of ethnicized party systems. Taleski 
argues that the ethnic identity is a “key feature of the party system” that  “in a 
sense, all political parties in Macedonia are ethnic parties” Taleski (2008 p.139). 
On the other hand, according to Petričušid (2008), “a fully mobilized ethnic party 
system has never been in place in Croatia”, because of the lack of Serb 
representation in Parliament in the early 1990s (p.68).  
Lastly, the study also offers insight to the functioning of conditionality in a 
transformed EU political setting than was the case in the 2004 accession. In fact, 
the foundations of the Western Balkans accession process are qualitatively 
different when compared to the Eastern enlargement. The Eastern enlargement 
was underpinned by the principle of returning to Europe and took place in a 
period of relative economic prosperity with a relatively stable commitment from 
the Union to the enlargement process. The narrative that has accompanied the 
Western Balkans accession “has been essentially negative and imbued with a 
sense of risk” as a result of the conflicts that have plagued the region 
(Phinnemore, 2013 p.33). In addition, the economic and political crises in the 
Union, as well as the post-2005 constitutional treaty crisis have all contributed to 
diminished importance of the enlargement agenda. Hence, besides studying the 
extended notion of conditionality, this study is also going to shed light to its 
operation in a qualitatively changed environment in comparison to the 2004 
enlargement.  
Building on existing research on the role of the EU in shaping minority 
policies, this thesis has two main objectives. First, it develops the agenda set by 
the literature on the previous enlargement especially in relation to studying the 
role of EU conditionality in the domestic context and its relationship with 
democratisation processes. Second, it contributes to filling a gap in literature 
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research of the accession process for the Western Balkans. The study of the 
accession of this region, as elaborated above, is linked to idiosyncrasies both on 
the side of the EU and in the region, which underpin the originality of this thesis. 
In relation to the EU, the conditionality in relation to national minority policies has 
been further structured and formalised through the introduction of a specific 
chapter and the insistence on an implementation, rather than rule adoption. 
Moreover, the general attitude towards the Western Balkans enlargement has 
been less popular both among the EU public and elites (See Di Mauro and Marta, 
2012). On the regional side, the minorities are of increasing importance foremost 
because of the legacy of the conflicts, but also because of the more structured 
organisation of minority interests in these countries.  
 
1.3  Framework for analysis  
As a study of the role of the EU in shaping national minority policies in the 
accession process, this dissertation draws upon the contested concepts of 
national minority (community), Europeanisation and conditionality. First, the 
analysis of any aspect of national minority policies is accompanied by the lack of a 
common definition as to who constitutes a minority. For Jackson Preece (2005), 
these disagreements exist because “the problem of minorities often manifests 
itself in efforts to distinguish between those who belong to a political community 
and those who do not” (p.9). The identity of those persons who constitute a 
minority is dependent upon the political and historical context, but also 
influenced by the international society (Jackson Preece, 2005 p.182). Brubaker in 
this direction argues that the national minority is “a dynamic political stance, or, 
more precisely, a family of related yet mutually competing stances, not a static 
ethno demographic condition” (Brubaker, 1995 p.112). While recognising this 
definitional problem, it is beyond the scope of this thesis to attempt to develop 
definitions of minority. This position is rather similar to scholars who argue that 
“the non-existence of a definition has never been an absolute obstacle to the 
drawing up of international instruments containing minority provisions [as] the 
essential elements of the minority concept are known” (Andr sek, 1989 p.14).  
Due to these definitional challenges, academic research has been adopting 
separate definitions of minority policies in light of the specific elements under 
analysis. Vermeersch (2003) in his analysis of minority rights in CEE understands 
the term ‘minority rights policies’ as a “range of policies which have in common 
that they all in one way or another recognize and accommodate the demands of 
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communities distinguishing themselves from majority populations by religious, 
linguistic, cultural and other characteristics that are considered ethnic” (p.1). 
While accepting this definition for the purposes of this research, the dissertation 
recognises the contested nature of minority policies in general and in the EU 
context.  
The lack of a common understanding in this policy area in the EU is also 
reflected in the variety of terms that the European Commission uses in its reports, 
i.e. minority rights, rights of persons belonging to minorities, which are mostly 
linked to the national definitions of the country in question.10 It has been also 
argued that the Commission adopted its own definition of minorities which 
included all the communities residing in these countries, and was not limited to 
the formal recognition of minority rights, but also included implementation (De 
Witte, 2002 p.142). Recognizing the importance of De Witte’s argument, this 
research will consider minority protection policies as a wide set of both formal 
policies, but also their respective implementation. Moreover, the research relies 
on the national definitions of national minorities which have evolved over time, 
without intending to go into normative and conceptual debates on national 
minorities. 
Conceptually, the study of the minority policies in the EU accession 
process draws upon the study of the processes of Europeanisation as well as 
democratisation in the conditions of post-communism.11 Research examining the 
link between EU accession and the candidate countries has traditionally been 
framed in an Europeanisation and/or conditionality framework.12 In its broadest 
terms, Europeanisation for the purposes of this thesis is understood as “domestic 
adaptation to European regional integration” (Vink and Graziano, 2007 p.7). The 
majority of studies have addressed the conditions under which Europeanisation 
takes place, as well as its impact on policies, polity and actors in the first instance 
on the EU member states (Risse et al., 2001). In the latter half of the 2000s studies 
appeared using and adapting this concept for the candidate countries for EU 
accession focusing on the instrument of conditionality (Schimmelfennig and 
Sedelmeier, 2005b, Grabbe, 2006). The use of conditionality is the essential 
feature that separates the processes of Europeanisation of the member states 
                                            
10 Author’s interview with European Commission official, Brussels, 8 December 
2010. 
11 For more details as well as criticisms see third chapter.  
12 Elaborated in more detail in the third chapter. 
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and the candidate countries, as a feature of the latter group that is of interest to 
this research. 
Although widely used in the literature, the concept of conditionality is 
subject to various understandings, two of which are of immediate relevance for 
this thesis (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2004, Sasse, 2005). First, from a 
rational institutionalism viewpoint, conditionality is understood as “a bargaining 
strategy of reinforcement by reward, under which the EU provides external 
incentives for a target government to comply with its conditions” 
(Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2004 p.662). The success of conditionality from 
this standpoint depends on the high credibility of EU conditionality and the low 
domestic costs of rule adoption (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2005b).13 
National minority policies, however, as elaborated above belong to the most 
contested issues of political life. In a recent analysis of the effectiveness of the 
external incentive model, Schimmelfennig (2008) concludes that “in the Balkans 
the troubles in the EU accession process are related to the legacies of ethnic 
conflict and are likely to create significant political costs to the target 
governments because of their high relevance for national identity” (p.932). Thus, 
while useful for the study of acquis conditionality, the high domestic costs 
associated with minority policies diminish the usefulness of this approach for the 
study of this policy area.  
The alternative approach to conditionality defines it through the “process 
of its application rather than by an ideal-type assumed power relationship” 
(Hughes et al., 2005). The focus on the process of its application entails the 
studying of the interactions between the EU and the national level as well as the 
continuity and change in conditionality. Moreover, Hughes et al. (2005) have 
argued that EU conditionality “includes not only the formal technical 
requirements on candidates but also the informal pressures arising from the 
behaviour and perceptions of actors engaged in the political process” (p.2). 
Whereas the former “embodies the publicly stated preconditions [...] of the 
‘Copenhagen criteria’ and the *...+ acquis”, the latter “includes the operational 
pressures and recommendations applied by actors within the Commission [...] 
during their interactions with their CEEC counterparts” (2005 p.26). This approach 
therefore attempts to unpack the operation of conditionality, while recognising 
                                            
13 For more on this see section Models for analysing conditionality in chapter 
three.  
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the formal documented conditionality as well as the importance of the 
interactions between the EU and national stakeholders.  
Moreover, as Hughes et al argue, “if the logic of conditionality works in 
practice we should be able to track clear relationships between the Commission’s 
use of conditionality and the compliance of candidate countries through policy, or 
institutional adjustments and normative change” (Hughes et al., 2005 p.2). In line 
with these assessments, this study approaches conditionality through tracing the 
construction of conditions at the EU level, their application and understanding at 
the national level and its development over time. First, the study of the devising 
of the EU conditions is necessary due the lack of benchmarks in the EU legislation 
on minority policies and the fleeting nature of the criteria. Second, the 
examination of the minority criterion in the domestic political context is used in 
order to account for domestic actors’ interference in the application of 
conditionality  and to avoid overemphasizing the role of the EU (See Sasse, 2009). 
Third, the analysis over time (in this thesis between 1997 and 2012) provides for 
the study of both continuity and change in conditionality pre and post-2005. Thus, 
it does not understand conditionality as a fixed variable, but as a process 
amenable to change, thus aiming to unpack its operation.  
The process-based understanding of conditionality underpins this study 
due to three major reasons. First, the contextual nature and flexibility of the EU 
criteria on national minority policies complicates their study in a rational incentive 
model.  This specificity is linked to the EU’s reliance on assessments of other 
international organisations such as the CoE and OSCE as well as the use of 
national legislation provisions as conditions. In relation to the former, it has been 
argued that EU conditionality in the area of minority protection is best 
understood as the cumulative effect of different international institutions (Sasse, 
2005). At the same time, research on the Eastern enlargement, noted that many 
recommendations of these international organisations remained ignored until the 
EU included them in their monitoring mechanisms (Rechel, 2009a). Such is the 
case with the CoE FCNM which is the only binding instrument in relation to 
national minorities. These assessments therefore, justify the focus on the EU in 
shaping national minority policies, while at the same focusing on how the EU has 
used these other international instruments, which is the case in this thesis.  
Second, in addition to reliance on other international organisations, the 
EU has also used national legislation as elements of conditionality. In these cases, 
the EU is “relying on domestic rules and agreements *which+ is advantageous as it 
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enables the EU institutions to focus their policy on the specific local situation, but 
it risks that the parameters of the situation determine the standards (normative 
assumptions) underlying EU policies” (Brusis, 2003 p.4). The reliance on national 
legislation and agreements makes conditionality increasingly dependent on the 
context and national actors, thereby complicating its analysis as an independent 
variable. While not going into normative debates on the position of the EU, this 
thesis will study how the EU has shaped national minority policies through relying 
on national legislation in the two cases.  Focusing specifically on this element, the 
thesis will shed light on the role of domestic actors, as integral elements of the 
conditionality mechanism.  
Third, rather than concentrating on the direct impact of the EU, this thesis 
studies the process of applying accession conditionality for the purposes of 
unpacking its operation. In this respect, studies of Europeanisation have shown 
that due to the simultaneity with the process of democratisation, demonstrating 
direct impact is increasingly difficult.  In fact, the focus on the direct EU impact in 
the study of shaping minority policies runs the risk of overestimating the role of 
the EU (See Hughes et al., 2005, Brusis, 2005b, Grabbe, 2006). This potential is 
amplified in the external incentives model, which according to Brusis (2005b) 
“does not allow the interference that the domestic change is driven by EU 
incentives because the Union applies conditionality or because domestic actors 
justify their decision as driven by EU conditionality” (p.297). At the same time, 
research has shown that especially in areas not covered by the acquis domestic 
actors have played the decisive role in the implementation and outcome of 
conditionality (Brusis, 2005b). While the alternative of studying the 
transformation of national minority policies in candidate countries without the 
role of the EU is not viable, studying the interactions between the EU and 
domestic level, as is the case in the process- based approach could minimise this 
risk. In this vein, Pridham has supported research “through focusing on 
interactions, and therefore two-way effects, between sets of international and 
domestic factors” (Pridham, 2005 p.10).  
As a study of the role of the EU in shaping minority policies in 
democratising settings, this thesis ultimately will shed light on the relationship 
between Europeanisation through conditionality and democratic consolidation.14 
In fact, “the components of ‘democratic conditionality’ *including minority 
                                            
14 For more details see chapter three. 
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policies], as defined by the first Copenhagen criterion, regain in significance as a 
litmus test of the medium- to long-term consolidation of the polities in question” 
(Sasse, 2008 p.843). For Kymlicka and Opalski (2002) “the ability or inability of 
countries in Eastern Europe to resolve their ethnic conflicts has profoundly 
affected the process of democratisation” (p.3). The crucial role of minority policies 
for  democratic consolidation has been underlined in literature by concluding that 
consolidation requires that there is consensus of the citizens of a territory on the 
legitimacy of the established political unit (Linz and Stepan, 1996 p.27). In this 
respect, as elaborated above, research has warned that firm trends cannot be 
determined in relation to the democratising role of EU conditionality. In a cross-
country study of the Eastern enlargement, Rechel (2009b) has concluded that  
“much depended on the point of departure at the end of communism, the ethnic 
make-up of the country, historical legacies, and whether the country experienced 
territorial changes or not” (p.227).  
 
1.4  Research questions  
In light of these assessments, this thesis studies the role of the EU in shaping 
national minority policies in Croatia and Macedonia. It examines how the EU has 
interacted with domestic actors in relation to national minority policies between 
1997 and 2012 and the implications of this involvement for the process of 
democratic consolidation in the two countries. It argues that the effectiveness of 
this instrument has been constrained by its lack of consistency and instrumental 
use by domestic actors. As a result, the EU’s involvement in this policy area could 
potentially lead to increased inter-ethnic polarisation. In order to analyse these 
dynamic relationships the thesis focuses on the following research questions:  
1. How has EU conditionality on national minority policies in Macedonia and 
Croatia been implemented between 1997 and 2005, and post-2005? 
This research question is the starting point of this thesis with the purpose of 
unpacking the operation of conditionality in the two countries. The temporal 
dimension is underpinned by the qualitative shift in EU conditionality which 
occurred in 2004 with the Eastern enlargement as well as with the inclusion of 
national minority policies in a chapter of the negotiations. Thus, this year is 
broadly considered in literature as a breaking point for the shape of conditionality 
(Pridham, 2007). Recognising this change and focusing on this temporal 
distinction, the dissertation will trace the qualitative changes before and post 
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2005 in terms of national minority policies in the two case studies in separate 
empirical chapters.  
2. How has the EU used the Council of Europe Framework Convention on 
National minorities and the national legislation as elements of EU 
conditionality on national minority policy between 1997 and 2005 and post-
2005? 
Given the lack of a common EU standard on national minority policies, the two 
elements that have been used by the EU in structuring and stipulating its criteria 
have been the CoE FCNM and national legislation in the respective candidate 
countries. Research has largely been an consensus that “over time the FCNM of 
1995 became the Commission’s primary instrument for translating the minority 
criterion into practice” (Sasse, 2005 p.5).  This research question will be addressed 
through a study of the evolution of the use of these specific components in the 
EU, national documents and through interviews with stakeholders in chapters 
five, six and seven of the thesis. Whereas the first two deal with both elements at 
macro-policy level, chapter seven deals closely with the representation of national 
minorities in the administration, as a specific national policy facilitated by the 
EU.15   
3. How consistent has EU conditionality been in relation to national minority 
policies in Croatia and Macedonia been between 1997 and 2005 and post-
2005 within the specific case studies?     
The literature review and the fieldwork data for this thesis have both indicated 
that in order to be effective in shaping policies, EU conditionality needs to be 
consistently applied over a longer period of time. At the same time, experience of 
the last enlargement shows that in this policy area EU conditionality is plagued by 
lack of consistency and clarity (Sasse, 2005). In order to address this question the 
thesis throughout its empirical analysis examines the consistency of the EU 
conditions in the EU and national documents, as well as among the stakeholders 
interviewed. This research question is closely related to the first two, since the 
thesis will aim to assess whether there is a significant change in the consistency 
before and post-2005, as well as in the structuring elements elaborated in the 
previous question.  
                                            
15 See section on structure below. 
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4. What role have domestic actors played in the application of conditionality in 
relation to national minorities in Croatia and Macedonia between 1997 and 
2012? 
Whereas the first three research questions largely address the EU side of 
conditionality, as elaborated above this dissertation approaches this instrument 
through the interactions between the EU and the national level. For this purpose 
it considers the domestic actors as an integral part of the conditionality 
instrument in line with literature. Literature on the previous enlargement has 
already pointed the decisive role of domestic actors in the operation of 
conditionality in policy areas not part of the EU acquis, as is the case with national 
minority policies (See Brusis, 2005b). This research question will bring insight from 
the Balkans, where, as already explained, the minority issue is of high salience in 
conditions of organised minority interests and increasing EU involvement in 
comparison to the Eastern enlargement.   
5. What are the implications of the Europeanisation by conditionality in relation 
to minority policies for the democratic consolidation of Croatia and 
Macedonia? 
Through its involvement in national minority policies, as an issue area of high 
political importance, the EU has gained a role the democratic consolidation of the 
countries concerned. Building upon the findings of the previous research 
questions, this last dimension is examined by looking into specific cases when the 
EU has advanced national minority policies, but also through cases where the EU’s 
involvement could lead to further polarisation or further embedding of potentially 
divisive policies. Though the uncovering of the relationship between the processes 
of Europeanisation and democratisation is a complex endeavour, this research 
through its largely contextual approach can draw preliminary conclusions on the 
specific role of the EU in the countries studied. With this question, the thesis 
advances the research on the Eastern enlargement to the Western Balkans.  
The research questions and the theoretical approach of this study 
underpin its methodological approach, presented in detail in the following 
chapter. The study employs a before and after approach in relation to 2004/2005 
and process tracing of official EU and national documents and relies on extensive 
fieldwork data. The thesis is modelled to reconstruct the practicalities of the 
European accession process as closely as possible, both through the documents 
and examining the views of a wide range of stakeholders. The latter include but 
are not limited to civil service involved in EU accession, civil society and 
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international organisations etc. The before and after approach is applied through 
the structuring of the analysis in two chapters, one in relation to the 1997-2005 
and the other dealing with the post-2005 period. Within these time frames the 
thesis conducts between country comparisons. Lastly, the thesis also presents a 
micro-study of the representation of minorities in the public sector, as a novel 
policy in the Western Balkans enlargement, in order to confirm its findings.  In 
light of the above explained theoretical approach the analysis is conducted at 
three levels. The data collected through archive and field work are analysed at 
three levels. First, the research examines the devising of the EU priority through 
the formal documents from the EU and interviews with EU officials. Second, the 
study looks at the domestic response of the national governments to the EU 
conditionality through the national strategic documents, adoption of legislation 
and policies and their implementation. Lastly, the interview data from the 
national level provide insight into the local understanding of and implementation 
of conditionality in relation to minority policies.  
 
1.5  Country and case selection 
Croatia and Macedonia are selected for the study of the role of the EU in 
shaping national minority policies primarily due to their contractual relations with 
the Union and the significance of the minority issue at the national level. The two 
countries were the first official candidates for EU accession in the Balkans since 
2004 and 2005 respectively, thus, providing a sufficient time period and data for 
analysis. During the research and writing of this dissertation, both Montenegro 
and Serbia have been granted the status of official candidates for accession. 
However, their experiences are qualitatively different since Croatia and 
Macedonia have both had a significant experience as candidate countries when 
the research was launched. Among the Yugoslav successors, Slovenia became a 
member of the EU in 2004 in the Eastern enlargement; however, the country is 
largely homogenous and was affected by the EU in different conditions as 
elaborated above; hence, it does not present a comparable case.  
Despite the formal similarities between the two case studies, their 
experiences of the pre-accession process have also been unique and different. 
Croatia negotiated its EU membership from 2005 until mid-2011, when a date for 
accession was set for mid-2013. Macedonia, despite holding the status of a 
candidate country since 2005, still, has not commenced the negotiations. The 
Commission’s 2009 recommendation for starting of the negotiations has since 
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been repeated annually.  The Council decision for launching of the negotiations is 
nevertheless conditional upon the resolving the dispute over the country’s 
constitutional name with Greece.16 Hence, the two countries will provide 
significant insight into the various incentives that operate in different contractual 
relations with the EU. In this respect, Avery and Cameron (1998) have argued that 
the opening of the negotiations differentiates the status of the countries because 
it possibly implies the intention of the Union to conclude them and accept the 
country as a member. 
 
 
Timeline: Relations of both countries with the EU  
(A more detailed timeline is provided in the appendix) 
Milestones in the EU relation with 
the countries  
Croatia  Macedonia  
Regional Approach April 1997 April 1997 
 Signing of SAA October 2001 April 2001 
Application for membership  February 2003 February 2004 
Opinion on application April 2004 October 2005 
Candidate status granted December 2004 December 2005 
Recommendation for opening of 
negotiations  
December 2004 November 2009 
Negotiations started October 2005 n/a 
Negotiations concluded  June 2011 n/a 
 
The thesis focuses on national minority policies in these two cases due to 
several interlinked reasons. First, minority policies are usually considered to be 
the ultimate test for EU conditionality (Sasse, 2005) due to high domestic political 
costs and the lack of a common policy at the EU level. Thus, they are a fertile 
ground for studying the role of the EU in shaping policies at the national level, as 
the main objective of the thesis. At the same time, because of the EU’s lack of 
competence, they’re significant for studying the implementation and consistency 
of conditionality. Second, this thesis examines minority policies also as a result to 
their increasing importance for democratic consolidation in the conditions of 
post-communism. In an article assessing the role of the SAP, Gordon (2009) points 
                                            
16 For more on this see chapter on contextual background. 
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that “the satisfactory resolution of inter-state relations and intra-state majority-
minority must lie at the heart of any long-term political stabilisation of the region” 
(p.336). In such conditions, the role of EU conditionality in relation to national 
minority policies is also of increasing importance for the democratic consolidation, 
and is addressed in the last research question of the thesis. 
In both countries under examination minority policies are an issue of 
everyday importance due to the ethnic heterogeneity, the recent experience of 
conflicts, as well as unresolved issues of state and nation building.  In Croatia, 
although numerically the national minorities comprise less than 10% of the 
population, the related policies are significant foremost due to the legacy of the 
recent Yugoslav wars that exacerbate the significance of minority 
accommodation.17 In light of the sensitivity of this issue, for the purposes of EU 
accession, Croatia has been required to implement relevant legislation, i.e. the 
Constitutional Law on National Minorities (CLNM) and to facilitate the return of 
predominantly minority refugees in the country. In this vein, it has been argued 
that “the unresolved situation of the Serbian minority undermines Croatia’s claims 
of democratic maturity” (Blitz, 2008 p.125).  
Similarly, national minority issues have dominated Macedonia’s political 
agenda since independence. This tendency has been underlined by domestic and 
international analysts, arguing that the main challenge facing Macedonia in the 
period of independence has been “the management of aspirations, attitudes and 
expectations of the population, incorporating a large minority group” (Miller and 
Ivanovic, 1999 p.318). National minorities (non majority communities) make up 
around 35% of the population, including a large 25% Albanian community.18 
Domestic intellectuals have also commonly argued that more than in the case of 
any other transition state, Macedonia’s prospects “are critically dependent on the 
willingness of the EU to support good government at home with realistic 
prospects of international integration abroad” (Muhic, 1996 p.246). Overall, in 
both countries minority protection policies are of increasing importance, as also 
has been the role of the EU in their management.  
The two countries provide a fertile ground for the study of the role of the 
EU in shaping minority policies also due to the differences in terms of their state 
organisation and role of organised minority interests. First, whereas Croatia is a 
                                            
17 For more on this, see chapter on context and population by ethnicity in Annex 
II.  
18 For more, see chapter four on context. 
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unitary state, Macedonia has a consociational system with a power-sharing 
agreement between the two major ethnic groups. Consociationalism consists of 
several institutional features such as grand coalitions in parliament, 
proportionality rules for allocation of ministries and at all levels of government, 
group autonomy and minority veto (Lijphart, 1977). Looking at the impact in a 
unitary state as Croatia and a consociational system as Macedonia provides 
insight into the impact of EU in varying domestic arrangements. Second, in both 
countries minority interests are fairly organized, although they play different 
roles. Whereas in Croatia minority parties have not always participated in 
governments, in Macedonia organized minority interests are strong due to the 
importance of ethnic cleavages. In this manner, the study will demonstrate 
whether there are substantial differences in the impact of the EU in countries with 
different domestic systems of minority protection and organisation of interests, 
an element contributing substantially to the originality of the research.  
At the same time, Macedonia and Croatia are not usually compared in the 
academic literature. In comparative research, Macedonia is commonly grouped 
with Bosnia and with Kosovo due to the division of the countries upon ethnic 
lines, their power-sharing agreements and the increasing role of the international 
community in these cases (See Bieber, 2005a, Vasilev, 2011).19 In regional studies, 
Croatia is usually analysed along with Serbia due to their conflicting past as well as 
their relations with Bosnia (See Gagnon, 2006, Maleševic, 2002). However, since 
the starting point of this research is the EU accession process, Macedonia and 
Croatia are suitable examples for study due to the fact that both countries signed 
the SAA and applied for membership at the same time, significantly before the 
other countries in the region. Adopting this position, Trauner (2011) has 
conducted an analysis of the justice, freedom and security reforms in both 
countries using the external incentives model. In his research Trauner (2011) 
focuses on rule adoption with respect to the acquis, the process of visa 
liberalisation and preparations for Schengen. As such, his work is largely confined 
to the adoption of norms, rather than reflecting on the implications of these 
processes, especially conditionality, for the democratic consolidation of the 
countries studied. His research therefore, while confirming the validity of the 
                                            
19 Though with unconsolidated statehood, Macedonia has not been considered as 
a minimalist state, as Kosovo and Bosnia in the work of Bieber on political 
conditionality, see BIEBER, F. 2011a. Building Impossible States? State-Building 
Strategies and EU Membership in the Western Balkans. Europe-Asia Studies, 63, 
1783-1802. 
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study of the two countries in the context of EU accession, examines an area highly 
regulated by the acquis and uses different theoretical lenses.  
Overall, the two case studies share similarities in terms of their common 
historical background and their current contractual relations with the EU. 
However, there are substantial differences in the contextual importance of 
minority protection and as a result; they provide sufficient ground for examining 
the impact of EU political conditionality in relation to a variety of explanations and 
actors. Lastly, whereas work has been done generically on minorities in relation to 
the conflicts in both countries, the literature examining their EU accession is 
limited. The examination of their experiences will provide significant reference 
information for the rest of the Western Balkans in its EU accession. By adopting 
this approach, the study also builds upon findings of Europeanisation literature 
arguing that “comparative insights are desirable, precisely in order to establish to 
what extent the conceptual frameworks developed in the context of eastern 
enlargement allow us to understand candidate country Europeanisation” 
(Sedelmeier, 2006 p.20).  
 
1.6  Structure  
This dissertation consists of eight chapters. Having presented the objective 
and the research questions in the introduction, the second chapter outlines the 
methodology of the study. This chapter presents the methodological approach of 
the thesis in terms of the data collection and analysis. As the thesis draws upon 
extensive fieldwork and interviews with stakeholders it reflects on the rationale 
behind the field research, as well as their advantages and shortcomings for the 
study. In its second part, this chapter explains the data analysis through a 
comparative case study method and process tracing, which underpin the 
dissertation. It also reflects on the logic of the periodisation of the research, as 
presented in the introduction. The objective of this chapter is to illustrate how the 
study approaches the EU’s role in shaping national minority policies through 
looking at EU conditionality as a process. At the same time it illustrates the 
method of analysis employed in the empirical chapters.  
The following two chapters present the theoretical and contextual 
foundations of the study. Chapter three examines the conceptual tools that are 
used in this dissertation, focusing on Europeanisation by conditionality and its 
relationship with democratic consolidation. For this purpose, it first presents 
inquiry of Europeanisation and conditionality, as the conceptual tools which have 
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underpinned the study of the role of the EU in domestic politics, with a focus on 
the candidate countries for accession. Arguing for a broad definition of 
Europeanisation, the chapter nevertheless singles out the mechanism of 
conditionality as the main instrument at work in the EU accession. The chapter 
studies the external incentives model and the process based understandings of 
conditionality, as the two approaches which have shaped the study of this 
phenomenon. The chapter justifies the use of the latter approach in this thesis 
due to the lack of standards in the policy area and the dependence on contextual 
factors, which were also essential for identifying the research questions of the 
dissertation. Having elaborated the understandings of Europeanisation and 
conditionality, the chapter moves on to link the study of these phenomena to the 
process of democratic consolidation. Highlighting the importance of the national 
minority issue for democratic consolidation, the chapter posits the EU as an actor 
which also shapes this process through its involvement. The last, fourth section 
uncovers the dynamic relationship between Europeanisation and conditionality, 
uncovering their potentially conflicting tendencies. Overall, this chapter 
substantiates theoretically the research questions and underpins the empirical 
analysis that follows.  
The theoretical examination is followed by a chapter which studies the 
legacy and contextual developments in both countries in relation to the national 
minority question and international actors, specifically the EU. Chapter four thus, 
complements the theoretical discussion by studying the contextual developments 
in both countries in relation to the minority question since independence, 
national minorities and electoral politics, as well as the relationship with the EU. 
The objective of this chapter is to provide a background to the pre-1997 period as 
well as the general context of the EU’s engagement in both countries, examined in 
the subsequent empirical chapters. The need for this chapter is a result the 
contextual nature of the conditions the EU imposes (national legislation and 
agreements) as well as the interest of the thesis in the role domestic actors.  Thus, 
it does not provide a thorough examination of the minority situation in the case 
studies, but rather the key defining country features that impact upon both the 
EU and the national level in the devising and implementation of conditionality, 
necessary for addressing the research questions.  
 The bulk of the empirical analysis of the thesis based on the original data 
collected through the fieldwork is organised chronologically as well as 
thematically, in the following three chapters. Overall, the thesis examines the 
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period between 1997 when the Regional Approach was launched and 2012.20 As 
mentioned in the introductory remarks, 2005 is taken as a critical point for the 
before and after approach, i.e. the first two empirical chapters study the 1997-
2005 period and post-2005 period separately. This organisation of the analysis 
allows for comparison between the different periods and cases. Thematically, 
chapters five and six deal with the use of the FCNM and the use of national 
legislation as an element of conditionality, before and after 2005. The two 
structuring elements are derived from document analysis and discussions with 
stakeholders. The last seventh chapter presents a detailed case (micro) study of 
the representation of minorities in the public sector.  
Chapter five presents the analysis of the role of the EU in shaping minority 
policies in Croatia and Macedonia between 1997 and 2005, i.e. until both 
countries became candidates for EU accession. Within the specified time frame, 
the chapter examines the national minority policies within two distinct EU 
initiatives: the 1997 Regional Approach and the 2001 SAA framework as two 
distinct periods of EU involvement in the Balkans. The qualitative difference 
between the two periods is linked to the lack of a membership perspective in the 
former, whereas with the SAA these countries were considered as potential 
candidates for membership. Focusing on the use of the FCNM as a benchmark and 
national legislation and agreements the chapter studies the implementation of EU 
conditionality in this respect, as well as its consistency in the separate elements of 
analysis. The specific topics studied in relation to the national legislation are 
determined in accordance with the policies that the EU considered important for 
each of the countries. In line with the methodological approach, the analysis is 
based on a study of the links between EU and national documents, as well as 
interviews with stakeholders.    
Along the same chronological and thematic logic, chapter six studies the 
interactions between the EU and the national level in relation to conditionality 
post-2005 until 2012. In this period, both countries under examination were 
declared official candidates for EU membership and were navigating their 
accession with the regular Progress Reports and the European partnerships. In 
addition, the respective governments started preparing more detailed documents 
such as the extensive National Plans for the Adoption of the Acquis (NPAA) in 
                                            
20 The last annual revision of the EU documents available for analysis was at the 
end of 2012. The thesis nevertheless reflects on major events of 2013 as well: see 
methodology chapter for more on this.    
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Macedonia, the National Plan for Integration in the EU (NPIEU) in Croatia and 
national Progress reports on the fulfilment of the conditions for accession. 
Furthermore, as elaborated above, the EU introduced a specific chapter in the 
negotiations dealing with minority policies. Lastly, in 2005 the European 
Commission launched membership negotiations with Croatia providing further 
benchmarking through the screening reports on all negotiating chapters, including 
minority policies. The European Commission also employed several benchmarking 
exercises for Macedonia through the key priorities of the Accession Partnerships. 
Focusing on the FCNM and the use of national legislation as elements of EU 
conditionality, this chapter studies whether and how the new instruments 
affected consistency of EU conditionality post-2005, the role of domestic actors as 
well as the implications for the democratic consolidation. Overall, by studying the 
pre and post-2005 period separately, the thesis conducts an analysis of the 
evolution of EU conditionality and compares the role of EU conditionality within 
the two specified periods. 
In order to test the findings of the previous two chapters on the role of 
the EU in shaping minority policies, the seventh chapter presents a micro case 
study of the policy of representation of minorities in the public sector as a 
condition for EU accession in Macedonia and Croatia. This policy was singled out 
in the course of the fieldwork as most prominent element of EU conditionality in 
relation to minority policies in these countries’ accession processes. As a highly 
politically significant policy area, the representation of national minorities is a 
fertile testing ground for the role of the EU conditionality in national minority 
policies, its consistency, the role of domestic actors and its relationship with 
democratic consolidation. Furthermore, this policy was not studied in the 
previous enlargement and as such contributes significantly to the originality of the 
thesis. The chapter complements the discussion of the previous two chapters, by 
providing further depth of the study of minority related conditionality. This 
chapter is therefore a micro-study of EU engagement in minority policies in the 
pre-accession process and addresses all the research questions elaborated above.   
 The last (eighth) chapter of the thesis reflects on the findings of the 
empirical research on the role of the EU in shaping national minority policies in 
the two countries by looking at how EU conditionality was implemented pre and 
post-2005, its consistency as well as its implications for the processes of 
democratic consolidation. The chapter looks back at the rationale, theoretical and 
methodological approach of the thesis and their advantages as well as 
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shortcomings for the study of conditionality in relation to minority policies. 
Summarising how the EU has used the FCNM or national legislation and 
agreements in its conditionality, the chapter illustrates the lack of consistency of 
conditionality and its changes over time. Given the findings for potential of further 
inter-ethnic polarisation through the involvement of the EU in national minority 
policies it questions the positive relationship between Europeanisation by 
conditionality and democratic consolidation and provides recommendations for 
further avenues for research. 
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2. Methodology and methods 
 
This chapter presents the methodology of the study and reflects on the data 
collection process, the method of data analysis, as well as the periodisation and 
limitations of the research. The objective of the chapter is to substantiate the use 
of qualitative methodology and process tracing for the study of minority policies 
in the EU accession process and to explain how these methods are used in the 
dissertation. For this purpose, it first deals with the manner of data collection, i.e. 
the fieldwork process and explains the rationale and the method of interviewing 
employed. In this respect, it presents the various groups of interviewees and the 
rationale behind their selection as well as the form of the interviews used. 
Second, it provides an overview and background on the multitude of official 
documents, examined in this dissertation. Third, it studies the position of a 
researcher as a former insider to the processes under examination and the 
advantages and shortcomings of this role.21 Fourth, it substantiates the method of 
data analysis. Lastly, it recognises the limitations of the adopted approach and 
reflects on the ways in which this thesis has attempted to overcome them 
through its research design. 
 
2.1 Data collection – open ended interviews and document analysis 
2.1.1  Fieldwork and interviews  
This dissertation is based on a combination of desk based research and 
three fieldwork visits to Brussels, Zagreb and Skopje in the period between 
September 2010 and July 2011. Each of the field trips lasted three months and 
they were arranged in accordance with the “timetable” of the EU accession 
process. Hence, I was in Brussels between September and December 2010, when 
the European Commission progress reports on all the candidates and potential 
candidates were issued. Between January and March 2011, I was in Macedonia 
during the preparation of national strategic documents for European accession. 
Lastly, the fieldwork in Croatia took place between April and June 2011 when the 
negotiations on the chapter 23: Judiciary and Fundamental Rights were finalised. 
National minority issues, especially remaining obligations of Croatia such as the 
slow progress in the employment of national minorities were high on the agenda 
in the period of my Zagreb visit. During the course of the fieldwork seventy 
                                            
21 This section is necessary in light of my personal experience as a former 
practitioner in EU accession process. 
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interviews (list is provided in the Annex IV) were conducted with representatives 
of the EU institutions, various departments of the national governments, 
international organisations and civil society organisations (CSOs). The use of open-
ended interviewing in both Brussels and the respective countries under 
examination contributes to the originality of this study. Although this approach 
was used extensively in the previous enlargement, this has not been the case in 
the Western Balkans (On the Eastern enlargement see Hughes et al., 2005, 
Grabbe, 2006, Pridham, 2005).  
The sampling technique was a combination of intentional choice, 
sampling for diversity and snowballing (by recommendation). The intentionally 
chosen interviewees were European Commission employees working on the desks 
for these two countries as well as civil servants of national governments that work 
directly on EU integration issues. Having in mind my personal experience in the 
area under research (see section 2.1.3 Role of the researcher), I already had 
established contacts with some of them or I was referred to a number of the 
intentionally chosen interviewees. These groups were asked to recommend 
individuals which they considered could provide useful information for the study. 
The intentionally identified interviewees were responsible for the minority 
policies portfolio from the aspect of EU accession in all institutions and afterwards 
a snowballing method was applied. In the case of the CSOs the sampling was 
conducted in accordance with fulfilling the criteria needed for the study, i.e. 
dealing with minority rights or monitoring EU accession in relation to the political 
criteria.  
For the purposes of the thesis representatives of three EU institutions 
were interviewed (European Commission, European Parliament and the European 
Council). These include the European Commission desk officers responsible for 
the respective countries in the Directorate General (DG) for Enlargement in 
Brussels as well as the European Commission delegations in Skopje and Zagreb. In 
the EP, the Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) that have acted as 
rapporteurs on both countries were also interviewed. In the Council the officer 
dealing with Macedonia due to its specific on-the-ground circumstances was 
interviewed, as there is no corresponding position for Croatia.  
At the national level, my primary interlocutors were civil servants working 
in the government on EU integration matters. In Macedonia this included the 
central government office – the Secretariat for European Affairs, as well as the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In Croatia, the primary target group was the staff in 
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the working Ministry of Foreign Affairs and European Integration. Civil servants 
working in the Ministries of Interior and also the Ministry of Justice were also 
interviewed since the fulfilment of the specific requirement from the EU on 
minority protection is in their portfolios. The interviewing of the line ministries 
representatives in addition to the central bureaucratic organisations which are in 
contact with the EU was necessary because representatives of ‘sister institutions’ 
with regular contact at the EU level through socialisation develop a common 
understanding of these processes (March and Olsen, 1998). In addition, both 
countries have specific offices which deal with minority issues, including the 
Ombudsmen, which were also visited and interviewed. 
The staff in the two countries’ representative missions to the EU in 
Brussels was also interviewed. The role of these individuals as transmission belts 
between the national capital and the European Commission was at times crucial 
for the understanding of the political conditionality issues. Moreover, the Brussels 
based diplomats commonly establish the closest contacts with the European 
Commission staff, thereby developing their unique perspective on EU 
conditionality. On the other hand, most of these individuals usually have previous 
experience working at the national level, providing them with a distanced, 
arguably more objective insight into the developments at the national level. In 
line with this discussion, empirical studies of Europeanisation of the previous 
enlargement have commonly highlighted the significance of the “national officials 
who operate on both European and national levels acting as change agents 
between the two” (Pomorska, 2007 p.28). 
The focus on the EU staff and the national civil servants is a result of the 
important role these individuals play in both crafting the political conditionality at 
the EU level as well as the national response to EU conditionality. Likewise, 
Grabbe (2001) in her research  argues that “within the executive, officials rather 
than politicians have had the longest and most consistent role in EU preparations, 
not least because of the rapid changes of government and the high turnover of 
political appointments” (p.1017). Thus, although several appointed officials were 
interviewed as well, the focus of this research remained on the more permanent 
staff both at the EU and national level. This approach was due to the specificities 
of the EU accession process and the need for the interviewee’s close familiarity 
with the wide subject matter of this study.  
At the same time, it must be kept in mind that the target groups of this 
study also not monolithic (See Rechel, 2009a). In this sense, differences within the 
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Commission on conditionality have implications over the possibility of stipulating 
clear benchmarks for fulfilment. Academic research has recognized the 
Commission is a fragmented organisation primarily in relation to different DGs 
(Nugent, 1997, Morth, 2000). In this vein, it has been concluded that the “working 
practices and structures of individual DGs suggest that they too may be 
considered as institutions in their own right” (Cini, 1996 p.222). Having in mind 
the lack of standards in the minority policies, the lack of consensus between and 
within various DGs carries importance for the success and study of conditionality. 
These differences between the actors within the Commission on this issue amplify 
the problem of lack of standards and diminish the potential for enforcing 
consistent conditionality. On a similar note, within the CoE there are differences 
between the Parliamentary Assembly and the Advisory Committee for monitoring 
of the implementation of the FCNM (See Letschert, 2005).22 Lastly, as pointed in 
my interviews, discordance has been noted between the views of the OSCE offices 
on the ground in the respective countries and the OSCE HCNM which monitors 
the position of minorities.23 Moreover, the same argument also applies to the 
national level where the implementation of minority conditionality depends on 
the respective government institution. Similarly as the DGs within the Commission 
these organisations do not always have the same understanding of conditionality 
or have the same agendas.  
In addition to the ‘official’ understanding of EU conditionality by European 
Commission and national civil servants, the field visits included interviews with 
representatives of CSOs both at the EU and the national level. Literature has 
underlined the role of non-state actors for understanding the accommodation of 
minority demands (Risse-Kappen, 1999). CSO representatives in many cases 
provide a more nuanced understanding of the EU conditionality than the official 
national or the EU source. Interviews with a wide set of CSO representatives are 
also necessary because “policy-makers tend to exaggerate the extent of EU 
influence for political purposes” (Grabbe, 2003 p.310). The data from the 
interviews with civil society representatives is used as a ‘counterweight’ to the 
official documents and official story of the accession process. In this manner, the 
                                            
22 Author’s interview with official of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Skopje, March 
2011. 
23 Author’s interview with OSCE representative, Skopje, February 2011; Author’s 
interview with official of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Skopje, March 2011. 
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study utilises information from a variety of stakeholders involved in the devising 
and implementation of EU conditionality.  
The need to deal with several interviewee target groups is a result of the 
diversity of actors involved in the national minority policies and the need to 
obtain a diverse set of opinions on the research questions. Since both political 
conditionality and national minority policies in the context of the EU accession 
process are subject to different understandings, the variety of opinions from the 
target groups contributes to the improved understanding of both these issues. In 
this direction, the use of interviews has been advocated in cases when we are not 
sure what rule is guiding the actors and when we do not know their definition of 
situations (Dexter, 2006 p.28). Similarly, Kvale (1996) argues that “the strength of 
the interview conversation is to capture the multitude of subjects’ views of a 
theme and to picture a manifold and controversial human world” (p.7).  
In light of the groups of interviewees, this research is constructed as an 
elite study; as it concentrates on EU and government officials and representatives 
of civil society. The need to focus on these groups is the result of both the nature 
of the transformation in this region as well as the top down nature of the 
accession process. Literature has been largely at agreement that the new 
transitional countries “were born as elite democracies because the construction 
of the new democratic order and its institutions began from above” (Agh, 1996 
p.54). Similarly, it has been commonly argued that conditionality is most likely to 
influence elite behaviour patterns (Pridham, 2005 p.14). While recognizing the 
limitations of elite studies, the study adopts a view of elites as “experts which can 
provide high quality information and guidance” which is of primary concern to this 
research since the policies studied in the thesis depends largely on elites (Moyser 
and Wagstaffe, 1987 p.16-17). 
With the exception of three interviews, all of them were recorded and 
followed a semi-structured questionnaire adapted to the specific target group of 
interviewees. The interviews were conducted in the language the interviewee felt 
most comfortable with (English, Croatian or and Macedonian). I personally 
transcribed and translated all interviews in English, in order to avoid interference 
by an external translator. According to Temple and Young (2004) “the 
researcher/translator role offers the researcher significant opportunities for close 
attention to cross cultural meanings and interpretations and potentially brings the 
researcher up close to the problems of meaning equivalence within the research 
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process” (p.168). Hence, my familiarity with the context eliminates the possibility 
of major misunderstandings of the regional politics and processes.  
The semi-structured interview as a method was considered appropriate 
for tackling the research questions of this study, because it “provides access to 
the context of people’s behaviour and thereby provides a way for researchers to 
understand the meaning of that behaviour” (Seidman, 1991 p.4). Thus, the 
interviews conducted were used in several ways in the dissertation. First, they 
were used for cross-checking and validating data obtained through the document 
analysis (see below). As the thesis analyses the understandings of EU 
conditionality of EU and national elites, the interviews provide information to 
supplement the document analysis. In this direction, “one of the strongest 
advantages of elite interviews is that researchers can interview first-hand 
participants of the processes they are investigating and obtain accounts from 
direct witnesses to the events in question” (Tansey, 2007 p.767). Moreover, it has 
been argued that the qualitative interviewing should be applied in research of 
abstract and complex issues, in cases where the researcher seeks to maximize 
response validity and where interviewees are elites which tend to prefer open-
ended questions (Aberbach and Rockman, 2002 p.674). Lastly, “interviews may 
also help in the process of identifying which documents have been deemed to be 
important, read and acted upon” (Harrison and Deicke, 2001 p.94).  
At the same time, the interview and the sampling method used in this 
study carry their disadvantages foremost in terms of representativeness and 
reliability. In relation to the first, attempts were made to include the main 
stakeholders in the policy area both from the EU, national level and civil society. 
However, the aim of this research was “to draw a sample that includes the most 
important political players who have participated in the political events being 
studied” (Tansey, 2007 p.765). For this purpose, a list was drawn up to ensure the 
inclusion of groups which can be expected to have different views on the 
interview questions. In addition, the representativeness of the sample was 
discussed with the interviewees in order to ensure the inclusion of the main 
stakeholders. In terms of reliability, “while information may be inaccurate for very 
genuine reasons (memory lapse), interviewees may also be unreliable for ulterior 
reasons” (Harrison and Deicke, 2001 p.95). In light of this possibility, the 
researcher in qualitative research needs to detects distortion by comparing data 
with other informants (Dexter, 2006 p.106). For this purpose, the thesis interview 
data was triangulated with the documents such as the EU, national and civil 
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society reports. Lastly, the findings are also compared with primary sources like 
newspaper articles and public statements by EU and national officials and linked 
with the available research on the case studies.  
 
2.1.2 Archival research of EU and national documents  
The fieldwork and the interviews as methods of collecting data were 
accompanied by archival research of both formal and unofficial EU and national 
documents.24 According to May (1997), “documents *...+ can tell us a great deal 
about the way in which events were constructed at the time, the reasons 
employed, as well as providing materials upon which to base further research 
investigations” (p.157). Official EU documents and reports were used as a starting 
point of this research in order to analyse what were the conditions stipulated by 
the EU. Such documents include documents from the institutions of the EU, 
primarily the European Commission and the Council of the EU. From the Council’s 
documents, the study utilises the Decisions on the Accession Partnerships, as the 
only formal documents adopted by the Council of the EU and published in the 
Official Journal of the EU, representing highest form of conditionality imposed by 
the EU upon the candidate countries.  
On the European Commission’s side, the thesis looks extensively into the 
regular Commission Progress Reports as the yearly assessment of a particular 
country. “These documents are the only official and transparent public 
statements of the Commission’s assessments of the progress of the candidate 
countries over time” (Hughes et al., 2005 p.85). The research examines the 
Commission’s understanding and assessment of minority policies under the 
heading of Minority Rights and protection of minorities in the political criteria 
section as well as the chapter 23: Judiciary and Fundamental Rights, after its 
introduction in 2005. The Progress Reports provided in detail monitoring of 
various conditions and “provided the basis for enlargement decisions by other EU 
executive institutions” (Pridham, 2007 p.453). The importance of the Progress 
Reports as an essential reference source of conditionality was confirmed to me 
during my interviews, both at the EU and national level. For Croatia, the study also 
uses the Screening Reports as well as the Reports on the fulfilment of the 
accession negotiations benchmarks prepared in the course of the negotiations. 
Furthermore, the study relies on unofficial documents published for guidance in 
                                            
24 See provided overview of documents below.  
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the accession process, which in many cases are much more detailed than the 
official progress reports. These include the reports published by the experts of 
SIGMA-OECD25 on the accession process, which deal with the preparedness of the 
countries for the accession negotiations (For more information see Hughes et al., 
2005 p.74). Although unofficial, the SIGMA reports represent the basis for the 
preparation of the Progress Reports, especially in the areas covered by this study.  
Since minority rights as a specific policy area are not directly regulated by 
EU law, when relevant, the research utilises the reports and opinions of the 
international organisations such as the CoE, the OSCE and the OSCE HCNM. Most 
of these reports and documents contain an assessment of the minority protection 
situation over a long period and are therefore very useful for setting the context 
and its analysis over time. Among these external documents, the Reports of the 
Advisory Committee on the implementation of the FCNM are of increasing 
importance. This Convention “by virtue of its binding character is considered as a 
breakthrough in minority protection” (Liebich, 2002, 125). Consequently, its 
ratification was extensively used by the EU as a reference point in the previous 
enlargement. Furthermore, both countries are signatories to the Convention and 
prepare regular reports, thereby providing sufficient information for analysis. My 
interlocutors singled out the reporting documents for the FCNM as a reference 
point for the development of minority policies, which were commonly used in the 
EU assessments as well. The objective of the research is not to untangle the 
influence of these different organisations, but rather examine how the EU has 
used the reports of these organisations in its conditionality, with a specific focus 
on the FCNM for the purposes of studying the consistency of conditionality. 
At the national level, the study extensively relies on strategic documents 
for EU integration, such as the National Plans for the implementation of the 
Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA), the Action Plans for the Accession 
Partnerships and the NPAAs. In addition, when available, the research uses the 
national contributions to the Progress Reports, which the countries prepare on a 
yearly basis in advance to the regular Progress Reports prepared by the European 
Commission. These national reports contain formal information on the measures 
implemented in the previous year in all areas related to the accession process, 
including national minority rights. Since the majority of these documents are 
                                            
25 Sigma is a joint initiative of the European Union (EU) and the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), principally financed by the EU. 
www.sigmaweb.org.  
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updated on a yearly basis, they provide a continuous insight into the formal 
response to conditionality and also allow for the possibility to track the 
developments over time. The national documents and information from the 
candidate countries were analysed in their original form and language and 
checked against the English translations cited, contributing to the originality of the 
study and eliminating major misunderstandings. 
Besides government documents, the study also utilises CSOs documents 
prepared in the context of EU accession. In accession countries, CSOs are 
monitoring development of minority policies and the EU accession process and 
prepare reports and briefs on the progress, which are used in the study. Civil 
society documents regularly provide a critical reflection upon the formal 
government response contained in the official documents, thereby creating a 
more nuanced view of the context. Furthermore, most of the CSOs interviewed 
for this thesis were regularly invited by the European Commission to submit 
contributions in the preparations of the Progress Reports and are therefore actors 
both in the devising and monitoring of EU conditionality. In addition, as was 
underlined by my interlocutors, when CSOs in these countries can’t influence the 
national government for certain policies they express their concerns to the 
European Commission, which in many cases takes them on board and sets them 
as conditions in the domestic context.26 Hence, “it is increasingly acknowledged 
that NGOs play an important role in pressing states to act in conformity with 
minority rights provisions” (Letschert, 2005 p.405). Lastly, the CSOs also provide 
shadow reports for the fulfilment of the FCNM, thereby providing information on 
the implementation of specific legislative provisions. 
Even though the study relies on a variety of documents from all the EU 
and national institutions, including international organisations and CSOs, it still 
recognizes the executive bias of the negotiations and accession process in 
general. Research has “highlighted an ‘executive bias’ inherent in the whole 
accession process, because of the structure of negotiations and the fact that EU 
actors mostly saw the process of adopting EU norms as an administrative 
exercise” (Grabbe, 2006 p.207-208). The focus on the executive has further been 
criticised from the perspective that it poses obstacles to the democratic 
consolidation in the conditions of post-communism. In order to partly overcome 
this criticism, the interlocutors for this study have included members of 
                                            
26 Author’s interview with CSO representative, Skopje, 18 January 2011. 
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Parliament (MPs), as well as CSO representatives. Still, the majority of the 
interviewees have either a link with or belong to the executive, because of their 
competence and direct involvement in the EU accession process. 
The problems encountered in the data collection were primarily linked to 
the availability of some of the identified interviewees, which were in most cases 
overcome. When the interviewee was not available most-likely substitutes were 
identified and contacted. In Croatia, the fieldwork took place during the 
negotiations for chapter 23 on judiciary and fundamental rights incorporating 
many of the issues under discussion in this thesis. Hence, some of the 
interviewees were at times wary of discussing some of the issues openly and felt 
“obliged” to portray a positive image of the EU. Lastly, accessing official 
negotiating documents useful for the thesis was at times difficult due to 
sensitivity of these issues in the accession negotiations in Croatia.  These were 
nevertheless made public after the conclusion of the negotiations in June 2011 
and therefore are used in the thesis.  
 
2.1.3 Role of the researcher 
As a former practitioner dealing with the EU integration of the Balkans, I 
hold skills and knowledge which have affected the methodology of this research, 
both through facilitated access, but also through shaping partly my personal role 
as a researcher. This experience was my personal long-term participant 
observation of the formal institutions dealing with EU accession at the national 
level. During this engagement I participated directly in drafting strategic 
documents and in the policy making processes for the fulfilment of the political 
criteria for EU accession. I was also in close contact with the national institutions 
responsible for the fulfilment of the political criteria for accession and the 
European Commission staff as a main interlocutor at the EU level. Kernaghan 
(2009) in this direction points that, “conceptualizing the public servant as a 
theorist involved in research through reflection-on-action highlights the 
importance of the scholarly practitioner as a source of learning” (p.503).  
My familiarity with the context and the formal and informal procedures of 
the EU accession process assisted me in the research in several interconnected 
ways. First, I was able to obtain access to most of the interviewees the study 
targets. Obtaining access to interviewees, especially in studies involving elites is a 
common problem, which was minimised in this research. Having established 
contacts with several main interlocutors in Croatia and Macedonia was helpful 
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both in the early phases of the research, but also in the snowballing process. 
Second, in some of the interviews it was easier to establish rapport and trust with 
the interviewees. Moreover, research has shown interviewers tend to be more 
successful in cases when they possess intimate knowledge about the situation of 
the interviewees (Burnham et al., 2008 p.124). In this direction, authors have 
argued that the use of language and specific terms is important in the creation of 
a ‘sharedness of meanings’ in which both interviewer and the respondent 
understand the contextual nature of specific references (Fontana and Frey, 2003 
p.86). This “sharedness of meanings” is of increasing importance because EU 
officials have been commonly accused of developing their own specific 
terminology, which is not easily understandable by outsiders to the process. Third, 
I was familiar with the main documents in the policy area and was also able to 
obtain a variety of informal documents which assisted in the context setting and 
analysis.  
However, I do not consider this position as fully unproblematic, because 
an insider to the field of study can give or accept certain meanings as a given. 
Studies commonly warn against the risk that the interviewer will think they know 
what the participant means and impose assumptions on the data without 
checking them out with participants (Darlington and Scott, 2002 p.55). I have as 
far as possible attempted to avoid the risks of insider research, when the rapport 
between the researcher and the interview is taken for granted. Having in mind my 
previous personal engagement with the topic under examination, during my 
research I was reflecting on my own role as a researcher. Still, as Darlington and 
Scott (2002) indicate, “the qualitative researcher is inextricably immersed in the 
research; thus qualitative research requires a high level of ‘reflexivity’ or self-
reflection about one’s part in the phenomenon under study” (p.18).  
 
2.2  Data analysis  
For the analysis, this thesis applies a combination of comparative case 
study method and process tracing. This combination of comparative method and 
process tracing was used in the previous work on the Eastern enlargement dealing 
with the study of EU conditionality. The basic approach of this dissertation is 
qualitative because “it seeks to understand the experiences and practices of key 
informants and locate them firmly in context” (Devine, 2002 p.197). In light of the 
research question and the need for in-depth analysis of both cases, this thesis is 
based on case oriented research as it seeks to understand complex units (Della 
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Porta, 2008). The case study method “attempts to locate its findings in particular 
historical and cultural milieu” and “can look directly at the sequence of events 
that produced an outcome, rather than just the outcome” (Peters, 1998 p.141).  
Similarly, the comparative method is adopted for this study due to “its capacity 
*…+ (for) an in-depth understanding of historical processes and individual 
motivations” (Della Porta, 2008 p.202). 
According to Vennesson (2008) “process tracing based on intensive, open-
ended interviewing, participant observation and document analysis helps to 
understand the meaning and role of established regularities, and can help to 
suggest ways to uncover previously unknown relations between factors” (p.234). 
Through this method, the EU and national documents are examined in a 
chronological manner in order to analyse the development of EU conditionality 
and its interactions with domestic policies. Having in mind the sequential 
relationship between the various reports, they’re suitable for process tracing.27 
The data collected through archive and field work are analysed at three levels. 
First, the research examines the devising of the EU priority through the formal 
European Commission documents and interviews with Commission officials in 
Brussels. Second, the study looks at the domestic response of the national 
governments to the EU conditionality through the national strategic documents, 
adoption of legislation and policies and their implementation. Lastly, the interview 
data from the national level provide insight into the local understanding of 
conditionality. The reports on the FCNM and the Opinions from the Advisory 
Committee are analysed in relation to their specific time of publication and their 
relationship with the priorities in the EU documents. Overall, the thesis engages in 
the study of the “document dialogue” between the EU and the national level and 
triangulates these findings with the interview data. The objective of this approach 
was to recreate as closely as possible the intricacies and the flow of information in 
the process of EU accession. 
The interviews conducted for this study provide information which 
assisted me in setting the context, but also for examining the understanding of 
conditionality among these elites. In terms of the latter aspect, the interviewees’ 
understandings of conditionality are an equally important element for analysis 
due to their role in the on-the-ground implementation of conditionality. The 
interviewees for this thesis can largely be attributed to three big groups: EU 
                                            
27 For an overview of all documents, see table below. 
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representatives, national officials and external actors (including CSOs, 
international organisations, think-tanks etc.). The understandings of all these 
three groups are extremely important for the analysis of conditionality because 
they represent different perspectives in the accession process. While the EU 
representatives are the authors of the conditions and their monitors, the national 
officials are responsible for delivering on these conditions. Hence, the shared 
understanding between and within these groups of the conditions is essential for 
the study of the consistency and implementation of conditionality. The last group 
are the external actors that are consulted by the European Commission in the 
preparation of their progress reports and assessments and are therefore are a 
constitutive element of the process of conditionality.  
Adopting this approach, the thesis supports views that a “consensus on 
norms and rules and their transmission” should be at the centre of a meaningful 
definition of conditionality (Sasse, 2005 p.4). Consensus is understood solely as a 
common understanding of the conditions that need to be fulfilled between the 
European Commission and the national level for the purposes of studying the 
consistency of conditionality, as well as the role of FCNM and national legislation 
as structuring elements of the thesis. Hence, the thesis does not deal with 
conceptual issues around building norm consensus and questions of legitimacy 
(See Payne, 2001). At the same time, literature has argued that in the thin areas of 
the acquis the formal conditionality is reduced, which strengthens the informal 
conditionality, providing the Commission with greater scope for ambiguity in its 
policy recommendations (Hughes et al., 2004 p.527). In such circumstances the 
ambiguity in the recommendations increases the potential for disagreements 
between the stakeholders and weak consistency of conditionality.  
The interview data is also used to assess the role of conditionality and not 
to ‘overemphasize’ its role at the national level, which has been a common 
weakness of studies of EU conditionality and Europeanisation. According to 
Grabbe (2006), “it is easy to over-stress the role of the EU when we are looking 
for it as a specific variable” (p.48). Policy research has argued that “whether an 
issue would be brought onto, or dropped from, a government’s agenda largely 
depends on its assessment in the EU Report” (Bokulid and Kostadinova, 2008 
p.31). This research questions these assessments and attempts to study whether 
the Progress Reports “in this region write history”, as has been argued by some of 
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my interlocutors.28 Recognising the formal importance of these documents, the 
objective of the presented analysis is to examine whether we can trace policy 
change and link it to the EU conditions.  
 
2.3  Periodisation of research  
Case-oriented studies which are largely context-bound give importance to 
the use of time in the analysis. Periodisation of the research is from this 
perspective of increasing importance. The analysis in this thesis considers 2005 as 
a breaking point and therefore is divided in the period 1997-2005 and post-2005 
period. The 1997 Regional Approach laid the foundations of the relationship 
between the EU and the region as the beginning of the conditionality towards 
these countries as a group. In 2001, this instrument was upgraded through the 
SAP, which legally still represents the basis of the formal contractual relations 
between the region and the EU. In this period, Macedonia and Croatia prepared 
their action plans for accession and also adopted most of the relevant legislation 
for setting the frameworks for minority policy. In 2005 the European Commission 
for the first time started preparing the Progress Reports on all the countries in the 
Western Balkans. Similarly in 2004/2005 extensive Opinions on the applications of 
membership of both countries were prepared by the European Commission, 
whereas in the post-2005 period the primary mode of monitoring was through the 
Progress Reports. The last reports analysed in the thesis were issued in 2012, 
although the thesis also reflects on some recent major developments of 2013 as 
well.   
Overall, the analysis is divided chronologically in two chapters dealing 
separately with the period between 1997 and 2005, as well as the post-2005 
developments, in line with the temporal dividing logic of George and Bennett 
(2005). 2004, as the year of the Eastern enlargement has been identified in the 
literature as a breaking point in which conditionality changed began changing its 
shape in a way that “one cannot speak of a simple evolution” (Pridham, 2007 
p.454). Koinova has studied Macedonia and EU conditionality with a before and 
after approach in relation to 2001, as the year of the OFA (Koinova, 2011). As this 
research is shaped in accordance with the EU’s approach to enlargement and the 
applications for membership and the formal status of a candidate, 2005 is the 
breaking point between the two empirical chapters. Besides the two chapters 
                                            
28 The role of the Progress Reports as writing history was commonly highlighted 
during the interviews.  
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dealing with minority policies overall, to illustrate in detail the functioning of 
conditionality, the last empirical chapter deals in detail with a novel minority 
policy, employment of minorities in the administration in both cases.  With this 
structure, the thesis both engages with the macro and micro (policy) dimension of 
the conditionality mechanism. Below is an overview of the documents studied and 
their timeline: 
Overview and timing of formal document exchange between the EU and 
national authorities in the accession process:29 
 Month Document  Issuing 
organisation 
Frequency 
1
9
9
7
-2
0
0
0
 
October  Commission Services 
Report on the 
Regional Approach 
European 
Commission 
Annually, except in 
1998 (two reports 
were published in 
May and October.  
September 
1999 
First Croatian Action 
Plan for EU 
integration  
Government 
of the 
Republic of 
Croatia 
Once 
2
00
1
-2
00
5
 
April  Stabilisation and 
Association Report 
European 
Commission 
Annually 
Usually in 
June 
Action Plan on the 
SAA report 
National 
government 
Annually  
Usually in 
January 
Report on fulfilment 
of the Action Plan 
National 
government  
Annually (although 
not prepared every 
year) 
 Depends 
on 
application 
Opinion on the 
application for 
membership and 
analytical report 
European 
Commission 
Once 
In this period the first Report and Opinion on the implementation of the 
CoE FCNM on Croatia were issued in March/April 2001 
 The first Report and Opinion on the implementation of CoE FCNM on 
Macedonia were issued 2003 and 2004. 
                                            
29 A detailed chronology of the accession process of both Croatia and Macedonia 
is provided in the Appendix.  
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P
o
st
- 
2
0
0
5
 (
ge
n
er
al
 t
im
e
ta
b
le
) 
October/N
ovember 
Progress Report  European 
Commission 
Annually since 2005 
October/N
ovember 
Draft Accession 
Partnership 
European 
Council 
2-3 years 
January – 
March 
National Plan for the 
adoption of the acquis  
National 
Government 
Annually since 2005  
March – 
May  
Peer Mission for 
justice, freedom and 
security 
European 
Commission 
Every two-three 
years 
May  SIGMA mission  Experts from 
the EU 
Every year since 
2006 
June EP Progress Report European 
Parliament 
rapporteurs 
Annually  
June Progress Report on 
realised activities 
National 
Government 
Annually  
September  Addendum to the 
Progress Report on 
realised activities  
National 
Government 
Annually 
October/ 
November  
Progress Report  European 
Commission 
Annually 
In this period two Reports and Opinions of the Advisory Committee on the 
implementation of the CoE FCNM and Macedonia were published in 2006 
and in 2010.  
     
P
o
st
- 
20
05
 (
C
ro
at
ia
n
 a
cc
es
si
o
n
 
n
eg
o
ti
at
io
n
s 
o
n
 c
h
ap
te
r 
23
) 
June 2007 Screening report 
chapter 23 
European 
Commission 
Once 
February 
2010 
Negotiating position Government 
of the 
Republic of 
Croatia 
Once 
March 
2011 
Interim Report  on 
chapter 23  
European 
Commission 
Once 
April 2011 First Report meeting 
the closing 
Government 
of the 
Once 
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benchmarks in 
chapter 23  
Republic of 
Croatia  
May 2011 Report on meeting 
the benchmarks in 
chapter 23 
Government 
of the 
Republic of 
Croatia  
Once 
June 2011 EU Common position 
on chapter 23 (closing 
of negotiations) 
Intergovern
mental 
conference 
Once 
  
2.4  Methodological limitations and conclusions  
By adopting the specific methodological approach elaborated above, this 
thesis carries the common weaknesses of qualitative case study comparisons and 
process tracing research. Primarily, by comparing similar systems this research 
“cannot go beyond so-called middle range theories that apply only in a restricted 
area” (Della Porta, 2008, 214). Furthermore, by choosing cases that share the 
same historical background and are subject to a specific regional process – EU 
accession, the thesis limits its findings to multi-ethnic countries with an EU 
membership perspective. On the other hand, Landman (2003) argues that 
“researchers working in area studies are essentially employing most similar 
systems design, and the focus on countries from these regions effectively controls 
for those features that are common to them while looking for those features that 
are not” (p.29). The findings of the research are nevertheless relevant for the rest 
of the countries in the Western Balkans which are in the accession pipeline, i.e. 
countries holding a membership perspective.  In addition, as will be shown in the 
empirical analysis and conclusions, the thesis’ findings carry theoretical 
significance for the study of EU conditionality and its relationship with democratic 
consolidation.  
Any study of conditionality in the context of EU accession, carries the risk 
of overstating the role of the EU. This study makes an attempt to overcome this 
risk by extensively using national stakeholders’ views and addressing specifically 
the role of domestic actors. Reliance on primary information from all the 
stakeholders also assists in the distinguishing between the roles of different 
actors, as one of the common critiques of process tracing. Similarly, it has been 
argued that “process tracing can only work if a sufficiently high level of accuracy, 
and reliability, can be reached on specific processes and events” (Vennesson, 
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2008 p.237, see also Collier, 2011). For this purpose in the analysis, the data is 
triangulated between the document analysis, the interviews and where possible 
secondary research. Even in this case, the possibility remains that “negative 
evidence might be ignored” and the researcher overlooks contradictory data 
(Vennesson, 2008 p.238). In an attempt to overcome this criticism, this thesis 
conducts in-depth analysis and understands conditionality only as one of the 
potential explanations and factors in the processes studied. By analysing the 
operation of conditionality over a longer period of time, it also aims to uncover 
other explanations which might have fed into the policy processes.  
An additional line of thought of academic literature argues for the 
incompatibility between case studies, process-tracing and interpretative 
approaches. George and Bennett (2005) in their seminal work on case studies 
argue that “the strongest means of drawing inferences from case studies is the 
use of a combination of within-case analysis and cross-case comparisons within a 
single study”, but limit the use of the term “case study” to a positivist context 
(p.18). Checkel similarly highlights that the process tracing method is 
“fundamentally at odds with more interpretative epistemologies” (Checkel, 2005). 
On the other hand, more recent methodological studies using examples from 
trends in current research have supported the use of process tracing in 
interpretative research. Vennesson (2008) in this direction highlights that 
“process tracing can be used to assess the relative impact of certain variables, but 
also to get a better sense of the actors’ perceptions” (p.235). Having in mind this 
is a case-oriented, rather than variable oriented research, this observation is of 
increasing importance, because process tracing has enabled me as a researcher to 
grasp the evolution of conditionality and its understanding at the EU and national 
level. Hence, as this has been a widely used method in latest research and also 
due to the suitability of the processes under examination for a chronological 
analysis (illustrated in the tables above) this research has opted out for the use of 
case-study approach and process tracing method.  
 On a more general level, the use of identity as a basis of categorisation of 
analysis has been criticized as a potential way of reification of these concepts 
(Brubaker and Cooper, 2000, 5). Identity for the purposes of this study is 
understood in line with Tilly’s (2003) definition of “a potent set of social 
arrangements in which people construct shared stories about who they are, how 
they are connected, and what has happened to them” (p.608). Brubaker and 
Cooper (2000) argue that “researchers should avoid unintentionally reproducing 
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or reinforcing such reification by uncritically adopting categories of practice as 
categories of action” (p.5).  Approaching the practicalities of minority policies in 
light of the EU accession, this research cannot avoid the use of this terminology. In 
fact,  the discourse in the EU accession process on minority rights has largely been 
framed in group identification (Hughes and Sasse, 2003 p.8). By doing so, 
however, it does not imply that there are no intra-group differences within the 
analysed cases. At the same time it recognizes that “ethnic groups should not be 
understood as natural units that have always been there [...] since, conceptually 
and empirically, it makes more sense to understand them as the result of social 
and political processes of categorization” (Vermeersch, 2006 p.3-4) . 
The use of document analysis and elite interviews as methods raise 
several concerns in relation to the data that were obtained for the purposes of 
this study. Reliance on official documents in many cases can provide a general 
idea of the policy direction, but only in its formal aspect. The documents for this 
purpose will be treated in relation to the political context in which they were 
developed, rather than as direct indicators of policy directions. The documents 
were assessed according to the criteria of authenticity, credibility, 
representativeness and meaning (Harrison, 2001).  
The semi-structured interview as a method also raises several important 
concerns in terms of the data they provide and their subsequent analysis. First, 
conducting interviews is costly both in terms of financial resources and time. 
Nevertheless, as I was spending part of my research period in my home country 
and have obtained the minimal resources for conducting them, I was able to 
overcome these difficulties. In terms of time, as I had initial contacts with the 
interviewees, I was able to arrange and conduct the interviews fairly quickly. 
Similarly, access to the interviewees is always a major concern in research 
involving elites (See Dexter, 2006). Having already established contacts with parts 
of my target groups, including the civil servants and the CSO representatives I was 
able to partly overcome this problem. As my research focuses on the European 
Commission staff and civil servants, they are a group that is usually more willing to 
devote time to researchers than politicians and appointed officials.  
As this thesis examines a period which includes events over almost 15 
years, when using interview data, some of the chapters (especially the chapter on 
the period between 1997 and 2005) run the risk of reliability of oral history. Thus, 
it acknowledges that the possibility remains “the interviewer to invent a narrative 
out of his own interest; or the interviewee may wish to please the interviewer 
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knowing how to frame answers in his language and discourse” (Boobbyer, 2000 
p.557). In the interviewing context, the interviewee may select and organize 
certain incidents and communicate them in a particular way. However, even false 
information can be useful in relation to how a person chooses to explain an event 
(Boobbyer, 2000 p.557). Attempts to overcome these problems were made by 
interviewing a large sample of stakeholders relevant for the study and by 
triangulating of data from interviews with several target groups and extensive 
secondary literature and official documents.  
Lastly, qualitative studies relying on open-ended interviews carry specific 
ethical concerns which were taken into consideration when creating and 
conducting this research. When contacted for the purposes of the interview, 
potential interlocutors were provided with an information sheet with basic info on 
the proposed research project and its funding. Informed consent was obtained 
from all the interviewees in accordance with the University’s rules and regulations 
and was securely stored.30 Confidentiality of the interviewees was ensured 
primarily due to their public position. Literature highlights that it is the 
researcher’s responsibility to reflect on the possible consequences not only for 
the persons taking part in the study, but for the larger group they represent as 
well (Kvale, 1996 p.116). Hence, the interviewees that took part in the study in the 
thesis are identified according to their position and or institution/organisation 
since these factors are of relevance for this study. In the Annex IV of the thesis the 
interviewees are provided with their names and positions, however for the text of 
the thesis I consider their positions to be of primary relevance.  Moreover, in 
order to ensure confidentiality, the data is presented in a disaggregated way, i.e. 
in relation to the themes in order to reduce the possibility of recognition of the 
interviewees (see Darlington and Scott, 2002). 
This chapter has presented the methodological approach of this study. It 
has reflected on the process of data collection and data analysis for this thesis 
which aims to examine the application of EU conditionality in relation to minority 
policies in Croatia and Macedonia between 1997 and 2012. The next chapter 
examines how the research fits in theoretical debates on Europeanisation by 
conditionality and democratic consolidation in order to substantiate the focus of 
this thesis on the role of the EU in shaping national minority policies.   
                                            
30 This research project was approved by the University of Leeds Faculty Research 
Ethics Committee on 25th June 2010.  
 
55 
 
3. Europeanisation by conditionality in national minority policies –
framework for analysis 
3.1  Introduction 
As a study of the role of the EU in shaping national minority policies, this 
dissertation draws on theoretical and empirical findings of literature on how the 
EU influences domestic political developments. Due to the countries it studies, it 
relies on insight of the literature on the shaping of national minorities through the 
processes of Europeanisation by conditionality and post-communist 
democratisation. In academic (and policy) research all of these conceptual 
frameworks are subject to extensive contestations and debates. This chapter 
therefore aims to clarify conceptually how these terms and frameworks are used 
and applied in this dissertation. For this purpose, it first examines Europeanisation 
as the most common framework for studying the impact of the EU on member 
states and candidate countries. Looking into the variety of theoretical 
understandings of this phenomenon, the chapter singles out the instrument of 
conditionality as a defining feature of the Europeanisation of candidate countries. 
The second section of the chapter examines two approaches for the study of 
conditionality, through rational institutionalism and by studying conditionality as a 
process over time. It focuses on the understanding of political conditionality, 
specifically in relation to national minority policies. In light of the research 
questions posed in the introduction it adopts a process-based understanding of 
conditionality and justifies its use in the thesis. The following two sections 
examine the relationship between Europeanisation by conditionality and the 
processes of democratic consolidation. Section three examines the processes of 
democratisation and democratic consolidation and the role of national minorities 
in them. On the basis of the presented understandings of Europeanisation by 
conditionality and democratic consolidation, the fourth section reflects on the 
dynamic nature between these processes. Lastly, the chapter reflects shortly on 
the limitations of the study and presents its conclusions as a basis for the 
empirical chapters that follow.  
 
3.2  Europeanisation of member and candidate countries 
The role of the EU in shaping national policies has been studied commonly 
within the framework of Europeanisation. Although a common concept in the 
studies of the EU, Europeanisation has been subject to numerous redefinitions 
and debates. Its origins are linked to the domestic adaptations brought about by 
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EU membership in the EU member states. One of the earliest definitions of 
Europeanisation grasps it as a process in which the “EC [European Community] 
political and economic dynamics become part of the organisational logic of 
national politics and policy making” (Ladrech, 1994 p.69). Whereas originally 
studies of Europeanisation focused on the top-down pressures from the EU, 
subsequent research has incorporated its bottom-up approach through the focus 
on the member states’ influence on the policy making process in Brussels. Börzel 
(2002) in a study of environmental policy developed the bottom-up and top-down 
dimension of Europeanisation “by focusing on the ways in which Member State 
governments both shape European policy outcomes and adapt to them” (p.193). 
As a result of this extension towards encompassing both top-down and bottom up 
effects, a shift towards broader definitions can be noted. In this vein, Radaelli 
(2004), understands Europeanisation as  
the processes of construction, diffusion, institutionalisation of formal and 
informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, ‘ways of doing things’ 
and shared beliefs and norms which are first defined and consolidated in 
the making of EU decisions and then incorporated in the logic of domestic 
discourse, identities, political structures and public policies (p.3).   
The extension of Europeanisation to various structures and policies, has 
led to criticisms of over-stretching. In response, literature has attempted to 
delineate the boundaries of Europeanisation. Radaelli (2000) has argued that the 
concept is not precise enough, as it is inclusive of EU policy, politics, and their 
repercussions on national systems. He also underlines that Europeanisation 
should not be mistaken for its outcomes such as convergence and divergence, or 
with the process of European integration (Radaelli, 2000). In contrast, for Olsen 
(2002) the different conceptions of Europeanisation complement, rather than 
exclude each other. As a result of these debates, research has largely come to an 
agreement that “Europeanisation in itself is not a theory, but a phenomenon 
which a wide range of theoretical approaches have sought to explain” (Bulmer, 
2007 p.47).  
Authors have commonly used a range of theoretical approaches to 
supplement the Europeanisation concept, most prominently through the variants 
of new institutionalism, ranging from rational choice institutionalism, historical 
and lastly, sociological institutionalism. These approaches, which commonly 
compete for the understanding of EU impact on both member and non-member 
states make new institutionalism indispensable for understanding the theorisation 
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of Europeanisation (Bulmer, 2007 p.51). Rational choice institutionalism has been 
mostly used for the analysis of both rule adoption and rule implementation. The 
internalisation of EU norms has been analysed through the constructivist 
approach of socialisation and social learning advocated by authors like Checkel 
(1999). Both approaches respectively use the logic of consequences and 
appropriateness originating in the work of March and Olsen (1998). The 
“consequential frame sees political order as arising from negotiation among 
rational actors pursuing personal preferences or interests in circumstances in 
which there may be gains to coordinated action” (March and Olsen, 1998 p.949).  
Through the logic of appropriateness, “actions are seen as rule-based [and] 
human actors are imagined to follow rules that associate particular identities to 
particular situations” (March and Olsen, 1998 p.951). Börzel and Risse (2000) have 
argued that the two logics, despite their analytical differences can operate at the 
same time, which is a position also adopted in this thesis. Similarly, Olsen (2002 ) 
has proposed that “the way ahead lies in integrating perspectives on institutional 
dynamics, rather than choosing among them” (p.944). 
While originally developed in relation to EU member states, post-2000 the 
concept of Europeanisation has been extended to the analysis of the impact of 
the EU on the candidate countries (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2005b, 
Grabbe, 2006). Sedelmeier (2006) in his overview of the Europeanisation 
literature in new member and candidate states argues that the Europeanisation of 
applicant states has been slowly established as a separate sub-field of this 
broader research agenda. Similarly, Grabbe (2006) underscores the need for an 
“analytical framework similar to that used to analyse the EU, but one that takes 
into account the particular characteristics that were critically different for CEE” 
(p.45). Héritier (2005) describes these differences in terms of their inclusion of top 
– down and bottom-up processes. Hence, she argues that while Europeanisation 
of member countries is concerned both with the top-down and bottom-up 
processes, the focus of the analysis in the case of candidate countries is on the 
former (p.207). Moreover, literature is largely in agreement on the specific 
conditions that have affected the specific form of Europeanisation in the 
candidate countries, such as the transition and democratic consolidation of these 
countries and the link of Europeanisation with accession negotiations (Héritier, 
2005 p.203).  
 Morlino has ruled out Europeanisation of non-member states of the 
Union, though this position has not been supported by majority of literature 
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(Morlino quoted in Radaelli, 2000). Specifically in this context, Papadimitriou and 
Phinnemore (2003) have argued that the study of ”the Europeanisation thesis 
beyond existing members can not only help us understand better the process of 
transformation in Eastern Europe and the ongoing accession negotiations, but can 
also contribute towards the refinement of the term's rather blurred conceptual 
content” (p.1). Having in mind the different conditions under which 
Europeanisation of candidate countries takes place and the dominant top-down 
dimension of this phenomenon in the region studied, this study understands 
Europeanisation as “domestic adaptation to European regional integration” (Vink 
and Graziano, 2007 p.7). In this way, the research supports both the potential for 
Europeanisation of candidate countries, underscoring the need for analysing this 
phenomenon hand in hand with the domestic political processes. This definition 
encompasses both the top-down and bottom-up Europeanising processes, which 
are of significance and used in the study as will be shown later in this chapter and 
in the empirical analysis. Lastly, this approach recognizes that Europeanisation is 
not limited to the EU itself (as entitled EU-isation), but also to other forms of 
regional integration, in this case the CoE and the OSCE as well.31 The focus of this 
thesis is nevertheless on the role of the EU because, in the case of the candidate 
countries, the EU has streamlined the requirements from the other international 
organisations in its requirements for membership. Most prominently, it has used 
the CoE FCNM, as the only international binding document in relation to national 
minorities. Thus, its use as part of EU conditionality for accession is specifically 
examined in this thesis.  
 
3.3  Conditionality – a defining feature of the Europeanisation of the 
candidate countries 
3.3.1 Political conditionality  
The Europeanisation of the candidate states for EU accession has been 
managed primarily through the instrument of conditionality defined as  “the use 
of positive incentives (ultimately EU membership) as rewards for states that the 
EU specifies” (Sedelmeier, 2006 p.9). The mechanism of conditionality was most 
extensively developed in the study of the Eastern enlargement of the EU, since 
                                            
31 This has been a widely accepted approach especially in studies of accession as 
well as research specifically dealing with the post-Yugoslav space. See for 
example: SHAW, J. & ŠTIKS, I. 2010. The Europeanisation of Citizenship in Former 
Yugoslavia: An Introduction. CITSEE Working Paper, 2010/01, School of Law, 
University of Edinburgh. 
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prior to the 1990s there was no proper monitoring of conditions for accession to 
the EU, especially in relation to the political criteria (Pridham, 2007). Similarly, 
“conditional accession following the fulfilment of the Copenhagen criteria” has 
been the “main thrust of EU policy in the *Balkans+ region” (Elbasani, 2009 p.5). 
Minority policies specifically as the policy area of interest to this study are an 
element of EU political conditionality, which emphasizes “respect for and the 
furtherance of democratic rules, procedures and values” (Pridham, 2002a p.956). 
Political conditionality in its widest terms is a policy instrument which 
involves “the linking of development aid to demands concerning human rights and 
(liberal) democracy in recipient countries” (Sørensen, 1993 p.2). This wide notion 
of political conditionality is most commonly used in relation to development 
studies and although it shares some similarities with EU political conditionality, 
there is a substantial difference between these two instruments. The former is 
founded on the “threat of the reduction or ending of development assistance 
funds” (Uvin, 1993 p.67-68). In turn, EU political conditionality uses the carrot of 
membership in the Union, while the main threat is exclusion. In light of this 
difference, political conditionality has also been defined as a mechanism that  
entails the linking, by a state or international organisation, of perceived 
benefits to another state (such as aid, trade concessions, cooperation 
agreements, or international organisation membership) to the fulfilment 
of conditions relating to the protection of human rights and the 
advancement of democratic principles (Smith, 2001 p.37). 
This distinction is necessary since inferences from economic conditionality (IMF 
and the World Bank) to political conditionality are questionable due to the 
different nature of the problems they address (For a discussion see Kelley, 2004b 
p.430). For example, Grabbe (2006) argues that whereas in the IMF and World 
Bank conditionality the perceived benefits are clearly linked to the fulfilment of 
certain conditions, in the case of EU political conditionality “the tasks were 
complex and many of them were not amenable to quantitative targets that 
showed explicitly when they had been fulfilled” (p.32). When referring to EU 
conditionality, this study will use the latter definition and focus on the literature 
linked with the EU accession process, rather than general conditionality literature. 
Whereas literature commonly uses both terms democratic and political 
conditionality, Anastasakis (2008) in his work on the Western Balkans supports 
the use of the term political conditionality instead of democratic conditionality. 
The objective of the use of this specific terminology is to underline the importance 
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of the political transformation without the unquestionable inclusion of the 
democratisation aspect. Anastasakis (2008) also highlights that “EU political 
conditionality can run counter to democratisation, at least in the short term when 
some of the prescriptions prioritize law and order instead of elections and/or civil 
society development” (p.366). Taking into account these debates and the official 
terminology adopted by the EU, this dissertation for the purpose of consistency 
accepts the term political conditionality. This term is suitable since the analysis 
will deal with the political criteria for EU accession and will also reflect on the 
impact of the political criteria on the democratic consolidation of the countries 
under examination.  
 
3.3.2 Studying conditionality – the external incentives model  
Despite its widespread use in literature, a consensual understanding of EU 
conditionality is missing in academic debates. Similarly as Europeanisation, 
conditionality is commonly studied with the use of rational choice institutionalism 
and sociological institutionalism, linked respectively with the logic of 
consequences and appropriateness originating in the work of March and Olsen 
(1998) discussed in the previous section. Rational choice studies commonly follow 
the logic of consequences, linked to the perceived benefits of conditionality. On 
the other hand, authors like O’Brennan (2006) have recognised the importance of 
the logic of appropriateness, stressing that “normative explanations of the 
enlargement prove much more compelling than either geopolitical or economic-
centred arguments” (p.177). In an analysis of the relative impact of membership 
conditionality incentives and socialisation, Kelley (2004b) concludes that 
“combining both socialisation-based efforts and conditionality appears not only 
effective, but also wise” (p.453). This research recognizes the importance of both 
logics and thereby emphasizes the need for simultaneous examination of 
literature from both strands for the study of this mechanism and its impact.  
The most common analytical tools for the examination of political 
conditionality have revolved around the previously examined logics of 
consequences and appropriateness. In line with this division, Schimmelfennig and 
Sedelmeier (2005b) have developed three models for the examination of the 
effectiveness of conditionality – the external incentives model, the social learning 
model and the lesson drawing model. These models were applied in two 
alternative contexts: democratic (political as used in this thesis) and acquis 
conditionality. For these authors, conditionality is “a bargaining strategy of 
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reinforcement by reward, under which the EU provides external incentives for a 
target government to comply with its conditions” (Schimmelfennig and 
Sedelmeier, 2004 p.662). The conclusions of their research indicate that rule 
transfer from the EU to the CEECs and the variation in its effectiveness are best 
explained according to the external incentives model and are linked to the high 
credibility of EU conditionality and the low domestic costs of rule adoption 
(Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2005b). Having in mind that the credibility of 
conditionality in the area of minority protection is low, because of the contested 
nature of minority protection norms and the domestic costs are usually high, the 
chances for success of the external incentives are low. According to this model, 
the minority condition should not be effective, even though in cases like Latvia 
and Estonia conditionality has been praised for its success in relation to the 
protection of minorities, going directly against the logic of the external incentives 
model. In light of these bleak predictions for success, Sasse  (2009) has argued 
that the link between low domestic adoption costs and effective conditionality 
undermines the very notion of conditionality (p.18).  
The external incentives model has been the main explanatory tool for the 
study of rule adoption by the candidate countries in both the eastern 
enlargement of the EU as well as in the seldom studies of the Western Balkans 
accession (Grabbe, 2005, Trauner, 2011). At the same time, its application in non-
acquis policy areas and political conditionality especially has been subject to 
criticisms due to its focus on the outcome, presupposed determinacy of EU rules, 
focus on power politics and overestimating the role of EU conditionality (See 
Hughes et al., 2005, Brusis, 2005b, Grabbe, 2006). First, by focusing on rule 
adoption as the outcome of conditionality, the external incentives model does not 
provide sufficient tools to examine the process of application of conditionality 
which is of interest to this research. As a result, the approach does not account for 
the changes of conditionality over time, which are of significance for the before 
and after approach adopted for this thesis.  
Second, in the specific policy area of interest to this research, the external 
incentives model is not adequate due to the presumed determinacy of the EU 
rules. Rational institutionalist explanations of conditionality assume an existing 
consensus between both sides on the content of EU rules and the benchmarks for 
their fulfilment. On the other hand, as already explained, conditionality in relation 
to minority policies conditionality is highly flexible. Grabbe (2006) points to the 
analytical difficulties of grasping conditionality since it has become a moving 
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target. This has been the case foremost in the political criteria as the EU has 
moved down the path of using conditionality on issues of domestic politics 
(Pridham, 2002b). Moreover, “the EU puts different emphasis on the way it 
justifies its policy of conditionality to domestic actors in the various Western 
Balkan countries – a differentiation closely linked to the specificity of each case” 
(Noutcheva, 2007). As a result, the premise of the existence of a consensual 
understanding on the side of both the candidate country and the EU is strongly 
contested in academic literature, especially in relation to political conditionality. 
In response, Hughes and Sasse (2003) argue that “the standard measure of 
compliance employed in studies of EU enlargement, the degree and pace of 
transposition of the acquis de l’union, is not useful since EU law is virtually 
nonexistent, in the policy area of minority protection” (p.2). 
It is nevertheless necessary to qualify that the setting of criteria in the 
minority area is difficult primarily due to the complex nature of these policies. 
Pravda (2001) explains this practical problem in setting democratisation criteria 
and evaluating political performance, because “political targets are typically 
qualitative and hard to define as precisely as economic goals” (p.13). Brusis 
(2005b) also concludes that the conditions “are likely to have a more tangible 
direct impact in issue areas where the EU has a more prescriptive acquis” (p.316). 
In light of these assessments, Magen and Morlino (2009) criticize the tendency of 
literature towards the homogenisation of external influence on domestic reform 
processes (p.12).  Hughes et al  (2005) consider that a “fundamental problem for 
the concept is that macro-level and policy-level studies are inconclusive about the 
causal effects of ‘Europeanisation’ and demonstrate the persistence of deep 
structural divergences across national and policy contexts” (p.28). Magen and 
Morlino (2009) also underline that in reality, the same factors have a varying 
effect on democratisation outcomes, in light of the specific outcome studied.  
Moreover, it has been further argued that “if the conditionality criteria 
pertain to an issue area perceived as problematic for national identity, a different 
line of reasoning will be triggered than in cases where the criteria are considered 
unproblematic” (Freyburg and Richter, 2010 p.266). National minority issues are 
from this perspective of highest salience for the national identity. For Freyburg 
and Richter (2010) national identity determines the logic of social action that 
governments will follow when responding to the Union’s conditionality criteria 
(p.266). Thus, in these policy areas, the findings on the effectiveness on the 
external incentives model are qualified by emphasizing the context-dependent 
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influence of the EU as an actor (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2005a p.223). 
Overall, as a result of these difficulties in framing the EU’s impact in relation to 
minority protection in an external incentives model, research has recommended 
its use predominantly in relation to prescriptive acquis policies. 
Rationalist explanations of conditionality have also been under criticism 
due to their focus on power politics, which is not always adequate for grasping 
the nature of conditionality. To illustrate this point, Grabbe (2006) examines the 
restrictions of the free movement of people in the 2004 and 2007 accession, 
concluding  that “the candidates did not just respond to the material incentives 
provided by the EU’s exercise of power” (p.202). Hence, if rational choice explains 
the nature and behaviour of national governments, governments in many cases 
do not respond to EU conditionality in terms of their most favourable choices. 
Grabbe (2006) goes on to argue that “for the CEE candidates, the puzzle lies in 
their continued implementation of EU policies despite the imposition of a 
transition period and despite high levels of uncertainty” (p.3). She explains this 
phenomenon through the locking in the process of “Europeanisation which had a 
momentum and logic independently of the negotiations” (Grabbe, 2006 p.3).  
Lastly, the external incentives model has been under criticism because of 
the risk of overestimating the effects of the EU conditionality. As explained in the 
introduction, the simultaneity of the processes of Europeanisation and 
democratisation makes it increasingly difficult to account for the developments 
linked to each of them separately. Moreover, as the EU appeared as an actor in 
the CEE countries at a point when early transition choices had already been made, 
there is no possibility to study the effectiveness in absence of alternative setting 
without the EU as an actor. As a result, demonstrating causal links between the 
externally induced conditions and the domestic policy choice has been 
increasingly difficult. The external incentives model, according to Brusis (2005b) 
“does not allow the interference that the domestic change is driven by EU 
incentives because the Union applies conditionality or because domestic actors 
justify their decision as driven by EU conditionality” (p.297).32 As a result of these 
assessments, the external incentive model, although used for the study of acquis 
conditionality is not considered as an appropriate framework for this study, which 
is interested in the role of EU in shaping minority policies between 1997 and 2012. 
For this purpose, the next section, examines the alternative approach for the 
                                            
32 In light of these criticisms, this dissertation tackles specifically the role of 
domestic actors in the operation of conditionality.  
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study of EU conditionality by focusing on the process of its application and 
evolution over time, which is used in this thesis.   
 
3.3.3 Studying conditionality as a process  
Due to the challenges in framing the analysis of national minority policies 
in the external incentives model, empirical studies have attempted to incorporate 
its flexible nature and developments over time. As mentioned in the introduction,  
Hughes, Sasse and Gordon (2005), have argued that EU conditionality “includes 
not only the formal technical requirements on candidates but also the informal 
pressures arising from the behaviour and perceptions of actors engaged in the 
political process” (p.2). Whereas the former “embodies the publicly stated 
preconditions *...+ of the ‘Copenhagen criteria’ and the *...+ acquis”, the latter 
“includes the operational pressures and recommendations applied by actors 
within the Commission *...+ during their interactions with their CEEC counterparts” 
(p.26). This approach defines conditionality by the process of its application, 
which is essential for this thesis, as it allows for the research to study the 
consistency and shifts in the criteria within the specified time frame, i.e. between 
1997 and 2012. The period under study in this research extends over fifteen years, 
since the first launching of specific forms of conditionality to the Western Balkans. 
Thus, it provides an analysis of the developments of conditionality in relation to 
the Western Balkans, but also insight into the changes from the use of this 
instrument in relation to Eastern enlargement. 
Initially, the process based approach to conditionality was developed 
through the example of regional policy as a non-acquis policy area in the cases of 
the new member states prior to their accession through the work of Hughes et al. 
The findings from this policy area were subsequently applied to the case of the 
minority policies, foremost by the work of Gwendolyn Sasse on the eastern 
enlargement (Sasse, 2005, 2006, 2009). From this perspective, conditionality in 
relation to minority policies is first examined through the processes of its 
construction at the EU level both in the EU documents and through the 
stakeholders’ understandings. The second step is an analysis of its interactions in 
the domestic political context for the purposes of accounting for domestic actors’ 
interference in the application of conditionality (Sasse, 2009). As a result, the 
stakeholders’ understandings of conditionality become an integral element of the 
conditionality mechanism, as also explained in the methodology section. 
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The wide and process-based approach to conditionality underpins this 
study due to several reasons. First, this definition and approach provide for the 
possibility to examine the process of construction, application of conditionality 
and its outcome, thereby taking into consideration its changes over time. This 
approach according to Sasse (2009) “highlights the pitfalls of linear causality 
models and the need to take seriously the inherent politicisation of conditionality” 
over time (p.19). Hence, in line with Sasse’s (2009) arguments this study 
understands “the minority condition as a construct is the recognition that any 
notion of compliance is a construct, as well as a political judgement” (p.20). 
Pridham has similarly argued that we should study “conditionality contextually, 
since how it has developed and been handled is shown to be a dependent variable 
both on the EU side in terms of motivation and on the domestic side in terms of 
implementation” (Pridham, 2007 p.447). By approaching conditionality as a 
process and over time, the research will provide insight into its implementation, 
continuity and consistency over time, the features that have been identified as 
crucial for success by academic literature.  
Second, a strictly formal definition of conditionality is not appropriate for 
this thesis because in the specific policy area of its interest, the “Copenhagen 
criteria do not define the benchmarks or the process by which EU conditionality 
could be enforced and verified” (Hughes et al., 2005 p.25). This assessment is 
supported by the use of national legislation and agreements as elements of EU 
conditionality, a conclusion of academic literature, as well as of the fieldwork of 
this thesis (See Brusis, 2005a). The use of national legislation in the stipulation of 
conditionality makes the operation of this instrument context specific and flexible. 
Whereas Hughes et al would emphasize the flexible nature of conditionality, 
Grabbe has defined this as a moving target problem, which is common to the 
Copenhagen criteria, all of which are “debatable and slippery concepts” (Grabbe, 
2006 p.32). Moreover, with the changes of national legislation, the conditionality 
also shifts, thereby amplifying the moving target problem. For this purpose, the 
thesis specifically looks into the consistency of conditionality and how the EU has 
used national legislation and agreements as elements of conditionality in both 
case studies, including a common policy of representation in the administration.  
Pridham (2005) has demonstrated the evolution of the conditions of the 
EU from  
procedural conditions of formal democracy (rule of law, 
separation of institutional powers, free elections, freedom of 
66 
 
expression) to include criteria of substantive democracy, such as 
the role of political parties as a vehicle of political participation, 
pluralism of media, importance of local government and involved 
civil society (p.21) .  
This tendency is amplified in the case of the minority policies and the 
Western Balkans, due to its multiethnic nature and legacy of conflicts. As a result 
it has been argued that “the EU applied differentiated pressure across applicants, 
dependent on whether minority protection was regarded as problematic and 
security relevant in the particular case” (Schwellnus, 2008 p.187). In the countries 
studied, in light of the flexibility of the policy area the EU exercised increasing 
(formal and informal) pressure on the candidate countries. These informal 
dimensions are grasped in this research by relying on stakeholders’ views, as 
elaborated in the methodology chapter. 
Third, the formal and informal elements of conditionality are incorporated 
into the study due the multitude of roles the EU has undertaken in the post-
conflict societies in the region and in the two case studies specifically. In addition 
to using accession conditionality, in the Balkans the EU has also been directly 
involved in the domestic politics of these countries, primarily through 
negotiating/guaranteeing peace agreements in light of the recent conflicts. The 
variety of roles has been analytically examined by Noutcheva et al by making a 
distinction between the EU as ‘an active player’ and a ‘framework’ with respect to 
post-conflict circumstances. In the first case, the EU is an active player involved in 
the mediation and conflict resolution in the region, which gears the involved 
parties towards conflict settlement Noutcheva et al. (2004). The traditional 
instruments for accession as a long-term perspective of integration in the EU 
represent the latter role of ‘EU as a framework’, which offers the possibility of 
participation in decision-making for these countries and equips them with models 
of governance and policy options. Similarly, Berg and van Meurs in policy terms 
distinguish between both active impact of the EU in relation to border policies and 
conflict management in contrast to its passive dimension, which concerns 
identities and conditionality (Berg and van Meurs, 2002 p.71). While the EU role 
as a framework has mainly long-term implications, its function as an active player 
is intended to have short term effects on the conflict (Noutcheva et al., 2004).  
Fourth, as a result of the reliance of the EU on other organisations’ 
assessments in relation to minority policies (such as the CoE and OSCE), dealing 
with the EU conditionality in relation to minority policies as an independent 
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variable is further complicated. Sasse (2006) argues that “while the EU borrowed 
the link between democracy and human (and later) minority rights from the CoE, 
the OSCE provided the EU with the security-based rationale for minority 
protection” (p.65).  The result of the involvement of multitude of actors involved 
in minority policy is an exacerbation of the problem of attribution which is in any 
case present in Europeanisation and conditionality research (See Rechel, 2009a). 
By studying conditionality over time and looking in parallel into the use of other 
assessments by EU in the stipulation of conditionality, the process based 
approaches make a first step towards overcoming the problem of attribution. The 
focus on the EU conditionality is nevertheless maintained due to the broad 
assessment that the EU has acted as a hub for all the assessments of these 
organisations in relation to democratic conditionality, including minority 
policies.33 The role of other organisations (as well as domestic actors) is also 
studied through the reliance on the stakeholders’ views both at the EU and 
national level which are studied as an essential element of conditionality. In these 
circumstances, the assessment of implementation and consistency of 
conditionality are essential for unpacking the functioning and role of this 
instrument.  
Hence, this research looks into how the EU has used other international 
instruments, foremost the FCNM in devising its own conditions, rather than 
looking specifically into the operation of other international organisations, such as 
the CoE. For this purpose, in its empirical analysis the study specifically focuses on 
how the European Commission has used the FCNM as the only international 
instrument in this policy area in its stipulation of conditionality. As mentioned in  
the introduction an assessment of the work and cooperation between the OSCE 
HCNM, the CoE and the UN Working group of minorities in Macedonia and Croatia 
has been performed by Letschert (2005). Focusing on EU conditionality, but also 
looking at the assessments of the OSCE HCNM and the CoE, the study overcomes 
common criticisms of conditionality studies on ethnic politics due to their focus on 
a single institution and the particular strategy it applied (See Kelley, 2004b).  
Lastly, in addition to looking into the requirements from other 
international organisations, by approaching conditionality through the process of 
its application, this research will examine simultaneously the role of domestic 
actors as integral elements of this mechanism. In fact, empirical studies of soft 
                                            
33 This was confirmed to me at numerous occasions during the fieldwork in 
discussions with various interviewee groups.  
68 
 
areas of the acquis have emphasized the role of the domestic actors in the 
application and study of conditionality. Brusis (2005b) by analysing the use of EU 
conditionality in the regionalisation of  the Czech Republic and Slovakia argues 
that “domestic factors were of key importance for the trajectories and outcomes 
of regionalisation” (p.295).  As a result, this research will avoid overemphasizing 
the role of the EU, as one of the major criticisms of both Europeanisation and 
conditionality studies. This understanding is largely in line with the argument of 
Pridham in the study of the international dimensions of democratisation. 
According to him, the best way to “proceed *in research+ is through focusing on 
interactions, and therefore two-way effects, between sets of international and 
domestic factors that may well straddle the conventional boundary between 
them” (Pridham, 2005 p.10). Adopting this position, this research will examine 
how the EU has used the FCNM and national legislation in its conditionality 
mechanism as well as the role of domestic actors.  
 
3.4  Democratic consolidation and national minorities  
Studying the role of the EU in shaping national minority policies this thesis 
ultimately reflects on the role of the EU democratic consolidation in the 
conditions of post-communism. Democratic consolidation is considered generally 
in literature as a constitutive element of the process of democratisation. 
“Democratisation as a term describes the overall process of regime change [...] 
from the end of the previous authoritarian regime to the stabilisation and rooting 
of new democracies” (Pridham and Lewis, 1996 p.2). All academic approaches 
tend to divide the process of democratisation into several phases. Though often 
subject to disagreement, the most common temporal division with respect to 
post-communist countries is between the processes of transition to a liberal 
democracy and its subsequent consolidation (Pridham and Lewis, 1996 p.2). This 
research operates with this division and primarily focuses in its analysis on the 
latter phase, i.e. democratic consolidation. In this respect, literature has 
stipulated that by 1997 when the EU got extensively involved with the post-
communist world, the democratic transition in East-Central Europe was largely 
over (Pridham, 2007).  At the same time, it recognizes that some ongoing 
concerns in relation to state-building  in the Balkans would be classified by 
literature as relating to democratic transition as well (For a discussion see 
Pridham, 2007).  
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Although a commonly used term democratic consolidation has been 
understood in various ways in the academic research. Different definitions of 
consolidation emphasize “various processes, levels, dimensions, locations of areas 
of political change” (Plasser et al., 1998 p.11). Analysts like Schedler (1998) have 
pointed to its excessive conceptual overstretching, since the concept has come to 
include elements ranging from popular legitimation to the alleviation of poverty, 
and economic stabilisation. Alongside arguments of over-stretching, Linz and 
Stepan’s (1996) definition of democratic consolidation as one of the most widely 
used in research. For them, a consolidated democracy entails a multitude of 
conditions, the most important of which are: a free and lively civil society, a 
relatively autonomous political society, the rule of law, a usable state bureaucracy 
and an institutionalized economic society (p.7). However, as this study deals 
primarily with the management of inter-ethnic relations, a more focused 
definition of democratic consolidation is utilised. For the purposes of this 
research, consolidation requires that there is consensus of the citizens of a 
territory on the legitimacy of the established political unit (See Linz and Stepan, 
1996). In light of this definition, the research considers inter-ethnic relations, i.e. 
national minority policies as a key element for the democratic consolidation in the 
conditions of post-communism. At the same time, literature has considered 
national minority policies as one of the areas in which international actors stand 
in the core of the democratic consolidation process (Pravda, 2001). Thus, this 
research accepts that any theory on the national minority question in the region 
needs to incorporate a “systematic discussion of the role assumed by 
international organisations” (Smith, 2002 p.9).   
While positing inter-ethnic relations at the heart of democratic 
consolidation, literature has generally considered multi-ethnicity as an obstacle 
for democratisation. In this direction, Rustow (1970) points that belonging to a 
shared political community is a precondition for the transition to democracy. The 
experience of the post-communist world especially with the inter-ethnic conflicts 
that accompanied foremost the dissolution of Yugoslavia in the early 1990s largely 
confirmed Rustow’s expectations of difficulties in building democracy in plural 
societies. Vachudova and Snyder (1997) in this direction have argued that a 
“nationalist pattern” of political change took place in 1989 and caused the 
“ethnicisation” of domestic politics. In light of these early post-communist 
developments, Linz and Stepan (1996) underlined that “the more the population 
of a state is composed of plurinational, lingual, and religious societies, an 
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agreement on the fundamentals of democracy will be more difficult” (p.29). 
Schöpflin (2001) explains this tendency by positing ethnicity as the sole source of 
coherence in the public sphere due to the virtual non-existent civil societies 
(p.119). In response, Linz and Stepan (1996) have concluded that diverse societies 
in the transition process suffer from a stateness problem.  Overall, both the 
experience and the literature on post-communist transformation highlight the 
difficulties that diversity multi-ethnicity as an obstacle for democratisation.  
Due to the above outlined difficulties for building democracy in diverse 
societies, academic writings have looked into possibilities for accommodating 
multiethnicity (usually) via institutional changes. These responses, however, 
depend upon the understanding of minority rights as group specific or individual 
rights. As a result, the academic discussions have revolved around justifying 
minority rights and their implications in relation to the neutrality of the state. 
Kymlicka (2002c) has argued that “the idea of ethnocultural neutrality is simply a 
myth” (p.16). He goes on to argue that group-specific rights should be granted in 
line with the specific context (Kymlicka, 2002b). Looking at international 
instruments for minority rights Thornberry (2001) concludes that “minority rights 
have been ‘admitted’ into the contemporary canon of human rights as rights of 
individuals, not as ‘collective’ or ‘group’ rights” (p.53) . On the other hand, authors 
like Barry (2002) emphasize the primacy of fairness and equal rights for all, 
supporting the ethnocultural neutrality of the state.  
According to Brusis, the EU does not expressly support group rights as an 
approach to minority protection, but does not show a clear preference for 
individual rights either (Brusis, 2003). The lack of a clear approach in this policy 
area in practice is reflected in the variety of terms that the European Commission 
uses in its reports, i.e. minority rights, rights of persons belonging to minorities, 
which are in most cases linked to the national definitions of the country in 
question.34 Pentassuglia (2001) explains these variations with the fact that “the 
Commission does not seem to be demanding a new broader concept of minority, 
but rather to be encouraging solutions which can secure internal and international 
stability” (p.21). Hence, the “Commission’s approach to minority issues in the 
candidate countries reflects pragmatic concerns for internal and international 
stability” (Pentassuglia, 2001 p.22). EU officials interviewed for this thesis 
recognised the problem of the lack of a common approach on minorities, 
                                            
34 Author’s interview with European Commission official, Brussels, 8 December 
2010. 
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however, argued that the lack of a common standard has not hampered the 
Union excessively when dealing with these policy areas. 35 Still, it was also 
recognized that in the absence of an EU wide definition it has not always been 
easy to prescribe exact solutions.”36   
 While approaching minority policies as an element of democratic 
consolidation, this research does not underestimate the validity of the claims that 
“conditionality was  *also+ a result of the securitisation of minorities rather than 
part of an agenda to protect or empower” (Galbreath and McEvoy, 2012 p.267). 
Securitisation denoting the “discursive construction of wider categories of persons 
and practices as threats” has been considered as a key mechanism in the 
institutionalisation of the EU area of freedom, security and justice (Guild et al., 
2008 p.2). This phenomenon has been introduced also in the relations of the EU 
with the acceding countries, specifically through the conditionality instrument. In 
a recent article, Richter argues that “the EU’s approach, which enforces both 
security and democracy through one instrument, namely political conditionality, 
has yielded only limited success and has contributed to the emergence of a 
conflict of objectives” (Richter, 2012). Supporting the view that the EU has 
enforced both democracy and security through conditionality on minority policies, 
the assessment of the evolution, consistency and clarity of conditionality 
examined in thesis is mostly limited to the former. From this perspective the 
thesis focuses on the use of the FCNM, because literature has argued that “while 
the EU borrowed the link between democracy and human (and later) minority 
rights from the CoE, the OSCE provided the EU with the security-based rationale 
for minority protection” (Sasse, 2006 p.65). 
Still, without taking the democratising element of Europeanisation and 
conditionality as a given, the research takes on board the basic premises on which 
the securitisation of conditionality are grounded. Recognising these theoretical 
debates, however, this thesis does not go into normative discussions of the role of 
the EU. In fact, it approaches and studies the EU’s criteria on national minority 
policy with their contradictions and studies how they play out at the national 
arena. It examines in practice the implications of Europeanisation by 
                                            
35 Author’s interview with European Commission official, Brussels, 8 October 
2010.  
36 Author’s interview with European Commission official, Brussels, 8 October 
2010.  
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conditionality in relation to national minority policies in the Western Balkans for 
the process of democratic consolidation. 
 
3.5  Europeanisation by conditionality and democratic consolidation – a 
dynamic relationship 
Having explained how the thesis approaches the issue of Europeanisation 
by conditionality and democratic consolidation against the background of national 
diversity, this section studies the relationship between these two processes. In 
fact, research on the previous enlargement has brought about varying conclusions 
on the relationship between Europeanisation by conditionality and democratic 
consolidation. While generally recognising the generally positive dynamics 
between conditionality and democratic consolidation, literature also puts forward 
several aspects in which the dynamics between these two processes are 
conflicting. With respect to the former, the EU’s conditionality has been generally 
considered to have a lock-in effect of liberal forces after the overthrow of 
authoritarian governments (Vachudova, 2005). Pridham (2005) has further argued 
that “the EU has had together with the Council of Europe and the OSCE a positive 
impact over minority rights in the sense that otherwise progress here would have 
been slighter not least because of societal if not cultural barriers” (p.225).  
Still it has been recognised that “negative impacts could also occur 
notwithstanding the official commitment of Brussels to furthering democratic 
consolidation in Central & Eastern Europe” (Pridham, 2005 p.226). For example, 
Grabbe argues that policy choices are technocratic rather than political issues, 
leading to a deficit of democratic accountability in the whole process (Grabbe, 
2001). On the latter aspect, Pridham criticizes the favouring of the executive 
institutions over the parliament as well as the exporting of the EU democratic 
deficit in these countries (Pridham, 2006). Innes claims that the EU accession 
process “could have a debilitating effect, arresting party developments by 
excluding from political competition those substantive, grass-roots, ideological 
policy conflicts around which Western Europe systems evolved” (Innes, 2002 
p.101). These findings confirm the warnings of the general literature on 
Europeanisation regarding the intended and unintended consequences of 
conditionality (Grabbe, 2006 p.49). On a similar note,  Radaelli (2000) classifies the 
extent and direction of Europeanisation in four groups: inertia, absorption, 
transformation and retrenchment. The last dimension is in fact an instance where 
the policy may backslide or may be opposed by domestic groups.  
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Specifically, in relation to conditionality and national minority policies,  
Sasse argues that the impact can range from gradual legal changes and ethno 
political participation in government and opposition to a deepening of structural 
segregation and an increase in political polarisation  (2009 p.17). Using this 
classification as guidance Sasse comes to the following conclusion:  
an intense and highly visible international involvement in a politicized 
issue (or one aspect of them) can produce an overlay of contradictory 
outcomes: a legal change can hide deeper political or societal problems 
which might, in fact, have become ingrained in the context of the EU’s 
involvement (2009 p.28).  
Similarly, Noutcheva et al (2004) in relation to Europeanisation in post-conflict 
societies specifically warn against the creation of a “superficial layer of common 
institutions and policy coordination mechanisms which would exist for the 
purpose of satisfying EU requirements, but would not enjoy domestic support” 
(p.26). Having in mind the role of organised minority interests in the countries 
studied, it is also significant to note the experience from the Eastern enlargement, 
which shows that “political participation of an ethnic minority party and ethnic 
power-sharing, encouraged though not caused by the EU’s minority condition, can 
thus prove stabilizing during one stage of the transition process and destabilizing 
during another” (Sasse, 2009 p.27). 
 This variety of outcomes of conditionality (including unintended ones) 
supports the findings of research on the potentially destabilizing effects of the 
involvement of international organisations in national minority policies. Although 
earlier research on this topic was not framed specifically in the context of 
Europeanisation, the mechanisms at work are largely the same. In this sense, 
Tesser (2003) in her research concludes that although international organisations 
with significant leverage can lessen the potential of conflict, the external pressure 
in this area “can have at least two downsides that diminish the effectiveness in 
lessening the political salience of identity” (p.493). First, the pressure could result 
in superficial minority protection lacking domestic support and secondly, the 
presence of these standards can unintentionally encourage ethnic groups to 
define themselves as national thus creating greater majority-minority frictions 
(Tesser, 2003).  
Moreover, the relationship between these processes in the Balkans is 
qualitatively different, because of the extended requirements of the EU, 
significant democratisation obstacles as well as “severe Communist legacy and 
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systemic problems” (Pridham, 2007 p.454). For Pridham (2007), “this would 
suggest both more demands on conditionality (thus challenging its limitations) but 
also potentially more opportunities” (p.455). In the case of the Western Balkans 
this risk is even higher since the EU has moved further down the path of domestic 
politics by assessing the national political scene and the relations between the 
local political actors (See Pridham, 2007). Literature links this attitude with the 
role the EU has acquired through the brokering of peace-deals in Bosnia and 
Macedonia especially (Anastasakis and Bechev, 2003). In light of this Chandler 
(2008) argues that “EU member state-building in the Western Balkans is a clear 
example of the dangers of the liberal peace approach to post-conflict situations” 
(p.529).  In his work, Chandler (2008) is highly critical of the role of the EU in the 
Western Balkans arguing that “the externally driven nature of the policy process 
means that political elites seek to lobby external EU actors rather than engage in 
domestic constituency-building” (p.529). Contrary to Chandler, O’Brennan (2008) 
argues that that “the policy being pursued by Brussels is consistent with the 
expectations of the ‘normative power Europe’ approach to enlargement” (p.508). 
Similarly, Manners (2002) argues that the EU is a power with normative quality, 
which should act to extend its norms into the international system (p.252). 
Although this research will not deal with the role of the EU as a normative power 
in the Balkans, it recognizes that there have been instances when the EU’s 
involvement raises concern for the democratic consolidation of these societies.  
Recognising the potential of EU conditionality, this research will examine the 
implications of this instrument for the democratic consolidation of Croatia and 
Macedonia.  
Having in mind the above presented debates on Europeanisation, 
conditionality and democratic consolidation, this thesis extends the findings of the 
literature on the Eastern enlargement by studying the role of the EU in shaping 
national minority policies in Croatia and Macedonia. It examines the construction, 
application and implementation of conditionality in relation to national minority 
policies over a fifteen year period in order to grasp the consistency and change in 
conditionality and the role of both the EU and national actors in the operations of 
this mechanism. Due to the lack of acquis in this policy area, the research studies 
how the EU has used the FCNM and national legislation in the stipulation of 
conditionality, focusing on the consistency and change of the criteria. Recognising 
that national minority policies are crucial for the democratic consolidation of the 
countries studied, the thesis ultimately reflects on the relationship between 
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Europeanisation by conditionality and democratic consolidation. Doing so, it 
specifically builds upon recent research which has indicated the potential of 
increased inter-ethnic polarisation through the EU’s involvement in this policy 
area. As such, it underlines the unwanted effects of EU conditionality in relation 
to democratic consolidation in the conditions of diversity in post-communism.  
 
3.6  Conceptual limitations  
While incorporating the role of international actors in the study of 
minority policies in the EU accession process, this thesis does not deal with 
several specific elements related to the shaping of national minority policies in the 
conditions of post-communism. First, it does not deal with the role of kin and host 
states of the respective minorities studied. Kin and host states are key actors in 
the framework proposed by Brubaker (1995) for the study of national mobilisation 
in the new independent states, building the triadic nexus of minority policies. 
With the recognition of the role of international actors, revision of Brubaker’s 
model was advocated by inserting the international actors as a fourth variable in 
his model and forming a into a quadratic nexus (Smith, 2002). In this vein, recent 
literature on EU accession and minority policies has moved towards the 
incorporation of the role of kin states. For example, studies have examined if the 
EU had an effect on the wider geopolitical relationship between the host state 
and the kin state over national minorities (See Galbreath and McEvoy, 2010). 
Schulze in a similar project as this one has examined the role of kin state (i.e. 
Russia) in relation to the minority conditionality in Estonia and Latvia (Schulze, 
2009). As this dissertation studies in depth at the role of national minority 
conditionality both at macro and policy level, looking at the role of kin states 
would make it unmanageable. In addition, in the Balkans the incorporation of the 
role of kin states would necessitate an examination of the EU conditions on 
regional cooperation as a specific feature of this round of enlargement, which 
would have excessively increased the scope of the study.  
Second, this research does not tackle in detail the issue of the Roma 
minority, which does not fit in the traditional national minority literature. 
Vermeersch (2006) in his study of Romani politics argues that the Romani 
movement “does not seem to fit the patterns of ethnic mobilization” in the post-
communist world “as they are not seen as a threat to the stability and territorial 
integrity of an existing state” (p.2).  The situation of the Roma became an element 
of EU conditionality policy in the latter half of the 1990s as a result of 
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international advocacy efforts and the increasing number of Roma asylum seekers 
from CEE in the EU (Vermeersch, 2003). The empirical analysis of the role of the 
EU in the development and implementation of Roma policies has been 
inconclusive. On the one hand, it has been widely accepted that the development 
of “pro-Romani policies gained momentum during the accession negotiations” 
(Cashman, 2008 p.19). Similarly, Swimelar (2008) concludes that minority rights 
for the Roma, in the accession process “have become institutionalised, 
empowered in the public realm, and generally accepted as appropriate at the elite 
level” (p.519). On the other hand, Vermeersch (2003) concludes that the policy 
changes especially in relation to the Roma were predominantly a result of short-
term political considerations, thus minority protection norms remain contested 
both among EU members and the candidates Vermeersch (2003). Although partly 
addressing the Roma issue through the macro and policy analysis in relation to EU 
conditionality, the research does not deal with the specificity of the Romani 
question.  
Third, the use of the conditionality framework in the context of EU 
accession has its own weaknesses that have implications for this study. First, the 
use of conditionality instead of Europeanisation frameworks for the study of the 
role of the EU has been criticized for being too narrow. Galbreath and McEvoy 
(2010) for example argue for the need to “think beyond the strict confines of 
conditionality to a broader process of Europeanization concerned with the 
outworkings of the integration process” (p.360). On the other hand, the use of 
Europeanisation concept has been criticized due to its potential for overstating 
the role of Europe and difficulty in demonstrating causality (Radaelli, 2000, 
Haverland, 2006). Grabbe has underlined that “if we are always looking at the 
extent of Europeanisation, we may fail to notice that other processes are 
producing the effects” (Grabbe, 2006 p.48). The problem of causality is linked to 
the focus of research on case studies where the EU pressures are present without 
control cases in which this is not the case (Haverland, 2006). Nevertheless, as this 
research is specifically interested in the operation and development of the 
conditionality mechanism in a specific policy area for which there are no 
predetermined policies at the European level, it uses the conditionality framework 
as a mechanism of the wider Europeanisation. Furthermore, the conditionality 
framework is considered more applicable for the analysis due to the focus of the 
study on candidate countries where this is the basic mechanism at work.   
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Lastly, using the conditionality framework, the study also limits its findings 
to the literature on EU accession. Because of its largely empirical contribution, 
theoretical debates on why states comply with international norms are beyond 
the scope of this study. This in mind, it is important to note that “international 
norms must always work their influence through the filter of domestic structure 
and domestic norms, which can produce important variations in compliance and 
interpretation of these norms” (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998 p.893). The focus on 
the formative influence of international norms has been under criticism by 
Checkel (1999) who has argued that this approach underplays the role of 
domestic agency and social context. In light of these difficulties, Cortell and Davis 
(2000) concluded that “a norm’s domestic salience should be established by the 
analysis of national discourse, state institutions and policies” (p.72). This in mind 
the study does recognize that minority protection is part of a broader human 
rights policy at the EU level (Pentassuglia, 2001). Similarly, by focusing on norms 
which are not consolidated at the EU level, this research does not examine the 
anti-discrimination policy and the implementation of the respective EU directives, 
as they’re part of the acquis and are usually assessed in compliance studies. 
 
3.7  Conclusions  
This chapter examined the main concepts used in this thesis, namely 
Europeanisation, conditionality and democratic consolidation, and outlined the 
theoretical framework that underpins the empirical analysis that follows. The 
objective of this chapter was to provide conceptual clarity and to ground the 
dissertation in existing research, while also demonstrating how the thesis 
advances existing findings through the questions it studies. It first examined 
Europeanisation as the framework for studying the impact of the EU on member 
states and candidate countries. The examination of Europeanisation foremost 
focused on the evolution of this concept from its inception with relevance to the 
member states to its extension to the candidate countries for membership. 
Looking into the variety of theoretical understandings of this phenomenon, the 
chapter singled out the instrument of conditionality as a defining feature of the 
Europeanisation of candidate countries, which is in the focus of this dissertation. 
The next section of the chapter examined two approaches for the study of 
conditionality, through the external incentives model and by studying 
conditionality as a process over time for the purposes of grasping its changes, as 
well as formal and informal influences. It focused on the understanding of political 
78 
 
conditionality, specifically in relation to national minority policies. The analysis of 
conditionality unpacked the dominant external incentives model and its critiques 
for the purposes of analysing the impact of the EU on minority protection policies. 
By studying the outcome of conditionality, the external incentives model does not 
provide tools for further examination of EU’s interaction with the domestic 
political structure and its impact on the policies. The primary difficulty in this 
respect is that the external incentives model considers EU conditionality as an 
independent variable, thereby neglecting its politicised and constructed nature. In 
light of these difficulties of framing the analysis in this framework, the chapter 
examined the process based approach to conditionality which underscores its 
constructed nature and the need to analyse the construction and application of 
conditionality over time. Having in mind nature of the national minority policy 
area and the intention of this research to examine the operation of EU 
conditionality, the chapter uses this definition for the purposes of the study. This 
framework recommends examining the EU’s impact on minority politics by tracing 
the construction of the minority criterion in the EU and national political 
discourse, official and unofficial documents, in order to understand the EU’s role. 
Having determined the flexibility of these rules in the EU context, the research will 
focus on outlining how has conditionality developed and been implemented, as 
well as the similarities and differences between the two cases between 1997 and 
2012. In this time period 2005 is considered as a breaking point of two periods 
studied separately.  
Section three reflected on the implications of Europeanisation by 
conditionality for the democratic consolidation in the conditions of post-
communism. It examined how the thesis approaches democratisation and 
democratic consolidation and the role of multiethnicity in these processes. In fact, 
the management of inter-ethnic relations was posed as an essential element of 
democratic consolidation. It also showed that academic literature considers the 
prospects for democracy building in multi-ethnic societies are bleak.  On the other 
hand, the chapter uncovered the main debates over the accommodation of 
national minorities through the institutional setting and the lack of an EU 
consensus on this issue, thus outlining the complexity of setting criteria in this 
policy area. Overall, this section by recognising the significance of international 
actors, specifically the EU, in the management of domestic minority policies, 
underlines their position an integral actor in the democratic consolidation of the 
79 
 
societies examined, laying grounds for the last research question of the 
dissertation.  
The fourth section examined the relationship between the processes of 
Europeanisation and democratic consolidation, by studying the findings of the 
literature on the Eastern enlargement and the specificity of the Western Balkans 
in general. While recognising the literature’s positive assessments of this 
relationship, the chapter has also shown the conditions under which 
conditionality can undermine the consolidation process. Specifically in the 
national minorities’ policy, the involvement of the EU in highly politicized issues 
can also lead to further inter-ethnic polarisation. In the Balkans, as outlined in the 
introduction and in this chapter the EU has obtained a much more interventionist 
role and thus the scope for influencing democratic consolidation is higher.  
Building upon these findings, the thesis will extend the study of 
Europeanisation by conditionality in relation to national minority policies to the 
Western Balkans. Conceptually, due to the flexible nature of the minority 
criterion, conditionality is approached as a process and over time. In light of the 
findings of this chapter, the thesis fills both a conceptual and an empirical gap in 
academic literature. In relation to the former, it reflects on the study of 
Europeanisation by conditionality in the candidate countries and its relationship 
with democratic consolidation. More specifically, it illustrates the potentially 
divergent trends between the two phenomena by unpacking of the 
inconsistencies in the study of non-acquis conditionality. At the same time, it also 
demonstrates the integral role of domestic actors in the conditionality 
mechanism.  Empirically, the thesis addresses a gap in the study of the Western 
Balkans, as a region with increased salience of the minority issue. In addition, as 
was shown in the analysis, the EU has been increasingly involved in this region by 
extending its political conditionality. The different contextual conditions and the 
extensive role of the EU create new circumstances for the study of 
Europeanisation by conditionality which are addressed in this thesis. The former 
are examined in the following chapter which provides a background on the 
national minority issue and relationship with the EU in both countries under 
examination, setting grounds for the empirical chapters that follow.  
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4. Macedonia and Croatia – the minority question and relationship with 
the EU  
The previous chapter provided an analysis of the theoretical background 
for this thesis by studying the role of the EU in the minority question in post-
communist societies. Focusing on these same elements of analysis, this chapter 
examines the contextual background in the two case studies, in light of the 
conceptual and methodological indications of its importance for studying the role 
of the EU at the national level. Although literature has reflected on the 
importance of consideration of local circumstances, studies looking at role of 
external actors still suffer from criticisms of context under-appreciation (See 
Stewart, 2009). The importance of the local context in this thesis is amplified for 
the purposes of this analysis because the existing literature predominantly 
focuses on the experience of the Eastern enlargement countries.  
As explained in the previous three chapters, in the Balkans, contextual 
factors create different conditions for the involvement of the EU in comparison to 
the Eastern enlargement. While the countries of the Eastern enlargement were 
undergoing social, political and economic transition, in addition, in the Western 
Balkans all of them were undergoing state and in some cases nation building. The 
creation of new states and new majorities and minorities as explained in the 
introduction amplified the importance of the minority issue in these societies. The 
legacies of the Yugoslav times through the ethnic conflicts that have plagued the 
recent history of the region add an additional layer of complexity to the minority 
issue in these countries. At the same time, the widely recognised failure of the EU 
to deal with the Yugoslav wars also complicates its role in the region and the 
application of conditionality.   
In these regional circumstances, as explained in the introduction, Croatia 
and Macedonia have been selected for the analysis due to their contractual 
relations with the EU and the importance of national minority policies. The two 
countries are the first SAA signatories and candidates for accession in the Balkans. 
National minority policies in both of them carry significance for the processes of 
democratic consolidation albeit due to different reasons. In Croatia due to the 
wars of the first half of the 1990s, which involved the Serbs as the largest 
community, the national minority question carries importance for the 
reintegration of this group in the Croatian society. Macedonia foremost due to the 
large percentage of non-majority communities is built on a delicate inter-ethnic 
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consensus, thereby placing the minority question at the heart of its democratic 
consolidation.   
This chapter reflects on these regional and country contextual conditions 
and their significance for the involvement of the EU in national minority politics in 
sections on each of the countries. These sections deal with the minority question 
in the respective country since independence, the minority policies and electoral 
politics and the relationship with the EU. The background on these three elements 
is necessary foremost because of the objective of this thesis to study the role of 
the EU in shaping national minority policies in Croatia and Macedonia. By looking 
into the minority question and electoral politics since independence the chapter 
provides the context in which the EU has attempted to shape minority policies 
through its instrument of conditionality. In addition, these two sections on each of 
the case studies provide the background on the main domestic actors which, as 
explained in chapters two and three are considered an integral part of the 
operation of the conditionality instrument. By providing a general overview and 
the contested issues which are a part of the relationship of both countries with 
the EU, the chapter also contextualises the EU’s involvement in minority policies 
in the broader EU engagement with the region. With this in mind, the objective of 
this chapter is not to provide an extensive overview of the minority policies in 
Macedonia and Croatia or EU involvement in the Balkans, but to set the basis for 
the empirical analysis that follows in chapter five, six and seven of this thesis. 
 
4.1  Macedonia  
4.1.1 The national minority question in Macedonia since independence   
Macedonia gained independence without bloodshed from the Yugoslav 
federation; however amidst significant challenges both in the region and 
internally. The primary external challenge was the obstruction of the country’s EU 
and broader international recognition, due to the dispute over the name with 
Greece.37 Internally, the management of the minority issue topped the agenda.  
On the one hand, the majority ethnic Macedonians “viewed their republic as a 
national state” and a culmination of their work for statehood (Rossos, 2008 
p.257). On the other, both the referendum on independence and the first 
constitution of independent Macedonia were not supported by the Albanian 
community, representing a quarter of the population in Macedonia. 
                                            
37 See section on relationship between Macedonia and the EU below. 
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Independence was declared on September 8, 1991 after a referendum in which 
majority of the citizens opted for independence albeit the representatives of the 
Albanian community did not come out to the polling stations. Similarly, the 
Albanian MPs did not support the new constitution of independent Macedonia 
which was adopted by the Parliament in November 1991.  
The boycott of the referendum and the Constitution originated in the 
discontent with the preamble of the new constitution defining Macedonia as the 
national state of the Macedonian people and other nationalities.38 The term 
nationalities corresponded with the pre-1990 Yugoslav and Macedonian 
legislation which distinguished between nations (members of the six constituent 
Republics), nationalities and ethnic groups (See Jovid, 2001). In the Yugoslav 
period, the Albanians had a status of nationalities, higher than the status of a 
minority. The new status of a nationality within independent Macedonia was 
perceived as degrading and was contested by the Albanian parties, which 
demanded the Albanians in Macedonia to be considered as a constituent nation 
(See Jovid, 2001). However, “the Albanians did not come out at the polling 
stations not because they opposed the independence of Macedonia, but the 
other part of the referendum question which implied the possibility of a Union 
with the other states of former Yugoslavia”, having in mind the already evident 
attack by Serbian authorities on the rights of Albanians in Kosovo.39  
In practice however, the Albanian population and their representatives 
(as well as representatives of other minority groups) participated in the operation 
and functioning of the institutions of the state.  The highest level of cooperation 
was demonstrated in the ‘informal’ power sharing between the main Macedonian 
and Albanian parties institutionalised in partaking in a coalition government. 
Hence, in addition to the party winning most of the votes from the Macedonian 
block, all governments since independence have consisted of at least one 
Albanian party as well.40 Still, despite minority representation in government and 
Parliament, contestation of the status of the Albanian community on the ground 
continued during the 1990s. In the second half of the 1990s, there were major 
                                            
38 Constitution of the  republic of Macedonia available at the official website of 
the Assembly of the Republic of Macedonia. Available at: 
<http://www.sobranie.mk/en/default.asp?vidi=ustav>[Accessed 09 October 
2009]. 
39 Author’s interview with CSO representative, Skopje 5 January 2011. 
40 This feature of the Macedonian public space has been usually put forward as 
the main reason as to why the country avoided the bloodshed of the rest of the 
Yugoslav federation.  
83 
 
demonstrations and incidents involving issues related to the use of symbols, 
languages and establishment of higher education institutions. Research in this 
period has argued that Macedonia continues to be ruled on the basis of a delicate 
ethnic consensus (Dyker, 1996 p.2). 
The culmination of these problems was a six-month internal conflict 
between the Macedonian police forces and the Albanian paramilitary forces the 
National Liberation Army which took place in the first half of 2001. The conflict 
was concluded with the signing of the OFA in August 2001 under significant 
international (including EU) pressure leading to changes in the disputed 
constitution.41 The Agreement established a form of power sharing within the 
system instituting a minority veto, extending the use of the languages of the non-
majority communities which represent over 20% at the national and local level, 
the principle of adequate and equitable representation and decentralisation. With 
the OFA and the subsequent constitutional changes setting up a largely 
consociational system, the neutral term “non-majority communities” was 
introduced both in the constitution and relevant legislation in the country, 
replacing the previously contested nationalities.42  
The Agreement was signed in the midst of continuous involvement and 
coordination between the relevant domestic political actors as well as external 
actors, such as the US, EU, NATO and OSCE. It has been argued that “the conflict 
between majority and minority, in which the minority enjoyed the patronage of a 
much smaller external homeland (Albania), itself dependent on the EU, was 
actively controlled by the EU with an auxiliary role for the structural perspective” 
(Berg and van Meurs, 2002). The signatories of the OFA are the two major ethnic 
Macedonian and two Albanian parties, the president of the country at the time 
and the EU and US as external guarantors of the agreement. In principle, the 
Agreement was drafted in cooperation with the domestic actors, but with large 
external influence with respect to its key elements. Its provisions in fact will 
become key segments of EU conditionality which are examined in the empirical 
chapters of the dissertation.  
                                            
41 Text of the Ohrid Framework Agreement available at the website of the Sector 
for implementation of the Ohrid Framework Agreement, Government of the 
Republic of Macedonia www.siofa.gov.mk [Accessed 09 October 2009].  
42 While recognising this specificity, for the purpose of uniformity of terminology, 
this research will predominantly use the term minority. When discussing 
Macedonia post-2001, the thesis uses the term “non-majority communities”. 
Generally, the term minority will be used as usually is the case in the relevant 
literature. 
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EU officials have commonly referred to the agreement as the success 
story of the Balkans which provided for the establishment of a truly multi-ethnic 
democracy.43 However, its implementation has been faced with problems 
primarily in relation to the elevating the significance of ethnicity as most relevant 
cleavage. Academic literature has described this phenomenon as 
institutionalisation of ethnicity, denoting the representation of ethnic groups as 
ethnic groups in the all branches of government (See Bieber, 2005a). In addition, 
the OFA has triggered dissatisfaction of the smaller communities, such as Roma, 
Turks etc, which do not see the Agreement acting in their benefit. The 20% 
threshold stipulated by the OFA is commonly perceived as discriminatory against 
the smaller communities (Engstrom, 2002). Hence, these communities which 
represent roughly 10-12% of the population perceive the OFA as an instrument 
privileging the Albanian community. In such circumstances, the number of people 
belonging to a certain minority at the central and local level carries increasing 
significance, as will be shown in chapter seven of this dissertation. 
In the post-OFA period only one census was conducted in November 
2002, according to which  64.2% of the population are ethnic Macedonians, 25.2% 
are ethnic Albanians, 3.9% Turks, 2.7% Roma, 1.8% Serbs, 0.8% Bosniaks, 0.5% 
Vlachs and 1.0% belong to the other ethnic communities.44 The figures are the 
ones that will be used in this research, since this is the last census which was 
conducted in Macedonia. The following census was originally scheduled for April 
2011, but due to extraordinary elections and lack of agreement on the 
methodology was postponed for October 2011. Although the census started in 
October 2011, it was interrupted four days before the completion due to a 
resignation of the State Census Commission. In the official announcement the SCC 
justified the suspension on grounds of different interpretation of the 
methodologies. In fact, “the issue is essentially ethno-political: the Albanian 
political faction insisted on a census methodology that counted the many 
Albanian emigrants, some of whom may not have returned to the country for 
                                            
43 Speech of Erwan Fouerre EU Special Representative and Head of the European 
Commission Delegation in Skopje, Macedonia delivered at the Conference: The 
Western Balkans. Political Order, 
Economic Stability and International Engagement, Berlin27 October 2006, 
available at:  <http://www.delmkd.ec.europa.eu/en/key-information/key-
speeches/Speech_271006.pdf>.[Accessed 10 September 2011] 
44 State Statistical Office of the Republic of Macedonia, Final data of the census of 
population (2002), <http://www.stat.gov.mk/pdf/kniga_13.pdf> [Accessed 15 
September 2010]. 
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years” (Karajkov, 2011). At the same time, according to the standard Eurostat 
methodology persons living abroad for more than 12 months are not registered 
with the census, thereby creating the internal problem within the Commission 
and among the government coalition partners. Overall, numbers have acquired 
increasing importance in Macedonia since they serve as a sole basis for 
determination of rights (See Jovid, 2011). 
 
4.1.2 Electoral politics and the national minorities 
Competitive politics in Macedonia has developed against the lack of 
historical democratic tradition and has been shaped by the communist past and 
the population’s ethnic heterogeneity. Moreover, in Macedonia specifically, the 
ethnic division corresponds with other issues of personal salience like religion, 
languages and the rural-urban divide. Hence, in practice, two parallel blocks of 
political parties have developed in the country – the ethnic Macedonian and 
Albanian. Besides these two blocks of parties, ethnically based parties of the 
smaller communities (Turks, Serbs, Roma, etc) were also established since 
independence. According to Bieber, the electoral system in Macedonia and its 
evolution from majoritarian to proportional have been shaped by the inter-ethnic 
tensions between the two biggest groups, the Macedonians and Albanians 
(Bieber, 2005b).  
Since independence seven rounds of parliamentary elections have been 
held in Macedonia (1991, 1994, 1998, 2002, 2006, 2008, and 2011). As mentioned 
before, a primary feature of electoral politics in Macedonia has been the existing 
informal agreement between the elites for building inter-ethnic government 
coalitions. The communist successor party the Social Democratic Union of 
Macedonia (SDSM) in coalition with the ethnic Albanian Party for Democratic 
Prosperity (PDP) remained as the main government party in Macedonia until the 
elections of 1998, when the parliamentary elections were won by the rightist 
Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organisation – Democratic Party for 
Macedonian National Unity (VMRO-DPMNE), thus initiating the first turnover of 
power. Between 1998 and 2002 VMRO – DPMNE was in coalition with rightist 
Democratic Party of Albanians (DPA) forming a rather unusual government of 
both ethnically defined right oriented parties.  
The second turnover of power occurred in 2002 when the communist 
successor party SDSM won the elections and formed a coalition with the newly 
established Albanian party Democratic Union for Integration (DUI). This party was 
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formed of members of the National liberation army who participated in the 2001 
conflict and attracted the largest number of voters at the 2002 parliamentary 
elections in the Albanian block of parties. This coalition government was in power 
until 2006 when right wing VMRO-DPMNE was re-elected and formed a coalition 
with the DPA, as the party they had already governed with. However, as DUI won 
more votes from the Albanian parties concerns were expressed about the 
‘legitimacy’ of the governing coalition primarily in terms of representing the 
Albanian minority and later boycotted the parliament for several months. This 
tendency, hence, highlights the challenges that ethnically plural states present 
those governing them, which more homogenous societies do not face (See 
Ishiyama and Breuning, 1998). 
Following a veto from Greece on the country’s membership to NATO in 
April 2008 extraordinary elections were called for June of the same year, at which 
VMRO-DPMNE won the majority of the votes and was given the mandate to 
establish a Government. Rather than continuing their cooperation with the DPA, 
the choice of the partner in the Albanian block was DUI, the party that once more 
won the majority of the Albanian votes. This decision among other reasons was 
linked to both explicit and informal EU pressure. On the matter, in 2006 the EU 
Head of Delegation and Special Representative of the Council commented that “it 
would be logical if the Government consisted of the parties that won the most 
votes” (2006). At the national level, the statement was widely interpreted as an 
attempt of the EU to influence the formation of the government coalition mostly 
with respect to the party representing the Albanian community. National 
stakeholders have singled out this event as an example of “direct interference 
from the EU” and have generally considered the statement as a disruption of the 
internal dynamics of the Macedonian political scene.45 Such debates illustrate the 
specific embedded nature of the EU in the national politics of Macedonia since 
the OFA, which has been implemented with constant supervision from the Union 
and its institutions.  
 
4.1.3 Relationship with the EU  
In terms of the involvement of international actors, especially the EU, the 
country has been traditionally cooperative with the international community, 
although the establishment of official relations with the EU was complicated by 
                                            
45 Author’s interview with former Vice Prime Minister for EU Affairs, Skopje, 25 
December 2010. 
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the name dispute with Greece, elaborated below. In fact, Macedonia since the 
beginning of the 1990s has been open to international interventions – UN had a 
unique preventive mission, then in the second part of the UN Preventive 
Deployment force mandate they got the competences not to oversee the borders 
but to deal with inter-ethnic relations.46 The request for this mission came directly 
from the Macedonian authorities in light of the Yugoslav wars. Similarly, the EU’s 
engagement in Macedonia began by funding projects in the framework of the 
European Community Humanitarian Aid Office (ECHO) in 1992 mainly targeting 
refugees from the Yugoslav wars.47  
In light of these forms of engagement, in the early 1990s Macedonia 
received attention from scholars of conflict prevention and management looking 
at the other international organisations, but not the EU (Ackermann, 2000). 
Koinova (2011) highlights that analysis is missing because the EU had little 
involvement in Macedonia at the time (p.810).  In the same vein, Vachudova 
(2003) has questioned why the EU did not use political conditionality in the course 
of the 1990s since Macedonian governments were open to conditional Western 
assistance in this period (p.150). Stakeholders at the national level have explained 
this phenomenon against the background that many European representatives, 
especially the MEPs believed that the inter-ethnic relations in the country were 
completely amicable, although they would later be proven wrong.48  
In fact during the early 1990s the establishment of relations with the 
European Community at the time was strained due to the objections of Greece to 
the constitutional name “Republic of Macedonia”. Both countries are engaged in 
UN mediated talks for finding a solution, however even these have not given 
results (For a factual background see Karajkov, 2008). At the Lisbon summit in 
June 1992 under Greek pressure the EU decided to withhold recognition of 
Macedonia. The Council conclusions expressed “readiness to recognise that 
republic within its existing borders according to their Declaration on 16 December 
1991 under a name which does not include the term Macedonia” (Council, 1992). 
These events followed the positive opinion of the EU-appointed Badenter 
                                            
46 Author’s interview with former Minister of interior and foreign affairs, Skopje, 
22 February 2011. 
47 The European Union and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, 
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/ear/fyrom/main/mac-eu.htm. 
[Accessed 15 September 2010] 
48 Author’s interview with former Vice Prime Minister for EU Affairs, Skopje 23 
December 2010 
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Commission49 which was vested with a mandate to “rule by means of binding 
decisions upon request from valid Yugoslavian authorities”, on the basis of rights 
of minorities (Pellet, 1992). A consensual (albeit temporary) solution was found 
with the country joining the UN in 1993 under a provisional name “the former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia”. Formal diplomatic relations between 
Macedonia and the EU were not established until December 1995, after the 
signing of the Interim Accord between Macedonia and Greece in September of 
the same year.50 With the Interim Accord, Greece obliged itself not to veto 
Macedonia’s entry into regional and international organisations under the 
provisional reference, thus creating conditions for establishing full diplomatic 
relations with the EU.  
In the latter half of the 1990s the EU-Macedonia relationship developed 
as part of the regional approach for the Western Balkans and also by its 
constructive role during the NATO intervention in Kosovo.51 The country was the 
first one in the region to sign an SAA in early 2001. However, the signing of the 
SAA coincided with the inter-ethnic conflict which lasted between February and 
August 2001. The EU in cooperation with NATO took a leading role in managing 
and containing the conflict and was even a guarantor and a co-signatory of it. In 
the post-2001 period, however, the OFA is considered as central to the EU 
relationship with Macedonia.52 Whereas the implementation of the Agreement 
was channelled through domestic institutions, the EU constantly provided 
external support and at times pressure for its implementation. 53 Javier Solana, the 
EU High Representative for CFSP was directly involved in the OFA negotiations 
which led to widely accepted maxim in the national political discourse that ‘the 
road to Brussels leads through Ohrid’ (Solana, 2004).  
In addition to this form of political involvement, after the 2001 crisis, the 
first military peacekeeping mission in EU history Concordia was deployed in 
                                            
49 An international arbitration Commission consisting of the chair Mr Robert 
Badinter, President of the French Constitutional Council, the Presidents of the 
German and Italian Constitutional Courts, the Belgian Court of Arbitration and the 
Spanish Constitutional Tribunal. 
50  Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Republic of Macedonia, “Relations between 
Republic of Macedonia and EU”, http://www.mfa.gov.mk [Accessed 16 June 2010] 
51 For more see chapter 6 on EU conditionality and minority policies between 
1997 and 2004.  
52 Author’s interview with European Commission official, Brussels, 11 October 
2010. 
53 Author’s interview with former Vice Prime Minister for EU Affairs, Skopje 23 
December 2010. 
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Macedonia followed by the EU police mission Proxima in April 2003. My 
interviewees underlined that “through the involvement on the ground, the EU 
gained a big stake in Macedonia’s future. In some way it made Macedonia 
important to the EU almost rather than the other way around.”54 This role was 
largely accepted by local elites as well. The president of Macedonia in a speech 
highlighted that “our ambition is full membership in the Union, and I would like to 
see this mission *…+, as a step in that direction. The more of the EU we have in 
Macedonia, the more of Macedonia there will be in the EU (Trajkovski, 2003).”  
Hence, Macedonia is an indicative example for studying the involvement of the EU 
in the Balkans, as a country which has been at the same time both a frontrunner 
in the EU accession process and a laggard with extensive EU involvement on the 
ground. In response, my interviewees have pointed that “Macedonia is a 
candidate for EU membership and is being monitored from the Council. Hence, 
there is a dilemma whether the EU is supporting the country or is intervening with 
elements of a soft protectorate.”55  
The issue that further adds further complexity to the relationship 
between Macedonia and the EU is the continuation of dispute between 
Macedonia and Greece over the constitutional name of the country. This issue has 
been directly impeding Macedonia’s accession process since 2009 when the 
Commission recommended the start of the accession negotiations dependent 
upon finding a mutually acceptable solution for the name issue. In its 2009 report, 
the Commission underlines that “maintaining good neighbourly relations, 
including a negotiated and mutually acceptable solution to the name issue, under 
the auspices of the UN, remains essential” (EC, 2009b p.24). The recommendation 
for the negotiations has been confirmed every year since, but there is no progress 
on resolving this issue and therefore, negotiations have not commenced (For an 
analysis of the EU's role in the dispute see Mavromatidis, 2010). In the 
Enlargement Strategy of 2012, the Commission announced it “is ready to present 
without delay a proposal for a negotiating framework, which also takes into 
account the need to solve the name issue at an early stage of accession 
negotiations” (EC, 2012a p.25). 
 
                                            
54 Author’s interview with think tank analyst, Brussels, 11 October 2010.  
55 Author’s interview with former Ambassador to the EU, Tetovo, 22 December 
2010. 
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4.2  Croatia  
4.2.1 The minority question in Croatia since independence 
The Republic of Croatia, with its Western neighbour Slovenia declared 
independence on 25 June 1991 (On the communist rule see Cohen, 1997). The 
Badenter Commission56 vested with a mandate to “rule by means of binding 
decisions upon request from valid Yugoslavian authorities” made a reservation as 
to the positive opinion on independence regarding Croatia on the basis of rights 
of minorities (Pellet, 1992 p.178). The Constitution of independent Croatia of 
December 1990 redefined the republic as a national state of the Croats, with 
Serbs, who used to be constituent nations, as an ethnic minority.57 In contrast, 
article 1 of the 1974 Constitution of Socialist Republic of Croatia, defined it ‘as a 
national state of the Croatian people, state of the Serbian people in Croatia and 
state of nationalities living on its territory’.58 This change which was perceived as 
degrading by the Serbs in Croatia, which was a general fear of all groups in the 
Yugoslav federation (Jovid, 2001).  
In light of this dissatisfaction, the referendum on Croatian independence 
was boycotted by the Krajina Serbs (Krajina is a region in Croatia), who organized 
a separate vote on Serbian autonomy held in Knin, Benkovac and Obrovac 
(Petričušid and Žagar, 2007). In December 1991 the Krajina Serbs adopted their 
own constitution and proclaimed the independent Republic of Srpska Krajina, 
which functioned as a para-entity until mid-1995. In addition to Krajina, two other 
autonomous districts were established: Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium as 
well as Western Slavonia. Besides the constitutional changes, in 1991 the Croatian 
Parliament passed the Charter on the Rights of Serbs and other nationalities in the 
Republic of Croatia, which guaranteed self-government to the regions of Glina and 
                                            
56 An international arbitration Commission consisting of the chair Mr Robert 
Badinter, President of the French Constitutional Council, the Presidents of the 
German and Italian Constitutional Courts, the Belgian Court of Arbitration and the 
Spanish Constitutional Tribunal. 
57 Constitution of the Republic of Croatia, Official Gazette No. 56/1990 
22.12.1990, <http://narodne-
novine.nn.hr/clanci/sluzbeni/1990_12_56_1092.html> [Accessed 05 March 2010], 
this was confirmed by my interviewees as well.  
58 Constitution of the Socialist Republic of Croatia Official Gazette 08/1974 of 22 
February 1974, 
<http://www.pravo.unizg.hr/_download/repository/Ustav_Socijalisticke_RH_197
4.pdf> [Accessed 04 March 2013] 
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Knin.59 Those provisions, however, were never implemented because Serbian 
rebels occupied exactly those parts of the territory where autonomy was to be 
exercised (Petričušid and Žagar, 2007). 
In effect between 1991 and 1995 a third of the territory of Croatia was 
occupied by the local Serbs and the Yugoslav People’s Army. According to Cohen 
(1997), in this period, “Croatia had begun to disintegrate into two jurisdictions: 
one under the control of the Zagreb authorities, and another under the control of 
rebellious Serbs” (p.82). At the same time, within the Serb community the 
demands during this period differed and changed over time, as demonstrated 
below in the section on electoral politics as well (For differences among the Serb 
leaders in Croatia see Caspersen, 2003). In May and August 1995 with the military 
operations Flash and Storm the regions of Western Slavonia and Krajina were 
returned under control. The two operations were accompanied by accusations for 
ethnic cleansing of the Serb minority. Officials at the time have rejected the idea 
of ethnic cleansing on the grounds of public calls for the Serb population not to 
leave their homes. On 12 November 1995 with the Basic Agreement on the 
Region of Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium, these regions were 
peacefully reintegrated in the Croatian state. Due to the utmost significance of 
these events, analysts have argued that the minority policy in the 1990s in Croatia 
had two distinct periods: one before the Erdut Agreement of 12 November 1995 
and in the period post-this Agreement (Trifunovska, 1999). Similarly, Cohen (1997) 
pointed that “the territorial fragmentation and economic disruption of Croatia 
resulting from the Serbian rebellion of 1990-1991, and the so-called “homeland 
war” during the second half of 1991, would shape the tenor of the country’s post-
communist development during the next five years” (p.84). In this direction, the 
war of the 1990s was understood as just  and for “the liberation of occupied 
Croatian territories”, thus, representing “the Croats as victims of Serbian 
aggression and desire for territorial expansion” (Zambelli, 2010 p.1666).    
At the same time, however, Croatia was also participating in the war in 
neighbouring Bosnia where Croat separatists established a separate political unit 
similar as in the case of the Serbs in Croatia. The war in Bosnia was a conflict 
between the three entities (Bosnian, Serb and Croat) and there is evidence that 
                                            
59 Official Gazette 31/91 [Povelja o pravima Srba i drugih nacionalnosti u Republici 
Hrvatskoj] Charter of the rights of the Serbs and other nationalities in the Republic 
of Croatia, <http://narodne-
novine.nn.hr/clanci/sluzbeni/1991_06_31_876.html>[Accessed 04 March 2013]. 
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paramilitaries from Serbia and units of the Croatian army took part in the war (See 
Zakošek, 2008). Thus, “the Croatian and Bosnian wars were partly interconnected 
in military terms and included some military actions that took place in both 
countries” (Zakošek, 2008 p.593). In fact the Croatian president Tudjman, “while 
demanding international recognition for Croatia within its existing boundaries, [...] 
conspired to undermine Bosnia’s territorial integrity” (Silber and Little, 1996 
p.292). International pressures on Tudjman, predominantly through US pressures 
were the one of the main reason for withdrawing formal and informal 
involvement of Croatia in the Bosnian war and strained the country’s relations 
with the West at times. 
Both as a result of the Serb rebellion and their governing in the occupied 
areas between 1991 and 1995 as well as the operations Flash and Storm, Croatia 
in the 1990s experienced swift population movements. Prior to 1995, in the areas 
under Serb control “as a consequence of serious human rights violations 
committed by the de facto Serb authorities against the ethnic Croats, the number 
of Croats decreased significantly *…+ making room for the Serbian refugees from 
other parts of Croatia to move into these territories” (Trifunovska, 1999 p.474). 
The operations Storm and Flash on the other hand are estimated to have resulted 
in approximately 130 000 Serbs that fled from Krajina to Bosnia – Herzegovina and 
Serbia between August and November 1995 (Trifunovska, 1999, Petričušid and 
Žagar, 2007).60  These movements were reflected in the demographic structure 
since the results of the April 2001 census showed that 7.47% of Croatia’s 
population identify as national minorities noting a decrease of 50% in comparison 
to 1991.61 At the same time the total population of Croatia decreased 7.25%, 
while the share of the majority Croatian nation in the total population increased 
for 11.53% (for a detailed overview see Tatalovid, 2006).62 In addition to the 
changes in demographic structure, the military reintegration of the areas of 
Western Slavonia and Krajina and the peacefully reintegrated territories under the 
                                            
60 Numbers differ, according to Cohen 150 000 – 200 000 Serbs fled, see COHEN, 
L. J. 1997. Embattled democracy: postcommunist Croatia in transition. In: 
DAWISHA, K. & PARROT, B. (eds.) Politics, Power, and the Struggle for Democracy 
in South-East Europe. Cambridge Cambridge University Press.  
61 See Annex on census results. 
62 For info on 1981, 1991, 2001 and 2011 censuses see Annex. The results of the 
last census are not used in this thesis as during the fieldwork and in the entire 
pre-accession period, the primary importance in Croatia was assigned to the 
discrepancy of the numbers between 1991 and 2001. In such circumstances, the 
results of 2011 were issued too late, in 2012 in order to impact the policies 
studied.  
93 
 
Erdut Agreement stand in sharp contrast one to the other in relation to 
implementation of minority policies. In the military reintegrated areas, the 
difficulties associated with the return of refugees and restructuring of the 
institutions post-1995 posed additional burdens in an already complex situation. 
These circumstances explain why the EU conditionality is mostly focused in the 
Serb community in Croatia, as is the case in the dissertation as well. 
In addition to the ethnic war, independent Croatia has had a rather 
different experience with the Italian, and Czech minorities living in the country, 
which are rather well integrated. Most of the Italians live in communes of the 
Istrian County which has had exceptional multinational character. According to 
Petričušid, “members of the Italian minority in Croatia cling towards the regional 
political options that are advocating regional development of Istria,” (Petričušid, 
2008 p.65). Istria was the least affected by the war in the early 1990s, although 
Croatian refugees were being resettled to Istria to diminish the number of Italians 
in the area (Klemenčič and Zupančič, 2004). This was not the case with the 
Hungarian minority most of which lived in war affected areas and was largely 
displaced. According to Stjepanovid  (2012), “the Istrian regionalist politicians 
chose another path and a different legitimising narrative, that of European 
regionalism”, foremost supported by the Istrian Democratic Assembly party  
(p.21). At the same time, “the argument that Istrian identity had a ‘European 
world view’ went hand in hand with the view that Istria was a special region 
because of its Italian minority” (Bellamy, 2003 p.127).  
 
4.2.2 Electoral politics and national minorities  
Since independence, seven cycles for Parliamentary elections were held in 
Croatia (1990, 1992, 1995, 2000, 2003, 2007 and most recently 2011). Following 
the 1990 victory of the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ), most of the Serbian 
representatives boycotted the Croatian Parliament and participated in the 
alternative governing structures in the Serb controlled territories. In light of this, 
"the ‘Serb question’ in Croatia ceased to be a democratic question and became a 
question of stateness” (Zakošek, 2008 p.598). As to the representation of Serbs, 
the Serbs mobilised and created the Serbian Democratic Party (SDS) in 1990 which 
gained five seats in Parliament. The weak result was foremost linked to the fact 
that in this period most of the ethnic Serbs voted for the reformed communists 
the Social Democratic Party (SDP), as has been argued both by research and 
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confirmed by my interviewees (Caspersen, 2003).63 As a result, at the time, most 
of the MPs of Serb origin belonged to other parties, rather than the Serb 
Democratic Party.  
The SDS remained the only Serbian party until the 1995 elections and in 
this period it radicalised and served as political and military organisation in the 
Serb controlled territories. In the meanwhile, in the non-Serb controlled areas, 
the Serbian National Party was established (SNS) which initially supported the 
Croatian government and participated in the institutional system, whereas it took 
a less conciliatory course in the second half of the 1990s. Since the SDS did not 
participate in the elections, in 1995 the SNS competed with Milorad Pupovac, a 
Croatian Serb intellectual nominated by the Social Democratic Action of Croatia, a 
splinter of the SDP at the time. Hence, on the 1995 elections there was for the 
first time intra-Serb competition for the parliament seats. After the reintegration 
of all territories, the Independent Serbian Democratic Party (SDSS) was formed in 
1997 aiming at assisting the integration of Serbs in Croatia by merging with the 
Independent Serb Party established by Pupovac in 1995. In the same year the Serb 
National Council was established as an umbrella institution of both the political 
parties and various organisations representing the Serb interests in Croatia (For a 
detailed analysis, see Caspersen, 2003).  
Between 1990 and 2000 Croatia was under the rule of the HDZ and was 
heavily influenced by the strong personality of the president Franjo Tudjman 
supported by the majoritarian electoral system and the semi-presidentialism 
which underpinned this first decade of Croatian independence. In 1990, the HDZ 
for example won around 42% of the votes providing them with 60% of the 
mandates in the Parliament  (See Kasapovid, 1993). In addition, “having been the 
leading figure in the process of securing independence for Croatia, Tudjman was 
sometimes referred to as the father of the nation” (Jovid and Lamont, 2010 
p.1613-1614). The Tudjman regime was characterized by “anti-Serb resentment 
and the inclination was towards ‘nationalising state policies’ and defining Croatia 
as a nation-state of Croats” (Zakošek, 2008 p.598). Besides the nationalisation of 
the state, the regime was accompanied by formal and informal discrimination 
against minorities. For illustration, in late September 1995, the parliament 
‘temporarily’ suspended certain provisions of the Constitutional Law relating to 
                                            
63 Author’s interview with CSO representative, Zagreb, 21 June 2011, Author’s 
interview with Brussels correspondent, Brussels, 13 October 2010. 
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the Serb minority, which included representation in institutions as well.64 
Remaining in power until his death in December 1999, Tudjman’s rule has been 
characterised as semi-democratic at best or more commonly as semi authoritarian 
(See Jovid and Lamont, 2010, Kasapovid, 2000). By the end of the 1990s, however, 
the rule of HDZ was faced with a legitimacy crisis and Tudjman grew increasingly 
isolated demonstrated in the suspensions of EU aid and assistance, request for 
sanctions from the UN Security council and similar, examined in the next section.   
At a general level and especially in terms of the response to minorities the 
year 2000 was a turning point for Croatia. 2000 is the year of the first turnover of 
power, which occurred with the former communist SDP winning the simultaneous 
parliamentary and presidential elections. In addition, in 2000 the political practice 
of building coalition governments in Croatia was introduced for the first time (See 
Kasapovid, 2004). The 2000 elections were also followed by constitutional changes 
aiming at strengthening the parliamentary dimension and weakening the power 
of the President, adopted at the end of 2000. In addition, the electoral system 
underwent change by replacing majoritarianism with the current proportional 
representation in 10 electoral districts, in addition to a district for the diaspora 
and one specifically designed for 8 guaranteed seats for the ethnic minorities, out 
of which 3 for the Serb community. The reforms aimed at dismantling the 
authoritarian tendencies of the Tudjman era and as will be shown in the next 
section ending the isolationist foreign policy.  
The second turnover of power occurred in 2003 when HDZ was voted in 
power again which was seen as a test as to the ‘reforming’ of the party, in light of 
its legacy of the first decade of independence. “Knowing that the image of the 
HDZ would not be an asset [the new leader of the party and prime minister] 
Sanader worked hard to change it both internationally and internally” (Vlahutin, 
2004 p.30). In fact, after these elections HDZ formed a coalition government with 
the minority representatives, including the SDSS. The coalition of 2003 between 
HDZ and the Serb minority representatives signified a major change in terms of 
                                            
64 Constitutional Law on Temporary Suspension of the Constitutional Law on 
Human Rights and Freedoms and the Rights of Ethnic and National Communities 
or Minorities, Official Gazette 68/1995. *Odluka o proglašenju Ustavnog Zakona o 
privremenom neprimjenjivanju pojedinih odredbi ustavnog zakona o ljudskim 
pravima i slobodama i o pravima etničkih i nacionalnih zajednica ili manjina u 
Republici Hrvatskoj] <http://narodne- 
novine.nn.hr/clanci/sluzbeni/1995_09_68_1192.html> [Accessed 04 May 2010]. 
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putting minority policies and refugee return on the government agenda.65 At the 
same time, in the discourse of both parties the coalition was justified “specifically 
in terms of prospective accession to the EU” (Djuric, 2010). In fact, most of my 
interviewees highlighted the 2003 coalition government as a demonstration in 
practice of the general shift in minority policies in Croatia after 2000. The HDZ 
subsequently won the elections in 2007 and remained in power until 2011 with 
the support of the minority representatives, managing the entire EU accession 
process of Croatia and signing the accession treaty of Croatia in December 2011.  
The last electoral change took place at the end of 2011 when the SDP with a big 
supporting coalition won the parliamentary elections. The EU accession 
negotiations were concluded by then, i.e. in June 2011, although the pre-
accession monitoring from the European Commission was still in force until 
Croatia’s accession to the EU in July 2013. 
 
4.2.3 Relationship with the EU  
Similarly as with the minorities, the Croatian relationship with 
international actors in the first decade of independence was not been easy. In 
fact, although  independent Croatia was based on the narrative of belonging to 
Europe, by the mid-1990s, Tudjman criticized Europe for being inactive on the 
Yugoslav wars  (Jovid, 2006).  This has been also noted in research arguing that 
“Croatian citizens’ distrust of the EU developed early in the 1990s, partly because 
of the Union’s efforts to keep Yugoslavia together and its inactivity in stopping the 
wars (Fisher, 2006 p.204-205).  In general, academic research has argued that the 
policies of the international community towards the region were diverse, however 
“the instruments used were often inadequate, untimely, ineffective and 
inconsistent” (Zakošek, 2008 p.602). Nevertheless, the European orientation and 
belonging of Croatia were underlined in the public discourse.  
In light of these conflicting objectives, the establishment and 
development of the EU-Croatia relationship has not had a linear path, although 
the Union recognised Croatia as an independent state already in 1992. In 1992, 
the Commission presented a Proposal to include Croatia in the PHARE 
Programme, but it was rejected from the Council and EP on grounds of insufficient 
respect of human rights (CORDIS, 1996).  In March 1995, the EU agreed to start 
negotiating a cooperation agreement with Croatia and to extend PHARE 
                                            
65 This was confirmed to me by a majority of the interviewees. 
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assistance to the country. In August of the same year, both processes were 
suspended following the operations Flash and Storm, although in January 1996 
the PHARE programme was re-opened to assist the reconstruction of Eastern 
Slavonia (See EC, 1996). Overall, during the first five years of independence the 
war in Croatia as well as the role of Croatia in the Bosnian war heavily strained the 
relationship with the EU.  
At the same time, Croatia reluctantly joined the EU Regional Approach of 
1997, devised specifically for the former Yugoslav countries and Albania, 
examined in chapter five. The 1996 launching of the Regional Approach of the EU 
was foremost criticized because of its association with the Western Balkans, 
which was starkly opposed by Tudjman at the time. For illustration, in 1997 the 
Croatian constitution was amended by introducing a prohibition to “initiate any 
procedure for the association of the Republic of Croatia in alliances with other 
states if such association leads, or might lead, to renewal of a South Slavic state 
community or to any Balkan state alliance of any kind”.66 Croatian intellectuals 
and academic literature have linked the introduction of this specific legal 
obligation to the launching of the EU Regional Approach, examined in chapter 
dealing with the 1997-2005 period (Rodin, n/a, Jovid, 2006). At the same time, 
however, the European orientation of Croatia was stressed, and “in this sense EU 
membership is not only a goal in itself, but also a means of potentially recognising 
the de-Balkanising of Croatia” (Zambelli, 2010). 
The relationship with the EU was similar to the relationship with other 
international organisations and closely linked to the efforts for reconciliation after 
the war. Croatia became a member of the CoE in 1996 after having its initial 
application submitted in 1992 frozen and being imposed specific human rights 
requirements.  Even in this case, there were doubts about the human rights 
record of the country both in academia and policy circles (See Sadurski, 2009). 
Similarly, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) 
became a key actor, which has been of increasing importance in the process of 
Croatia’s EU accession. Tudjman was in the same way reluctant to cooperate with 
the ICTY. In 1999 the ICTY “prosecutor requested  the [court] President  to  find  
that  Croatia  had failed  to  comply  with  its obligations  towards  the  Tribunal  
and  to  report  the matter  to  the  Security Council”  (ICTY, 1999). Overall, the 
                                            
66 Amendments to Constitution of the Republic of Croatia, Official Gazette No. 
135/97 15 December 1997 <http://narodne-
novine.nn.hr/clanci/sluzbeni/1998_01_8_121.html> [Accessed 04 May 2010]. 
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first decade of independence of Croatia was marked by difficulty in joining and 
cooperating with international organisations, including the EU.  
In light of this legacy of the first 10 years of independence, the post-2000 
period in addition to being a break up with the previous minority policies practice, 
was characterised by a shift in the relationship with the international 
organisations, especially the EU. Thus, the first post-2000 government “initiated 
the processes of rapprochement and integration of the country into the 
international political and economic organizations and institutions from which it 
had been barred” (Kasapovid, 2004 p.63, See also Zambelli, 2010). “The new 
narrative was based on the notion that isolation was neither desirable nor viable 
in the long-term. In order to survive as a state, Croatia must join European 
institutions” (Jovid, 2006). In fact, between 2000 and 2003 Croatia signed the SAA, 
became a partner of the NATO Partnership for Peace, and in a way was 
attempting to catch up on the decade in which it was in the foreground of the EU 
accession processes.  
In addition to the standard set of Copenhagen criteria two issues have 
been burdening Croatia’s relationship with the EU: the cooperation with the ICTY 
and regional cooperation. The ICTY cooperation was of extreme significance since 
the negotiations with Croatia were postponed until the cooperation with the 
tribunal was deemed successful, i.e. with the handing over of war general Ante 
Gotovina to The Hague. The cooperation with the ICTY has remained one of the 
most divisive topics in the Croatian society (For an analysis see Zambelli, 2010). 
This example demonstrates that despite the reconciliation slowly taking place, 
there is no common stance on the recent history and past (Sadkovich, 2009). In 
relation to the latter, a border dispute with Slovenia was also a stumbling block in 
relation to Croatia’s EU accession process. Slovenia in fact blocked the 
negotiations process between December 2008 and September 2009, when it 
agreed to resort to international arbitration and decoupled the problem from 
Croatia’s EU negotiations. It has been argued that the dispute was an “example of 
instrumentalizing accession negotiations for domestic political goals [...], but led 
to an almost one-year blockage of accession negotiations with Croatia and 
consequently postponed its accession” (Lang, 2012 p.501).  
 
4.3  Conclusions  
This chapter situated the study in its context in terms of minority policies 
and involvement of international actors, especially the EU in Macedonia and 
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Croatia. In terms of the first element of analysis, it examined the evolution of the 
minority issue since independence in the case studies. While both countries were 
members of Yugoslav federation and thus had similar formal legacies, the 
minority issue has developed divergently. On the one hand, the biggest minorities 
in the newly independent states (Albanians in Macedonia and the Serbs in 
Croatia) found themselves threatened by the new status in the independent 
Macedonia and Croatia. Although this similarity is largely shared, the 
developments in the minority issue had divergent trajectories. Whereas the 
majority of the Serbs in Croatia excluded themselves from the Croatian 
governance in the early 1990s, the Albanians in Macedonia participated in the 
institutions, despite signs of discontent with the new position of a minority. At the 
same time, in the latter case dissatisfaction with the status persisted and led to a 
short conflict which transformed the nature of the minority rights regime. In 
Croatia, the use of force by the state and the massive displacement of the Serb 
population are the key feature of the minority question since independence.   
In both countries the electoral systems were heavily influenced by the 
minority politics and note an evolution from a majoritarian to a proportional 
system of government. This shift has generally been considered to support 
minority participation, although in Croatia this is ensured through the reserved 
seats in Parliament as well. However, in Macedonia due to the peaceful 
transformation of the regime as well as the higher number of minority population, 
ethnic minority parties have been participating in coalition governments since 
1990s and generally have a much more powerful position than the case of Croatia. 
In the latter, ethnic minority parties were members of the coalition governments 
between 2003 and 2011, but they’re not an indispensable part, as is the case in 
Macedonia.  
Lastly, both countries’ relationship with the EU was strained in the early 
1990s, however due to a variety of reasons. For Macedonia, Greece’s objections 
to the name issue led to a belated establishment of diplomatic relations. The role 
of Croatia in the Bosnian war and Tudjman’s discontent with Europe strained the 
relations for the entire first decade of Croatian independence, marked by call for 
sanctions for non-cooperation against Croatia. Since 1997 and especially 2001, 
their relationship with the EU followed the same path through the regional 
approach and the signing of the SAAs. At the same time however, in Macedonia 
the EU gained prominence through its role as a co-signatory of the 2001 OFA. In 
late 2004 their paths diverge again as Croatia received a recommendation for the 
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start of the accession negotiation which were launched at the end of 2005 and 
completed in 2011. In contrast, Macedonia until mid 2013 has not commenced 
negotiations for EU accession in the last several years because of the name 
dispute with Greece.  
These most important features, similarities and differences between the 
two cases shape the environment in which the EU has employed its policy of 
conditionality since 1997 with the Regional Approach. Overall, it must be kept in 
mind that with the OFA the EU has gained a much more embedded role in 
national minority policies in Macedonia, than in Croatia. At the same time, due to 
the stronger organisation of domestic actors in Macedonia, their influence can 
also be expected to be higher. Lastly, in light of the countries’ trajectories on the 
road to the EU it can be concluded that since 2005, the credibility of the accession 
of Croatia has been higher than in the case of Macedonia, as will be discussed in 
chapter six of the dissertation. 
Having presented the context, the rest of the thesis is dedicated to an 
empirical analysis of the application of EU conditionality in relation to minority 
policies in Macedonia and Croatia. The following three chapters (five, six and 
seven) deal in detail with the EU conditionality in relation to minority policies in 
both case studies since 1997. Chapters five and six study horizontally the 
interactions between the EU and domestic actors in relation to minority policies 
between 1997 and 2005, i.e. before the accession negotiations with Croatia were 
launched. Chapter six deals with the post-2005 period, since when Croatia starts 
the accession negotiations and Macedonia is a candidate state waiting for the 
launching of the negotiations. Lastly, chapter seven examines in detail the policy 
of employment in the administration which has become the most prominent 
element of EU conditionality in relation to minority policies.    
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5. Conditionality and minority policies: The regional approach (1997-2000) 
and the early SAA period (2001-2005) 
5.1  Introduction 
The Regional Approach, launched in 1997 laid the foundations of the 
relationship between the EU and the Western Balkans region as the beginning of 
the conditionality towards these countries as a group. In 2001, this instrument 
was upgraded through the SAP, which represents the basis of the formal 
contractual relationship between the region and the EU.67 This chapter examines 
the interactions between the EU and the national level with respect to 
conditionality on minority policies between 1997 and 2005. The analysis focuses 
on two distinct periods in the EU-Western Balkans relations: the Regional 
Approach (1997-2000) and the early SAA period (2001-2005).  
Studying the period between 1997 and 2005, the chapter examines 
conditionality and its national responses in the two case studies before they 
became candidates for EU accession, i.e. until Croatia started the accession 
negotiations. The timing of the use of political conditionality is of significance as it 
has an impact upon the incentive structures that operate both in the Union and in 
the candidate countries. In the Eastern enlargement, political conditionality was 
mostly enforced when the countries had advanced well in the negotiations 
process, as was the case with Romania and Bulgaria. Pravda (2001) emphasizes 
this point in terms of the international position of the states with respect to the 
EU on a scale of insiders and outsiders. Between 1997 and 2005 Croatia and 
Macedonia were largely outsiders, shifting towards insiders in the accession 
process. Dimitrova and Pridham (2004) have argued that the process of 
negotiations generally guarantees the fulfilment of the political criteria. However, 
in the period examined in this chapter, since the two countries were not locked 
into the negotiations, there was no increased likelihood of the fulfilment of the 
conditions in relation to minority policies. Still, as was pointed in my interviews, 
“the EU has been in the Balkans before the official negotiations started and this is 
important as pre-history”. 68 
While touching upon all the research questions, the chapter primarily 
focuses on how EU conditionality has been implemented through the use of the 
FCNM and national legislation and the consistency of EU conditionality between 
                                            
67 With the exception of Croatia’s accession treaty.  
68 Author’s interview with advisor to the President of the Republic of Croatia, 
Zagreb, 20 May 2011. 
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1997 and 2005. The chapter is structured in two major sections dealing with the 
Regional Approach (1997 – 2000) and SAA period (2001-2005). Both sections 
follow the same structure, as they first present the context of the EU initiative and 
the literature’s findings. The second part of both sections consists of process 
tracing of the EU documents, national strategic documents and the interview 
data. Since in the first period the EU’s assessments are general, the analysis is also 
conducted at a macro level. With the increased specification of the EU 
conditionality since 2001, the analysis is divided in two sections corresponding to 
the second research question of the thesis, i.e. by focusing on the use of the CoE 
FCNM as part of EU conditionality and national legislation and agreements in both 
countries.69 The chapter argues that the weak consistency of the use of the FCNM 
and national legislation as elements of EU conditionality in the period of 
examination, has constrained the effectiveness of the instrument. Thus, it 
contributes to illustrating the overall argument of the thesis, while concentrating 
on the first two research questions elaborated in the introduction.  
 
5.2  1997-2000 Regional Approach  
5.2.1 Background on the Regional Approach  
As a region, the Western Balkans has been subject to EU conditionality 
since the mid-1990s through various instruments and policy frameworks, ranging 
from the Union’s foreign policy to the enlargement portfolio. Generally, “there 
has not been a single policy by the EU towards the region, but rather a number of 
different policies carried out by a host of different institutions and ad hoc bodies 
of the EU” (Bieber, 2011b p.1776). In the late 1990s, the EU introduced the 
regional approach targeting the countries of the region with the purpose of 
inciting reforms in the political area, such as return of refugees and inter-ethnic 
reconciliation. In the official terminology of the Council of the EU, the Regional 
Approach combined the objective of implementing the local peace agreements, as 
well as advocated political and economic cooperation between the countries in 
this region (Council, 1997). Although directed towards the regional reconciliation, 
of which minority rights present an essential element, in the regional approach 
“no direct references were made to minority rights per se within the country-
specific conditions though the need to address majority-minority relations was 
clearly implied” (Gordon et al., 2008 p.12). 
                                            
69 As already explained, the same structure is used in the next chapter as well. For 
more on this, see methodology chapter.  
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The launching of the Regional Approach occurred prior to the entry into 
force of the Amsterdam treaty, i.e. in a period when the EU engagement in 
external relations was still nascent (On the early development of the CFSP see 
Smith, 2003). In 1997, the EU was largely still in the shadow of its failure to deal 
effectively with the Yugoslav crisis, focusing on the Eastern enlargement and 
without a political agreement on the Balkans. In this direction, one of my 
interviewees referred to the Regional Approach as “almost a pre-historic era in 
terms of EU conditionality”.70 In the context of enlargement, the launch of the 
Regional Approach corresponds with the beginning of the EU’s systematic 
monitoring of the countries of the Eastern enlargement as the first progress 
reports on these candidates were introduced precisely in 1997. While the 
countries of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) were about to launch negotiations, 
in the Balkans, however, the political situation and security situation was still 
highly volatile. For illustration, the late 1990s, Serbia was still under sanctions and 
the Kosovo conflict was at its peak. Hence, the EU shaped its position in the region 
through an immediate security threats approach, not looking into deeper use of 
conditionality.71 Moreover, “in reality, bilateral relations barely progressed in the 
post-1997 period and negative conditionality prevailed in the form of limited 
contractual relations, exclusions from Association Agreements and, in cases like 
Serbia outright sanctions” (Anastasakis and Bechev, 2003 p.7).  
In academic literature, the Regional Approach, has been assessed as 
inadequate to bring about stability and prosperity among other reasons for not 
having a “core perspective nor an elaborate strategy” (Fakiolas and Tzifakis, 2008 
p.381). This assessment is supported by two main explanations: the “collective” 
approach and the lack of membership incentive. In relation to the former, the 
Regional approach was the first form of conditionality for the Western Balkan 
countries as a group (Gordon et al., 2008). Prior to this strategy, every country 
had established bilateral relations with the Union following its respective 
recognition by the EU member states. Moreover, these states were to form a new 
political category under the heading of the “Western Balkans” (Bartlett and 
Samardžija, 2000). In fact, “in a situation where there is no shared notion of the 
region but only various, often contradictory, notions held by the respective 
regional countries themselves, what constitutes the ‘region’ is frequently defined 
from the outside” (Delevic, 2007 p.14).  
                                            
70 Author’s interview with think tank analyst, Brussels, 5 October 2010. 
71 Author’s interview with think tank analyst, Brussels, 5 October 2010. 
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This new reinvention of the region (excluding the candidate countries 
Bulgaria, Romania and Slovenia) carried negative connotations for all of the 
countries concerned. Albania and Macedonia were already bound by agreements 
with the EU and hence “perceived the regional approach as a rather step 
backwards in their relations with Brussels, [while] Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia 
saw in this EU undertaking an attempt at reconstituting somehow a version of 
former Yugoslavia” (Fakiolas and Tzifakis, 2008 p.381). These two countries as 
countries which were not involved in warfare had signed agreements with the EU 
which contained exceptional conditions in relation to the regional stability, hence 
the respective governments expected  to advance at a quicker pace than the rest 
of the region (For a detailed analysis of their agreements see Fierro, 2003). As a 
specific case, Croatia has traditionally since independence resisted accepting any 
association with the Balkan region or the other Yugoslav successors. According to 
Vlahutin (2004), “Croatia’s urge to distance itself from the underdeveloped and 
war-torn region [...] resulted from an assessment that inclusion in the Balkan 
grouping would necessarily drag Croatia down” (p.22).  
In addition to its “collective dimension” the regional approach was also at 
the time of its launching considered as an inadequate mechanism of conditionality 
since it did not provide the basic incentive of the prospect of membership. “While 
refraining from extending the offer of membership, Brussels developed relations 
with the regional states both on an individual and collective basis” (Anastasakis 
and Bechev, 2003). Local experts have considered that the EU Regional Approach 
was vague with limited financial backing and most importantly offered no 
incentives to these countries to carry forward its main objectives (Uvalic, 2001).  
This has been a common critique in literature as to more recent periods of EU 
accession as well, in terms of “a fundamental commitment deficit: without a clear 
time frame regarding a future EU membership for the countries in the Western 
Balkans, the prospect of membership remains only an abstract possibility without 
palpable political implications” (Renner and Trauner, 2009 p.450).  
This section has presented the contextual developments and literature’s 
take on the regional approach as the first monitoring and application of 
conditionality towards the region. It has presented the main elements of the 
regional approach, the context of its launching as well as the literature’s findings. 
Against this background, the following section will present the empirical analysis 
of the content of the reports on the case study countries in order to establish 
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whether there is any evident form of a minority policy conditionality developed in 
the period studied.  
 
5.2.2 Empirical analysis for Regional Approach 1997-2000 
 Having determined that the Regional Approach has broadly been assessed 
as a weak tool of EU conditionality, this section examines the European 
Commission documents for the purposes of studying the consistency of the 
criteria in relation to minority policies. The analysis is largely based on the 
European Commission reports because in this period, as the respective 
governments did not produce extensive strategic documents for EU integration, 
which is the case in the following two chapters. In the Annex of the 1997 General 
Affairs Council conclusions, the specific conditions according to which progress in 
meeting the requirements of the Regional Approach are outlined, including: 
 I) the right of minorities to establish and maintain their own institutions, 
organizations or educational, cultural and religious institutions, organisations or 
associations 
 ii) Opportunities for these minorities to speak their own language before 
the courts and public authorities; 
 iii) Adequate protection of refugees and displaced persons returning to 
areas where they constitute an ethnic minority (Council, 1997) 
In light of these conditions, local experts have concluded that “the 
Regional approach political conditions basically correspond to the Copenhagen 
political criteria, but focus more on human rights, and specifically on minority 
rights” (Jordanova, 2006 p.8). 
Between 1997 and 2000, the European Commission published five reports 
on the progress of each of the countries of the region in meeting the conditions of 
the regional approach.72 “The Regional approach was similarly based on periodic 
assessments – but very general ones examining whether the governments of 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, the FRY, Macedonia, and Albania were respecting 
basic Western standards of democracy and human rights” (Vachudova, 2003 
p.147). A close examination of the European Commission documents in this 
period shows that in relation to minority policies there is increased repetition of 
the EU assessments. The copying of the same remarks and lack of specific 
assessments or conditions that need to be fulfilled was also confirmed in the 
                                            
72 Two reports were published in 1997 and one per year in 1998, 1999 and 2000.  
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interviews. In this direction, it was highlighted that “the repetition of the remarks 
in the reports from this period was a result of the still distant relationship 
between the EU and the region”.73 One of my interlocutors in Macedonia 
highlighted that “although one would expect the minority issue to be high on the 
agenda before 2001, the assessments in this period were not negative and had no 
specific benchmarks, especially if one examines the reports of 1998 and 1999”.74  
In terms of topics, the Commission in this period deals with a variety of 
issues linked to institutional and legislative aspects of minority policies, ranging 
from use of languages, education to formal mechanisms for cooperation between 
majority and minority groups. Furthermore, the careful reading of the European 
Commission documents highlights that there are no benchmarks or 
recommendations put forward, in addition to the repetition of the European 
Commission remarks and the evident non-responsiveness at the national level. 
The analysis therefore confirms the findings on the previous enlargements which 
have argued that “the first reports of the European Commission on the candidate 
countries lack a clear methodology on the political conditionality for objective 
cross-country comparisons between states, which explains the general 
assessment that the countries fulfill the Copenhagen criteria”(Pridham, 2002a). 
 The European Commission reports on Macedonia are essentially 
characterised by reiteration of the remarks and lack of continuous follow up on an 
annual basis. There is substantial difference between the reports of the first two 
years (1997-1998) as opposed to 1999 and 2000. In the former, the Commission 
dealt with policy and institutional aspects of minority policies, whereas in the 
latter period it assesses the relationships between the political parties and inter-
ethnic relations. For example, in the three consecutive reports between 1997 and 
1998, the Commission criticizes the lack of operation of the Parliament appointed 
Council of Inter-Ethnic Relations (EC, 1997b, 1998b, 1998a). Though repeated in 
the all three reports, this remark is not followed up in the subsequent reports of 
1999 and 2000, putting into question the consistent application of conditionality. 
Lack of follow up is also noticeable in relation to other policies like use of 
language and education. In 1997 and 1998 the Commission notes that “a key 
minority issue is access to Albanian language education and, despite some 
                                            
73 Author’s interview with former vice prime minister for EU affairs, Skopje, 23 
December 2010. 
74 Author’s interview with senior civil servant in the Secretariat for European 
Affairs, Skopje, 22 December 2010. 
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progress. the school system is still faced with serious difficulties due to limited 
resources, in particular shortages of secondary school teachers for Albanian 
language education” (EC, 1997b p.4, see also, 1998b). Similarly as with the Council 
of Inter-ethnic relations, this remark is also not followed up in the last two reports 
of 1999 and 2000.  
Whereas in the first two years the European Commission deals with the 
policy and institutional aspects of minority policies, in 1999 and 2000 it changed 
its focus and concentrated on assessing the work and political will of the 
Government and coalition partners.  Thus, in the 2000 report, the European 
Commission changes its focus and deals with the inter-coalition relations between 
the Governmental partners, without follow up on the remarks and 
recommendations from previous years. Pridham (2002b), noted this tendency by 
arguing that “the EU has moved resolutely down the path of high as well as low 
politics and, thereby, into areas traditionally regarded as internal to states” 
(p.203). Similarly, one can relate this shift to the evolving role of the EU as an 
actor in the case of Macedonia, discussed in chapter three (See Noutcheva et al., 
2004). Moreover, the European Commission in the same year comments on the 
“open attitude” and “pragmatism” of the Government towards ethnic minorities, 
without a follow up on the policy level which was the case between 1997 and 
1998. Hence, between 1997 and 2000 it is evident that there are two distinct 
approaches with respect to Macedonia which are to be identified in the EU 
documents. In the first two years, the European Commission deals with policy 
level conditions which are not followed up in 1999 and 2000, when the reports 
deal with the relations between the political actors.  
 In its monitoring of Croatia between 1997 and 2000, the European 
Commission focuses on the role of the Serb and Italian minority and the topics of 
language and return of refugees with numerous reiterations on the lack of 
progress from year to year. In the first report of 1997 the Commission states that 
most [minorities] do not experience major problems, at the same time 
highlighting the problems of refugee return (EC, 1997a). This assessment was 
surprising because only two years previously, in 1995 the expulsion “of ethnic 
Serbs *…+ set Croatia off track, after which the country was removed from PHARE 
and cooperation negotiations were halted” (Fisher, 2006 p.191). In addition, in 
1996-1997 due to insufficient cooperation on human rights and failure to facilitate 
the return of Serbian refugees  Croatia had severed its relations with the CoE and 
the US (See Smoljan, 2003). In these circumstances at the time, the European 
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Commission assessment that minorities do not experience major problems is 
problematic and puts into question the viability of conditionality as expressed in 
the EU documents. 
On a legislative level, in Croatia the Commission focuses on the Minority 
language act and the Law on the use of minority languages in education (EC, 
1998a, 1999).75 However, the reports only mention the suspension of provisions 
of the Constitutional Law on Human Rights and the Rights of National Minorities 
in 1999, without going into detail of the impact of these suspensions, although 
they have been considered in literature to be highly discriminatory against the 
national minorities (See Petričušid and Žagar, 2007). The recommendation to 
adopt a new Constitutional Law on the Rights of National Minorities, which was a 
long-term obligation for Croatia’s CoE membership is for the first time mentioned 
in the 1999 report and is then repeated as an obligation which was not fulfilled in 
2000 (EC, 1999, 2000). The 2000 report as the last one of the Regional Approach, 
solely states that “none of the expected modifications of the legislative 
framework for the protection of minority rights has been finalised, notably the 
revision of the Constitutional Law on Human Rights and the Rights of Minorities” 
(EC, 2000 p.11). Hence, for Croatia the Commission fleetingly addresses minority 
issues with a repetition of the failure to adopt minority related legislation. As an 
explanation of the Commission’s fleeting references to minority policies, an 
interviewee with extensive experience in Croatia highlighted that “at the time the 
Commission did not have the capacity to monitor all of the aspects of minority 
issues”.76 
The government response to the EU recommendations in Croatia was 
equally inconsistent. The Government already in 1999 adopted the First Action 
Plan for European Integration  which does not foresee any substantial activities on 
the minorities issue besides mentioning the on-going revision of the 
Constitutional Law without undertaking any further obligations (Government of 
the Republic of Croatia, 1999). This approach was largely confirmed by my 
interviewees who have argued that the “Government at the time was much more 
closed for discussion of minority issues”.77 This response is not surprising having in 
                                            
75 These laws were adopted upon the change of Government in 2000, after 6 
years in parliamentary procedure and published in the Official Gazette 51/00. 
76 Author’s interview with UN representative, former OSCE representative, 
Zagreb, 07 June 2011. 
77 Author’s interview with UN representative, former OSCE representative, 
Zagreb, 07 June 2011. 
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mind that the largely nationalistic Tudjman regime was still ruling Croatia, as 
explained in the previous chapter. Similarly, Vachudova (2003) has argued that 
the compliance with the conditions for association with EU of Croatia was 
selective. As a result, in April 1998 “the Council stated that it was even 
considering removing Croatia from the autonomous trade preferences regulation 
at next review” (Cremona, 1999 p.487)  
 Overall in the period of the Regional Approach, the European Commission 
has fleetingly and selectively highlighted minority issues in each of the countries 
studies at different points in time. Even though the Conclusions of the General 
Council put forward specific conditions according to which the progress of the 
countries would be measured, these were not followed up in their European 
Commission Reports. First, there was no consistent approach on the issues 
addressed in both countries, or within one country chronologically. Second, there 
was no attempt to go beyond the legislative/institutional dimensions of minority 
policy and the assessments are repeated from one year to another. In terms of 
country differences, in reference to Macedonia, the Commission in the 1997-1998 
deals with various aspects of policy and legislation, whereas in the two 
subsequent years, it assesses the political developments and the relations 
between the Government partners. In Croatia, on the other hand, there is a 
constant focus on the lack of progress in adopting legislation, more specifically the 
CLNM. The analysis therefore largely confirms the findings of the literature on the 
largely blurred and unsuccessful role of the regional approach, which was 
upgraded with the SAP, discussed in the following section.  
 
5.3  2001-2005 period: From SAA signatories to candidates   
 This section examines the interactions between the EU and national 
governments in the period since the signing of the SAAs in 2001 until the granting 
of a candidate status in 2004/2005. As in the preceding analysis, it first provides a 
short introduction into the SAA process elaborating on its multifaceted nature, its 
background and literature findings for setting of the context for the empirical 
assessment that follows. The latter empirical section uses process tracing to 
examine the consistency and application of EU conditionality in relation to 
minority policies and is divided in two main parts. The first one examines the use 
of the FCNM as a benchmark in minority policies, whereas the second examines 
the consistency in the use of national legislation as a benchmarking tool for 
minority policies. The time span of the analysis corresponds to the period when 
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the European Commission issued the SAP Reports on the countries of the Western 
Balkans which are substantially less detailed than the subsequent Progress 
Reports introduced in 2005. 
5.3.1  Background on the Stabilisation and Association Process 
 The launching of the SAP followed the largely recognised failure of the 
Regional Approach examined in the previous section. The SAP consists of three 
main instruments in supporting the countries from the Western Balkans to 
advance their development path towards membership: the SAA, the autonomous 
trade measures and substantial financial assistance.  As a legal document, the SAA 
does not contain a suspension clause, but links the provision of assistance under 
the Community Assistance for reconstruction, development and stabilisation 
(CARDS) to the priorities set by the Commission, including democratic 
stabilisation, strengthening civil society and the media, protecting minority rights 
and good governance (Börzel and Risse, 2004). The SAAs represent the core 
formal contractual relationships between the countries of the Western Balkans 
and the EU and as such have established the main bodies of communication 
between the EU and the candidate countries. These include the annual meetings 
of the Stabilisation and Association Council, the Committee and the thematic sub-
committees at which various topics related to the respective country’s accession 
process were discussed.  
 Macedonia and Croatia were the first signatories of the SAA in the 
Western Balkans region. Macedonia signed the SAA Agreement in February 2001 
in peculiar circumstances as the country was in the midst of an armed conflict, as 
explained in chapter three of the thesis. Academic research has argued that 
“Macedonia was offered a SAA as a political reward for support given to the West 
during the Kosovo war, [while] Croatia was next to sign the agreement as a 
reward for the formation of a new government following the death of Tudjman” 
(Anastasakis and Bechev, 2003 p.7). During the war in Kosovo, almost 350 000 
refugees arrived in Macedonia and were hosted in a period of nine weeks, 
although the numbers still remain controversial (See Barutciski and Suhrke, 2001). 
Fierro (2003) has maintained that the quick negotiation of the agreement with 
Macedonia was a result of its significance for regional stability in general. 
Similarly, Trauner (2011) pointed that “the link between conflict resolution and 
the reward of signing the SAA hence provided the EU with powerful external 
leverage at a crucial moment” (p.146).  
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Croatia’s signing of the SAA in October 2001 was considered as a 
beginning of the political liberalisation following the largely authoritarian rule of 
former President Franjo Tudjman.78 In fact, in the aftermath of the Presidential 
and Parliamentary elections of 2000 the relations between Croatia and the EU 
improved dramatically (Cremona, 1999 p.487). Similarly, research on minority 
policies and especially minority return has singled out the year 2000 as a major 
turning point in this policy area  (Djuric, 2010). Still this period of shifting policies 
was not completely smooth because due to the refusal of the SDP government to 
transfer an army general to the ICTY led to suspension of the SAA ratification by 
the British and Dutch Parliaments (See Fisher, 2006). 
In an attempt to address some of the identified problems of the Regional 
approach, the main novelty of the SAA was the consideration of the countries of 
the Western Balkans as potential candidates for accession. The “potential” 
candidates status was a result of EU negotiations between Germany and France in 
the first half of 2000 under the German presidency of the EU, as illustrated by Friis 
and Murphy (2000). The perspective for membership for these countries was also 
confirmed in June and November 2000 at the Feira and Zagreb European Councils 
(European Council, 2000b, 2000a), however, until 2004 these countries were still 
subject to monitoring solely in relation to their SAA obligations and were in the 
portfolio of DG for External Relations.79 As a result, governments in the region 
have regarded the conditions in the SAA as a way of deferring membership 
(Anastasakis and Bechev, 2003). In this vein, it has been argued that “the SAP was 
not as elaborate and geared to EU accession as the Accession Partnerships for the 
CEE candidate countries” (Vlahutin, 2004 p.26). Although at the EU level there 
was an expectation that once the SAA was implemented, the country would be in 
a position to apply for a candidate status, this did not materialise. Both 
Macedonia and Croatia applied for membership already in 2003/2004, indicating 
the dissatisfaction with the state of play as potential candidate countries, seeking 
to be “upgraded” to candidates for accession (see Vlahutin, 2004).  The reception 
of their applications was not positive and both of them were actively discouraged 
from this step (On Croatia see Fisher, 2006 p.194). For Macedonia, an interviewee 
                                            
78 See section on context in Croatia in chapter four.  
79 The transfer of these countries to the DG Enlargement will be discussed in the 
following chapter as this period is specifically examined there.  
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described the application for membership as “an almost impossible mission, 
having in mind the cold informal reception from the EU officials”. 80 
 In light of these complexities, academic literature has considered the SAA 
as a hybrid process, having in mind that it is based on the principles of the Eastern 
enlargement while at the same time attempting to address the post-conflict 
societies of this region (Gordon, 2009). In essence, the policy consisted of both 
assisting post-conflict reconstruction and in building future EU member states 
(Bieber, 2011b). The research on the success and perspective of the SAA as an 
instrument has brought about different conclusions. On the one hand, it has been 
recognized that the SAP was “as a shift from an ad hoc ‘fire-fighting’ style of crisis 
management to a more long-term broadly integrationist approach to the WB 
region” (Gordon et al., 2008 p.3). At the same time, due to its multifaceted 
nature, Elbasani (2008) has maintained that “the EU enlargement framework in 
the Balkans is less clear than in the previous example of CEE in terms of the 
overloaded and rather conflicting agenda combining stabilization and association” 
(p.2). Similarly, Fierro (2003)  has argued that whereas in the Eastern enlargement 
conditionality “serves the purpose of bringing these countries on the track for 
accession to the EU, in the case of Southeastern Europe, conditionality is used as a 
tool for bringing durable peace and stability to the region” (p.133).   
 While research on the general role of the SAA in terms of the combination 
of both building member states and peace and post-conflict reconstruction has 
appeared (Chandler, 2007), the analysis specifically of minority rights in the EU 
accession process has been mostly limited to expert opinions and CSO studies 
(See Bokulid and Kostadinova, 2008, Gordon et al., 2008). In general, the work of 
Gordon et al has already hinted at the internal inconsistencies in the policy at the 
European level in relation to minorities (Gordon et al., 2008). This section 
therefore builds upon and extends this research on the SAA process and 
minorities primarily by bringing insight from national documents for European 
integration and the data from the interviews with stakeholders. It looks closely 
into the EU progress reports from this period and the national strategic 
documents in order to examine if there is consistency and clear causality in the 
relationship between the EU conditions and the developments in national 
minority policies between 2001 and 2005.  
  
                                            
80 Author’s interview with senior civil servant in the Secretariat for European 
Affairs, Skopje, 22 December 2010.. 
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5.3.2 Empirical analysis – conditionality and national minority policies 
between 2001 and 2005  
 This section presents the empirical analysis of the minority related 
conditionality between 2001 and 2005.  In this period the European Commission 
published three SAA reports in 2002, 2003 and 2004. These documents, as 
explained in the methodology section, serve both for stipulating and monitoring 
of the realisation of EU conditionality. In addition, in 2003/2004 the European 
Commission sent questionnaires on the applications for membership to both 
countries. In 2004, the Commission Opinion on the application of Croatia for 
membership was published. A year later, the corresponding document on 
Macedonia was also prepared by the Commission, upon receiving the country’s 
application for membership. These documents served as main sources of 
conditionality in relation to minority policies, since, as was argued by my 
interviewees “there was no further guidance in this policy area”.81 In this period 
the countries started preparing elaborate documents for EU accession at the 
national level. Hence, in 2001 the governments in both countries prepared their 
plans for implementation of the SAAs and submitted reports on their 
implementation on a yearly basis. This section therefore presents a process 
tracing analysis of this “dialogue of documents” between the EU and national 
governments and links these findings with the interview data. The objective is to 
trace if the European Commission has consistently used and applied conditionality 
in relation to minority policies, whether these conditions were accepted from the 
national level in the strategic documents and through the interviews with 
stakeholders.  
The structure of the section was determined by document analysis and 
interview data, which have pointed to two major ways in which the European 
Commission has addressed minority policies in its documents, reflected in the 
second research question of the dissertation. First, similarly as in the previous 
enlargement, it used references to the FCNM and second, it monitored the 
adoption and implementation of domestic legislation and agreements. In fact, 
most of my interviewees when asked about the main sources of EU conditionality 
highlighted that the EU uses references to international instruments, most 
notably the FCNM and also monitors various aspects of the implementation of 
domestic policies in relation to minorities. In the latter case, the EU was “relying 
                                            
81 Author’s interview with European Commission official, Skopje 21 January 2011. 
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on domestic rules and agreements [which] is advantageous as it enables the EU 
institutions to focus their policy on the specific local situation, but it risks that the 
parameters of the situation determine the standards [...] underlying EU policies” 
(Brusis, 2003 p.4). In line with the focus of the European Commission, this section 
examines whether there was consistent use of the FCNM and references to 
national legislation as elements of EU conditionality in the two countries between 
2001 and 2005.  
 
The FCNM as an element of EU conditionality  
As already explained in the introduction, due to the lack of common 
standards on minority policies, research has adopted a context-specific approach 
in relation to the countries in question.  In the Eastern enlargement, conditionality 
in relation to the minorities was mostly focused on the adoption of non-
discrimination directives, the FCNM and governmental strategies targeting the 
Roma (Rechel, 2008). Sasse in her research argues that “over time the FCNM of 
1995 became the Commission’s primary instrument for translating the minority 
criterion into practice” (Sasse, 2005 p.5). As a result of its importance, studies on 
EU enlargement have stressed the need for a shift “towards a somewhat more 
formal incorporation of the Council of Europe [i.e. FCNM] monitoring system 
within the EU pre-accession” (Kochenov, 2006 p.341).  Recent research, however 
has highlighted that “despite the fact that the FCNM *…+ aspired to create a 
common standard, this standard was selectively applied by the EU towards the 
reforming states of Eastern Europe” (Koinova, 2011 p.811).  
The main legal document which determines the relations between the EU 
on the one hand and the case studies in this period and in Macedonia’s case until 
today, is the SAA itself. Specifically in relation to minority rights, Gordon et al have 
underlined that although the Communication on the SAA “acknowledged the 
importance of human and minority rights [...] , there was no further mention of 
this dimension in its early exposition of the six main elements of the SAP let alone 
in the country specific conclusions” (Gordon et al., 2008 p.13). The SAA solely 
recalls the need for respect of minority rights in principle and does not stipulate 
any specific obligations. The criteria for the assessment of compliance with the 
Regional Approach provided in the Annex conclusions of 1997, examined in the 
previous section were not incorporated formally in the SAA. Gordon et al highlight 
that “as the regional approach was incorporated into the broader and 
multifaceted Stability and Association process, the actual place of minority rights 
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was to become diluted (Gordon et al., 2008 p.13). Kochenov (2004) has made a 
similar remark in relation to the progress reports of the Eastern enlargement 
arguing that, “despite the Commission’s rhetoric concerning the ‘absolute priority’ 
and importance of the political criteria, a record-low space in the progress reports 
is reserved for the political criteria analysis” (p.9). 
  On the national level, in 2001 both countries prepared their 
Implementation Plans for the SAA stipulating activities to be undertaken in the 
upcoming several years. In Macedonia, the main strategic document which 
outlines the activities for this period is the Action Plan for implementation of the 
SAA and the matrix for monitoring its implementation (Government of the 
Republic of Macedonia, 2001). The Action Plan, being prepared in response to the 
SAA obligations, did not incorporate the topic of minority policies. In fact, while 
recognising the need for respect of minority rights; the plan does not foresee any 
specific activities in this policy area. In relation to chapter VII which refers to 
Justice and Home Affairs it puts forward the following broadly defined activity: 
Upgrading of domestic legislation in the function of reinforcement of 
institutions and rule of law, in the context of implementation process of 
the domestic legislation of the “Programme for Approximation of the 
National Legislation to the Legislation of EU”, including continuous active 
implementation of ratified  international documents, as well as acceding 
and/or ratification of EU, Council of Europe and UN conventions, which are 
directly concerned with future reinforcement of institutions and rule of law 
(Government of the Republic of Macedonia, 2001).  
Even if interpreted widely, it is evident that the 2001 SAA Action Plan primarily 
establishes legislative activities with no specific mention of minority policies. 
Similarly, the Croatian Initial implementation Plan of the SAA does not contain any 
reference to the FCNM (See Government of the Republic of Croatia, 2001a).  
As of 2002, the European Commission began publishing annual reports on 
the progress of all the countries included in the SAP. These documents are not as 
detailed as the regular Progress Reports but contain references to all the 
elements of the political criteria, including minority policies.  In the 2002 report on 
Macedonia the European Commission considers that “despite formal protection 
of minority rights *...+ and the ratification of the “Framework Convention for the 
Protection of National Minorities” in 1997, the enforcement of minority rights is a 
major problem in the country, greatly contributing to the current inter-ethnic 
crisis” (EC, 2002). This assessment is to be expected especially having in mind that 
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in the previous year the country was torn by an inter-ethnic conflict, which ended 
with the signing of the OFA, as explained in the previous chapter. However, the 
European Commission does not recommend measures which need to be 
undertaken for the improvement of the situation, nor does it stipulate any 
benchmarks.  
In June 2003, the Macedonian government prepared an Action Plan for 
the implementation of the recommendations of the 2003 SAA Report, a detailed 
document outlining activities specifically directed towards the fulfilment of EU 
conditions (Government of the Republic of Macedonia, 2003a). With respect to 
minority policies, the Action Plan sets out detailed activities for the 
implementation of the OFA mostly directed towards legislative changes and 
reconstruction of buildings damaged in the conflict. The Plan does not mention 
the FCNM or any other international reference. In November 2003, the 
Government prepared a Report on the realisation of this Action Plan which 
provides detailed information on what was implemented in the six months period 
(Government of the Republic of Macedonia, 2003b). This document provides 
detailed information on the legislative activities undertaken and mentions the 
submission of the Initial Report of the country on the implementation of the 
FCNM. However, the reference to the FCNM is sporadic and is not linked to any 
planned activity in relation to fulfilling EU conditionality. 
 Whereas in the documents on Macedonia the European Commission 
fleetingly mentions the FCNM, it does not make any reference to this instrument 
in relation to Croatia. The lack of reference to the FCNM is surprising as the 
Advisory Committee on the FCNM published a report on Croatia in 2001 with a 
detailed analysis of on-the-ground the situation, highlighting the need for 
adoption of the new Constitutional law on national minorities (CoE, 2001). 
Nevertheless, the European Commission did not use this document to back up its 
recommendations for the adoption of a new CLNM in Croatia. Similarly, in the 
2003 SAA report on Croatia or the first European Partnership of 2004 there is no 
mention of the FCNM (EC, 2003a, Council, 2004). Since the national documents 
for EU accession are in essence responses to the EU requirements and 
recommendations, the FCNM is also not mentioned in the official documents of 
the Croatian government, such as the 2002 report on the implementation of the 
SAA (Government of the Republic of Croatia, 2002). Hence, the European 
Commission does not use the FCNM as a reference with respect to Croatia, in 
contrast to the fleeting references with respect to Macedonia elaborated above 
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highlighting the lack of consistency in the use of the FCNM in the EU accession 
process noted by literature (Kochenov, 2006). 
At the same time, the interviews in Croatia provided a more nuanced 
overview of the use of the FCNM in the EU accession in this period. In Croatia 
specifically, national officials responsible for implementing the EU 
recommendations into policies in Croatia highlighted that “the conditions 
stipulated would have been strengthened with the more extensive use of the 
FCNM, which the European Commission did not employ”.82 Similar arguments 
have been put forward in academic literature arguing that “the system of 
standards employed by the CoE during its monitoring is much better articulated 
than that of the EU” (Kochenov, 2006 p.341). This use of the FCNM, however, is 
not reflected in the EU documents as such. On this note, an interviewee reflected 
on the changed circumstances “since 2000 when the primary international 
interlocutor on minority issues was the CoE and not the EU”.83 As a result, CSO 
representatives pointed that in this period “there was a lot of use of the FCNM by 
the EU officials, which is not the case today when the EU officials are attempting 
to set standards”.84 These remarks largely confirmed the process-based definition 
of a formal and informal dimension of conditionality, as well as its changes over 
time. 
In 2004, the last SAA Report for Macedonia was issued, in which the 
European Commission started using the term “European standards” and fleeting 
references to FCNM in relation to minority rights (For more on European 
standards see Kymlicka, 2006). Thus, the European Commission underlined the 
need for “efforts to be made to fully apply European standards, such as the 
implementation of the FCNM of the Council of Europe, [which] would help to 
build further confidence and sense of loyalty to the State” (EC, 2004a). Sasse 
highlighted in her work that this was a legacy of the eastern enlargement, since 
phrases such as international or European standards were used in this case (Sasse, 
2005 p.7). However, the use of the term ‘standards’ in itself is criticized in 
literature, since these are never specified (Hughes and Sasse, 2003). Kymlicka, 
further criticizes these new rules, since “states can fully respect these new 
                                            
82 Author’s interview with senior civil servant in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
Zagreb, 2 June 2011. 
83 Author’s interview with Croatian Ministry of foreign affairs official, Brussels, 10 
November 2010. 
84 Author’s interview with CSO representative, Zagreb, 19 April 2011.  
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standards and yet centralise power in such a way that all decisions are made in 
forums controlled by the dominant national group” (Kymlicka, 2006). 
The use of the term “European standards” which as of this period is 
common in later years has been substantially criticized by all of my interlocutors. 
Most importantly, the officials working on minority issues in relation to EU affairs 
commonly noted that the term “European standards” was used whereas there 
was no common understanding of what it entailed.85 Similarly, it was also argued 
that the term “European standards” conveys an impression that there are 
established standards in relation to minority policies at the EU level, which is not 
the case.86 In this sense, the stakeholders both at EU and national level considered 
the use of these terms more confusing than helpful. For example, a Commission 
official explained that “in many cases the term is used without clear meaning 
behind it”.87  A national official at the other end of the conditionality spectrum 
also did not see the use of the term as beneficial, because of the “evident 
contradictions between the policies of the various member states”.88 
The last formal exercise in the period under analysis in both countries was 
the European Commission “questionnaire” for both countries in relation to their 
applications for membership and the submission of the answers by the respective 
governments. The Croatian and Macedonian questionnaires as indicated by my 
interviewees were very similar and contained detailed questions and answers 
from the respective governments on the minority policies and their 
implementation (For the Macedonian answers to the questionnaire see 2005). 
The objective of this exercise was to determine the factual situation in relation to 
the minorities demanding detailed information on current policies. Following the 
submission of the answers to the questionnaire by Croatia and Macedonia, the 
European Commission published the Opinions recommending that they become 
candidate countries, in 2004 and 2005 respectively. In the 2004 Opinion on 
Croatia the Commission for the first time refers to the FCNM, by underlining that 
“the principles of equality and non-discrimination *…+ appear to be incorporated 
in the Croatian legislation [and that] these principles are consistent with the basic 
                                            
85 Author’s interview with civil servant in the Ministry of Labour and Social Policy, 
Skopje, 28 February 2011. 
86 Author’s interview with Macedonian diplomat, Brussels, 19 October 2010; 
Author’s interview with CSO representative, Zagreb, 16 June 2011. 
87 Author’s interview with European Commission official, Brussels, 8 October 
2010. 
88 Author’s interview with civil servant in the Ministry of justice, Skopje, 18 
January 2011. 
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principles of the FCNM and the European Charter for Regional and Minority 
languages” (EC, 2004b). Similarly, Letschert in her research has argued that the 
European Commission did not refer to the Opinion of the Advisory Committee of 
the FCNM, nor advised its experts in the preparation of this document (Letschert, 
2005 p.411). The ratification of the FCNM by Macedonia is noted in the 2005 
Analytical report though it is not used as a specific benchmark, nor it is further 
developed (EC, 2005a). 
Overall, in relation to the document analysis of the SAA reports two 
distinct conclusions can be drawn. First, the European Commission fleetingly uses 
the FCNM as a reference in relation to minority policies and this is also reflected in 
the national documents, which contain no substantial references to the FCNM. 
Second, whereas the European Commission uses the FCNM in reference to 
Macedonia since 2002, the FCNM is referred only in the Opinion on the 
application for membership of Croatia in 2004. Hence, from the document 
analysis it is difficult to trace consistency in the use of the FCNM as a benchmark 
in relation to minority policies between 2001 and 2004. The interview data 
indicate that the FCNM was referenced and used more as a benchmark in the 
discussions between the European Commission and national level stakeholders 
than is the case in the formal EU documents.  However, the differences between 
and within groups of interviewees on the role of the FCNM in the EU accession 
process puts its usefulness as a benchmark to question. In this sense, the distinct 
understandings of the role of the FCNM between the Commission representative 
in Brussels and the EU delegations in the candidate countries shed light on the 
non-homogenous role of the Commission as an actor in the application of 
conditionality.  Furthermore, while all stakeholders agreed on the potential of the 
FCNM as a source of benchmarking in the area of minority policies, it was argued 
that this has not materialised in practice having in mind the fleeting references to 
the Convention and its absence from the accession negotiations.  
 
National legislation as part of EU conditionality in relation to minority policies 
In addition to relying on international instruments (i.e. the FCNM) 
discussed in the previous section, when dealing with minority policies, the 
European Commission has also supported amendments or implementation of 
existing legislation in the candidate countries. The primary objective the European 
Commission supported in Macedonia in the period under analysis was the 
implementation of the OFA. The implementation of the Agreement necessitated 
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numerous constitutional, legislative and institutional changes directed towards 
accommodating the communities living in the country. 89 From this perspective, it 
can be expected for the EU in its documents to have clear benchmarks and 
assessments for its implementation. However, the document analysis indicates 
that this is not the case, since in the first report of 2002 the Commission notes the 
amendment of the constitution to increase the protection of minority rights, but 
does not provide any further elaboration (EC, 2002). The Commission also noted 
that “it is expected that the implementation of the Framework Agreement of 
August 2001 will provide a higher degree of protection for persons belonging to 
minority communities” (EC, 2002 p.11).  
In the 2003 SAA report, there is no follow up on the policy related 
activities from the previous year, but instead the European Commission deals with 
the interethnic relations between the communities (EC, 2003b). In this document 
the European Commission recognises that “the interethnic relations have 
undeniably improved since the crisis” and recommends that “further measures to 
build confidence and promote dialogue between communities will be vital to 
support the on-going political process and reinforce the de facto cooperation 
which often, at local level, allows daily public affairs to be conducted” (EC, 2003b 
p.10). This assessment can be expected, since in the immediate aftermath of the 
signing of the 2001 OFA most of the energy at the state level was channelled 
towards the legislative reforms foreseen with this Agreement. Thus, in 2003 the 
European Commission notes the positive developments but also provides broad 
recommendations in relation to institutional developments such as the need for 
the “Parliamentary Committee on Relations between the Communities *...+ to play 
an important role in preventing or resolving inter-communities issues” (EC, 2003b 
p.9). The operationalisation of this recommendation is nowhere to be found in the 
documents further indicating the lack of consistency and follow up, similarly as in 
the previous section.  
The lack of formal follow up however in this period was accompanied by 
increasing on-the-ground involvement of the EU through its first EU military 
peacekeeping mission Concordia deployed in Macedonia, reinforcing the role of 
the EU as an active player in conflict prevention. The ensuing EU police mission 
Proxima was deployed in April 2003 and was described by EU officials as “an 
instrument in the cooperation between Macedonia and EU which needs to be 
                                            
89 See background on the Ohrid Framework Agreement in the fourth chapter 
dealing with the context in both countries.  
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used to meet the objective of membership in the Union” (Solana, 2003). National 
stakeholders underlined that “the EU had a major role on the ground with their 
police missions and as far as the major policies are concerned”.90 The high 
involvement of the EU on the ground has also been reflected in the ‘double hat’ 
representation of the EU in the country combining the position of the EU Special 
Representative of the Council and the Head of the Commission Delegation. “Due 
to this double hat policy, the political functions of the Council have been 
performed by the same representative managing issues of EU enlargement, 
further strengthening the link between the two”.91 As a result, EU representatives 
in Macedonia have become intrinsically connected with the domestic politics, 
which is demonstrated in the role they have played in managing crises between 
the major political actors in the country in the following chapter. 
In 2003, the Macedonian Government adopted a Plan for implementation 
of the recommendations of the SAA Report of the same year (Government of the 
Republic of Macedonia, 2003a). Having in mind that the SAA Report of the same 
year does not stipulate precise benchmarks and targets, with respect to minority 
policies, this plan makes general references to maintaining “regular dialogue 
within the coalition government” and “between political parties represented in 
the Parliament”, i.e. activities without potential of meaningful monitoring 
(Government of the Republic of Macedonia, 2003a). An interviewee explained this 
“as a tendency by minimising the obligations undertaken for the purposes of the 
EU accession, since with vague activities there are no indicators of 
implementation”.92 The only substantial obligation undertaken by the 
Government is the adoption of a programme for equitable representation of the 
communities in the public administration and public enterprises, a topic discussed 
separately in the last empirical chapter of this thesis. This activity is followed up in 
the 2004 SAA report with the European Commission underlining that the 
stipulated targets have not been met, underlining the need for increased efforts 
from the authorities (EC, 2004a). On this point, the Commission is the most direct 
and elaborate, suggesting also increased budgetary allocations, training and 
changes in the regulations affecting the employment in the public sector.  
                                            
90 Author’s interview with former Vice Prime Minister for EU Affairs, Skopje 23 
December 2010. 
91 Author’s interview with think tank analyst, Brussels, 11 October 2010. 
92 Author’s interview with senior civil servant in the Secretariat for European 
Affairs, Skopje, 22 December 2010. 
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The use of “national legislation” as a tool of benchmarking in the EU 
accession process was confirmed by all stakeholders as a way of tackling dealing 
with the lack of a unified policy or benchmarks in this policy area. In Macedonia, 
all of the groups of stakeholders were unequivocal about the significance of the 
OFA for the EU accession process. Furthermore, it was highlighted that “because 
of the specificity of this political agreement based on minority rights, also 
streamlined into the Constitution, the EU’s focus on the minorities is much 
bigger”.93 Commission officials in general regarded the implementation of the OFA 
as unequivocal condition with respect to minority policies. On several occasions 
my interlocutors stated that “in Macedonia before 2004/2005 minority policies 
were exclusively linked to the implementation of the OFA”.94 A national official in 
Macedonia working on the EU accession process described this in the following 
way: “the changes in Macedonia were a result of the domestic political actors, 
however, this was put in a document [OFA] which was used as a benchmark from 
the EU for us at a later stage – to remind the authorities of the need to adopt or 
amend certain laws or their implementation”.95 
Still, despite this general acceptance of the OFA as a condition, the 
interviews with stakeholders illustrated that there were major disagreements 
once specific policies were on the agenda. First, doubts were expressed on the 
usefulness of the stipulated recommendations as they were not unified at the EU 
level and the need for more definite benchmarking. In this respect, “in the early 
2000s it was possible for the European Commission to put forward the 
implementation of the OFA as a condition, however, in the later years there was 
need for more definite benchmarking, which was missing”.96 This problem has 
been highlighted in literature by contrasting the Commission’s checklist approach 
with the vagueness of the political criteria in general (Haukenes and Freyberg-
Inan, 2012). In the words of one of my interlocutors “we *meaning the civil 
service] as a bureaucracy expect to receive concrete tasks which we will then 
easily translate into obligations and to give feedback to the EU”.97 Hence, while 
                                            
93 Author’s interview with Macedonian diplomat, Brussels, 19 October 2010. 
94 Author’s interview with former vice prime minister for EU affairs, Skopje, 23 
December 2010. Same was confirmed by Author’s interview with senior civil 
servant in the Secretariat for European Affairs, Skopje, 22 December 2010. 
95 Author’s interview with civil servant in the Ministry of justice, Skopje, 18 
January 2011. 
96 Author’s interview with former vice prime minister for EU affairs, Skopje, 23 
December 2010. 
97 Author’s interview with Macedonian diplomat, Brussels, 19 October 2010. 
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accepting the OFA as a national obligation and EU condition, constant remarks 
were made about the lack of definite benchmarks and consistency, which are ever 
more prevalent in the post-2005 period discussed in the following chapter. 
While the OFA was the primary document on minority policies in 
Macedonia, in Croatia in the period under analysis in this chapter corresponds to 
the timing of the negotiations for adoption and early implementation of the 2002 
CLNM. In October 2001, immediately following the signing of the SAA in 2001, the 
Croatian government prepared the first plan for the implementation of this 
Agreement. The most important activity foreseen in relation to minority policies 
was the adoption of the new Constitutional Law on human rights and freedoms 
and the rights of ethnic communities and minorities in the Republic of Croatia, 
which was planned for December 2001 (Government of the Republic of Croatia, 
2001a). Having in mind that the implementation plan was prepared in October, 
the potential adoption of this law in two months was not realistic since this piece 
of legislation was already substantially delayed. In light of the adoption of this 
law, it is important to have in mind that “the legislation previously governing the 
protection of minority rights was politically an extremely controversial and much-
discussed law, and was amended and suspended quite a number of times in its 
existence of just over ten years” (Petričušid, 2002 p.607). Hence,  it is not 
surprising that in the Croatian Government report on the realised activities for 
2001, the adoption of this most important piece of legislation was moved for mid-
2002 (Government of the Republic of Croatia, 2001b).98 Lastly, an interviewee 
highlighted that “the final adoption of this Law in November 2002 was a result of 
the pending ratification of the SAA”, illustrating the role of EU conditionality in 
relation to formal legislative change.99  
In the 2003 SAA report, the Commission criticizes the CLNM adoption as 
overdue since November 1996 and Croatia’s accession to the CoE (EC, 2003b). In 
this context, both the Venice Commission and the Advisory Committee on the 
Framework Convention of National Minorities since 2001 recommended the 
adoption of a Constitutional law on the rights of national minorities in order to 
remedy the minority situation in the country with specific reference to the 
position of the Serbian minority (Venice Commission, 2001, CoE, 2001).An 
                                            
98 This approach in delaying the undertaken obligations will be further elaborated 
in the next chapter, since it will examine the more detailed strategic documents 
for EU accession which were developed by the candidate countries at a later 
stage. 
99 Author’s interview with CSO representative, Zagreb, 5 May 2011 
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interlocutor at the national level pointed that “the CoE foremost through the 
Venice Commission provided external assistance during the adoption of this law, 
however did not have an implementation role”.100 The role of the EU was 
illustrated as a “highly important actor standing as a supervisor”.101 In light of its 
adoption and inclusion in the European Commission documents, Commission 
officials I interviewed in Brussels considered that the CLNM as such was not 
demanded in the EU accession process. It was argued that “there was no direct 
link between the EU accession process and the discussions on the Constitutional 
Act”.102 On the other hand, a representative of a Croatian CSO argued that “the 
CLNM was in fact a result of the SAA negotiations at the time, having in mind the 
timing of its adoption”.103 
After its adoption with a two-thirds majority of the Croatian Parliament, 
including the MPs representing minorities, the Commission its 2003 SAA Report 
criticized Croatia for excluding minority representatives from the drafting of the 
Law (EC, 2003b). In this direction, it was highlighted to me that “the Law was 
adopted in a version less favourable to the minorities than in its original 
version”.104 On a more general note, however, the law in general has been 
considered by several interviewees as a solid legislative basis for the development 
of minority policies.105 However, despite the final adoption of this piece of 
legislation, in the following reports or the Opinion on the application for 
membership in 2004, the Commission does not deal with the implementation of 
the CLNM in terms of formal benchmarking of implementation. In fact, “the first 
Action Plan for the implementation of this Law was adopted six years later, i.e. in 
2008, once more excluding the representatives of minorities”.106 Thus, a lot of 
questions remain around its implementation and the EU role in this segment, 
which will be discussed in the following chapter.  
Local research and the fieldwork experience has also supported that in 
addition to the CLNM, the crucial element for the European Commission to 
                                            
100 Author’s interview with CSO representative, Zagreb, 5 May 2011 
101 Author’s interview with advisor to the President of the Republic of Croatia, 
Zagreb, 20 May 2011 
102 Author’s interview with European Commission Official, Brussels, 15 November 
2010 
103 Author’s interview with CSO representative, Zagreb, 5 May 2011. 
104 Author’s interview with CSO representative, Zagreb, 5 May 2011. 
105 Author’s interview with CSO representative, Zagreb, 21 June 2011; Author’s 
interview with researcher, Zagreb, 21 April 2011. 
106 Author’s interview with CSO representative, Zagreb, 21 June 2011. 
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consider the minority criterion fulfilled was the “change in power at the end of 
2003, when the new administration was able to form parliamentary majority 
thanks to the representatives elected in special constituencies for members of 
ethnic minorities” (Gjenero, 2006a p.74). In fact, this coalition constituted by the 
“HDZ and SDSS, which made the formation of HDZ led minority government in 
2002 possible, placed the issue of minorities and particularly the return of Serb 
refugees into the government’s focus” (Petričušid and Žagar, 2007 p.40). The 
coalition was a result of the shift from a majoritarian to a proportional electoral 
system in 2000, as explained already in chapter four (Kasapovid, 2000). Similarly, 
an interviewee considered that “the turn of the HDZ towards a semi-liberal pro-
European narrative in 2003 would not have happened without the role of the EU 
and in particular the Commission”.107  
The presented analysis of the ways in which the European Commission 
supported the adoption and implementation of national policies and legislation in 
Macedonia and Croatia between 2001 and 2005 highlights the context-specific 
nature of the conditions and the lack of clear benchmarks for assessment. Also, 
the analysis indicates that the evolution and application of EU conditionality 
diverts from the ideal model in which there are mutually agreed conditions, 
studied in the theoretical chapter. Instead of this, the EU conditions and 
recommendations are unfulfilled and repeated from year to year, or mentioned in 
one year and then not followed up in the other. Only in the case of Macedonia, 
does the European Commission in the last report of 2004 refer to the Government 
plans and targets for realisation of the equitable representation strategy. In the 
other cases, there is no evident tendency towards a follow up of the activities. 
Furthermore, the European Commission reports pay very little attention to any 
implementation and are focused on the adoption of legislation and strategies, 
which is reflected in the national programmes as well.  
 
5.4  Conclusion 
This chapter has examined the consistency and application of EU 
conditionality in relation national to minority policies between 1997 and 
2004/2005 when Croatia and Macedonia respectively became official candidate 
countries for EU accession. The objective of this chapter was to examine whether 
in the specific periods of analysis, there was a consistent stipulation of EU 
                                            
107 Author’s interview with advisor to the President of the Republic of Croatia, 
Zagreb, 20 May 2011. 
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conditions and benchmarks as well as response from the national level in both 
case studies. This chapter primarily focused on how EU conditionality has been 
implemented through the use of the FCNM and national legislation and the 
consistency of EU conditionality between 1997 and 2005. In an ideal type of 
conditionality, in the EU and national documents and through the interviews 
there should be consistent use of benchmarks which are understood and agreed 
by both the EU and the national level and should be evident in both policy 
documents and the interviews with stakeholders.  
The analysis focused on two distinct periods in the EU-Western Balkans 
relations: the Regional Approach (1997-2000) and the early SAA period (2001-
2005). In the first section, the chapter dealt with the reports issued from the EU in 
the period between 1997 and 2000, i.e. as part of the EU Regional Approach. 
Although minority policies were of primary importance for the relationship with 
the region at this point, there is no consistent approach in the EU and national 
documents. While the Conclusions of the General Council put forward specific 
conditions according to which the progress of the countries would be measured, 
these were not consistently followed in their European Commission Reports. 
Overall, in the period of the Regional Approach, the European Commission has 
fleetingly addressed selective minority issues at the country level at different 
points in time. Hence, there was no consistent approach on the issues addressed 
in both countries, or within one country chronologically. Second, there is no 
attempt to go beyond the legislative dimensions of minority policy and the 
assessments are repeated from one year to another. The approach of the EU in 
this period highlights the difficulties of employing conditionality without an 
objective of membership, which has been confirmed in recent literature on the 
European Neighbourhood Policy (See for example Schimmelfennig and Scholtz, 
2008). 
 The second section examined the interactions between the EU and 
national governments in Macedonia and Croatia in the period since the signing of 
the SAAs between 2001 and 2004/2005 when the countries were granted official 
candidate status. On general, the SAA reports are more detailed and extensive 
than the European Commission monitoring documents of the Regional Approach 
examined in the previous section. In addition, in this period, the national 
governments responded by preparing their action plans for implementation of the 
SAA. However, the analysis does not indicate a link between the further 
structuring and elaboration of the documents with the improved consistency of 
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conditionality on minority policies. This is supported by several findings. First, the 
SAA as a document does not stipulate specific criteria or benchmarks on minority 
policies, a situation reflected in the national Action Plans for implementation of 
the SAA. Second, the three SAA progress reports between 2002 and 2004 provide 
general assessments without specific benchmarks for their implementation. In 
turn, the national action plans for their implementation correspond to the topics 
of the regular reports and provide a small number of planned activities for their 
implementation. The analysis was structured around two major issues which were 
identified as features of the EU approach during the fieldwork and were 
addressed as part of research questions of the dissertation: the use of the FCNM 
as a reference and national level legislation and policies. These two topics have 
structured the relation between the EU and the candidate countries in the 
absence of an EU level minority policy as explained in the introduction.  
In relation to the use of international instruments, the chapter focused on 
the use of the FCNM as the only legally binding document dealing solely with 
minority issues and to which both countries are signatories. The analysis showed 
that whereas the European Commission during the 2002-2004 made fleeting 
references to the FCNM in relation to Macedonia, the first mention in the 
Croatian case is much later. Nevertheless, besides referring to the FCNM 
occasionally there are no direct references to the Reports of the Advisory 
Opinions on the implementation of the FCNM in both countries which would have 
provided a much more structured approach to conditionality. At the same time, 
the interview data highlights that the FCNM was a point of reference in the 
discussions between the European Commission and the national officials, 
underlining the informal dimension of conditionality. This was especially the case 
in Croatia, where despite the absence of the FCNM references from the EU and 
national documents (i.e., formal conditionality), the interviewees highlighted that 
in the period under examination in this chapter the Convention was a subject of 
discussion between the stakeholders (informal dimension of conditionality).  
In the last section the chapter dealt with the EU’s use of conditionality in 
relation to national level legislation, strategies and their implementation. In 
relation to Macedonia between 2002 and 2004 the European Commission focuses 
generally on the broad task of “implementing the Ohrid Framework Agreement”. 
There are attempts to follow up on the implementation in relation to the 
equitable representation of minorities, discussed in chapter seven of the thesis. 
Only with respect to Macedonia, does the European Commission in the last report 
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of 2004 refer to the Government plans and targets for realisation of the equitable 
representation strategy. In the other cases, there is no evident tendency towards 
tracing a follow up of the activities. In Croatia, this entailed the adoption of the 
CLNM. While the European Commission notes in its first reports the delay in the 
adoption of this law, in the following two years it solely lists its formal provisions, 
rather than focusing on the implementation. In response, this approach is also 
adopted in the national documents for EU integration.  
The presented empirical analysis in this chapter confirms the problems 
identified in the literature on non-acquis related conditionality, especially the lack 
of consistency in the design of stipulated conditions and weak follow up on 
obligations. In the period analysed in this chapter however, the instruments of the 
European Commission and at the national level were much less developed and 
the countries were moving from “potential candidates” to their formal inclusion in 
the EU accession process. At the same time, the membership perspective was 
weaker than in the period analysed in the following chapter. In the post-2005 
period when both countries under examination were official candidates for 
accession new instruments of EU monitoring and stipulating conditions were 
introduced such as the regular Progress Reports, the European partnerships, as 
well as the European Commission Enlargement Strategies. In addition, the 
countries started preparing more detailed documents as the National Action Plans 
for the Adoption of the Acquis and Regular Progress reports themselves. 
Furthermore, in this period the European Commission started negotiations with 
Croatia providing more detailed benchmarks on every aspect of EU accession, 
including minority policies. In Macedonia, there were also several benchmarking 
experiences through the key priorities of the Accession partnerships, the Visa 
liberalisation roadmaps as well as the high level accession dialogue launched in 
2012. Hence, the next chapter will examine this distinctively different phase in the 
EU accession process and assess whether the application of conditionality in 
relation to minority policies still suffers from the same inconsistencies highlighted 
in this chapter.  
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6. Conditionality and minority policies in the post-2005 period  
6.1  Introduction  
 This chapter examines the role of the EU in shaping national minority 
policies in the two countries since 2005. The objective of the chapter is to 
examine how the EU has implemented conditionality by using the FCNM and 
national legislation, as well as whether in the specific period of analysis, there was 
consistent stipulation of EU conditions and benchmarks and response from the 
national level in both countries. In an ideal type of conditionality, there should be 
consistent use of agreed benchmarks followed up from year to year in the EU, 
national documents and the interviews with stakeholders. As was argued by 
Hughes et al, “if the logic of conditionality works in practice, we should be able to 
track clear causal relationships between the Commission’s use of conditionality 
and the compliance of the candidate countries through policy, or institutional 
adjustments and normative change” (Hughes et al., 2005 p.2). The chapter 
therefore, aims to respond to all of the five research questions of the thesis by 
looking at the implementation of EU conditionality, the use of the FCNM and 
national legislation and agreements as well as the consistency of the conditions 
post-2005. Looking at a more recent period of EU involvement, it is also suitable 
for the examination of the role of domestic actors in the application of 
conditionality on national minority policies. Lastly, it also reflects on the 
implications of conditionality for the process of democratic consolidation in the 
two case studies in light of the policies it studies.  
In comparison to the period examined in the previous chapter, since 2005 
there were significant shifts in political climate in the Union in relation to 
enlargement, as well as the formal mechanisms of enlargement. In relation to the 
former, 2005 was marked by the failed referenda for the constitutional treaty in 
France and the Netherlands. In light of these internal problems of the EU, post-
2005, “the momentum of the process of joining the EU seems to have been 
declined” (Fakiolas and Tzifakis, 2008 p.378). In response to the constitutional 
crisis, the question of the absorption capacity of the Union has been re-
introduced in the discourse on enlargement. Phinnemore (2006) has argued that 
the “developments in the EU and in its handling of enlargement [... in this 
period...] raise questions about the commitment and capacity of the EU to extend 
its membership” to the region (p.8). At the same time, “the member states have 
been showing less scruple in instrumentalising enlargement for domestic political 
gains” (Hillion, 2010 p.6). This tendency has been demonstrated with the bilateral 
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issues often gaining prominence in the enlargement to the Balkans such as the 
name dispute between Macedonia and Greece, as well as the Slovenian – 
Croatian border issue as well. The result of this nationalisation of the enlargement 
policy, as Hillion (2010) puts it has resulted in questioning of the credibility of the 
perspective of EU membership.   
However, by launching and concluding the negotiations in this period, 
Croatia has been less affected by the enlargement fatigue, than the case of 
Macedonia. In this sense, the opening of the negotiations with Croatia is crucial, 
as it signifies the intent of the Union to finish them (Avery and Cameron, 1998). 
Similarly, Chatzigiagkou (2010) argues that Croatia was an exception from the 
general trend of enlargement fatigue in the Union, supporting this attitude with 
the decision of France not to subject the accession of Croatia to a referendum. 
Macedonia is rather different in this sense, since the delay in the launching of the 
negotiations with Macedonia has diminished the credibility of the perspective of 
membership both among the elites and the population.108 Thus, the post-2005 
period is marked by higher commitment on the side of the Union to the accession 
of Croatia in comparison to the Macedonian case. 
Since 2005 both countries under examination have been official 
candidates for EU membership, navigating their accession with the regular 
Progress Reports and the European partnerships. According to Maresceau (2003) 
“the publication of the progress reports  *…+ created an atmosphere of permanent 
follow-up and contributed considerably to the enhancement in the candidate 
countries of an awareness that the necessary measures must be taken” (pp.32-
33). In addition, the respective governments started preparing more detailed 
documents as the NPAAs and national Progress reports on the fulfilment of the 
conditions for accession. Furthermore, in 2005 the European Commission 
launched membership negotiations with Croatia providing further benchmarking 
through the screening reports on all negotiating chapters, including minority 
policies. The European Commission also employed also several benchmarking 
exercises for Macedonia through the key priorities of the Accession Partnerships 
and the visa liberalisation process. Due to this further ‘formalisation’ of the 
relations between the EU and the two candidate countries it can be expected that 
many of the shortcomings identified in the previous chapter (such as 
inconsistency and vagueness of the conditions) would be overcome. Hence, the 
                                            
108 Author’s interview with senior civil servant in the Secretariat for European 
Affairs, Skopje, 22 December 2010. 
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objective of this chapter is to analyse if these novel instruments in the post-2005 
period contributed to the increasing clarity of conditionality and consistency in its 
application.  
First, this chapter will present the post-2005 developments with respect 
to the benchmarking for EU accession. More specifically it examines the 
introduction of chapter 23 on judiciary and fundamental rights as a most 
important instrument of the new more structured approach to the minority 
policies in the period studied. As already explained, with this chapter minority 
policies have become a formal part of the negotiations process. The empirical 
analysis that follows is divided in two sections: the reliance of the EU on FCNM 
and its use in the accession process and the use of national legislation as an 
element of EU conditionality.109 Hence, both sections relate to the findings of the 
previous chapter in trying to trace whether there is more structured application of 
the FCNM as a benchmark and the national policies that became elements of EU 
conditionality post 2005. In relation to Macedonia the analysis focuses on the 
adoption of the law on languages, whereas in Croatia it deals with the 
establishment and functioning of the local councils of national minorities.110 
Lastly, on the basis of the empirical analysis presented the chapter reflects on the 
‘success’ of chapter 23 in stipulating clear and consistent benchmarks in relation 
to minority policies in the accession negotiations with Croatia.111 
 
6.2  Chapter 23 and benchmarking – new elements of conditionality in the 
post – 2005 period  
The 2004 EU enlargement and the accession process with Bulgaria and 
Romania brought about change in the management of the conditionality for the 
Western Balkans. Generally, although the negotiations for accession appear to be 
following a well developed path, all rounds of enlargement so far have shown a 
particularity which separates each from the others (For a discussion see Mayhew, 
2000). As explained in the introduction, since 2005, the structure of the 
negotiating chapters and the EU reports has been amended with the 
                                            
109 Following the structure set in the previous chapter. 
110 The most extensive national policy that the EC reinforces in its reports, the 
representation of minorities in the public sector is dealt in the following chapter. 
111 Croatia is the first and until now only country that negotiated this chapter. The 
screening for the chapter for Montenegro is ongoing at the time of the writing, 
see website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Montenegro: 
<http://www.mip.gov.me/index.php/Opste/pregovori.html> Accessed 04 May 
2013] 
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establishment of chapter 23: Judiciary and fundamental rights divided in three 
sections: judiciary, anti-corruption policy and fundamental rights. The launching of 
this chapter can be linked to two major developments, as was identified by a 
majority of my interviewees: first, the experience of the 2004/2007 enlargements 
and second, the nature of the potential candidate countries from the Western 
Balkans. In relation to the former, the problems encountered in relation to the 
judiciary and anti-corruption policies in Bulgaria and Romania were an impetus to 
give more emphasis to these specific issues (See Papadimitriou and Gateva, 2009). 
The internal situation and ethnic diversity of the Balkans raised the significance of 
minority policies and post-war reconciliation which were also included in this 
chapter. According to interviewees from the European Commission, “these policy 
areas were not tackled in an organized way in the past and the idea was that to 
bring then into the accession negotiations by adding an element of greater 
structure to the process”.112  
Besides setting up an additional chapter in the negotiating structure, the 
Commission also employed a new approach in terms of introducing the tool of 
‘benchmarking’. According to the European Commission, the introduction of the 
benchmarks as a measurable tool is a result of “the lessons learnt from the fifth 
enlargement. Their purpose is to improve the quality of the negotiations, by 
providing incentives for the candidate countries to undertake necessary reforms 
at an early stage” (EC, 2006b p.6 emphasis added). Thus, in the area of minority 
policies, the negotiations with Croatia provide the most detailed stipulation of 
accession conditions in relation to minority policies through the screening 
process, as well as the benchmarks for opening and closing the negotiations. The 
former concern “key preparatory steps for future alignment, and the fulfilment of 
contractual obligations that mirror acquis requirements”, whereas closing 
benchmarks “primarily concern legislative measures, administrative and judicial 
bodies, and a track record of implementation of the acquis” (Spernbauer, 2007 
p.282). This mechanism “first developed in the context of the Romanian and 
Bulgarian post-accession verification process, is now being implemented for each 
chapter of the EU’s acquis under negotiation” (Papadimitriou and Gateva, 2009 
p.162). The benchmarking tool is therefore specifically devised for areas of the 
acquis, but also for the purpose of overcoming the difficulties in non-acquis areas 
                                            
112 Author’s interview with European Commission official, Brussels, 08 December 
2010. 
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in terms of the consistency of conditionality and the subjectivity of the 
assessment of compliance.  
In Macedonia, the Commission employed benchmarking without having 
launched membership negotiations through the ‘key priorities’ of the Accession 
Partnerships, which indicated the primary conditions for progress in the 
accession. A similar exercise process was employed through the visa liberalisation 
dialogue which touched upon minority rights as well. Most recently in 2012 in 
Macedonia the Commission launched a so-called High level Accession dialogue 
dealing with the most pressing issues of the chapters 23 and 24 (Europa Press 
Release, 2012). This dialogue is based on recommendations from the European 
Commission, including issues such as developing the dialogue between the 
communities and the representation of minorities in the administration.113 From 
the presented overview it is clear that in the post-2005 period the European 
Commission has attempted to further formalise its benchmarking system and the 
following sections will examine whether this has resulted in adding consistency, 
clarity and a common understanding of the conditions among the stakeholders.   
 
6.3  Empirical analysis – the use of the FCNM and the national legislation as 
elements of EU conditionality post-2005 
Having in mind the further development of the mechanisms for accession in 
the post-2005 period it can be expected that the problems of the lack of clarity 
and inconsistency noted in the previous period would be overcome. Therefore, 
due to the further ‘formalisation’ of the process, it can be assumed that in the 
post-2005 period the EU conditions would be more structured and consistent and 
would be met by follow-up at the national level. Building upon the empirical 
discussion in the previous chapter which highlighted inconsistent use of EU 
conditionality prior to 2005, this section therefore examines the use of EU 
conditionality in the post-2005 period. The section picks up on both topics 
discussed in the previous chapter – the use of the FCNM as a benchmark for EU 
accession as well as the use of national legislation as an element of EU 
conditionality in both countries.  
 
                                            
113 The latter is discussed in the following chapter. 
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6.3.1 The FCNM as an element of EU conditionality  
The previous chapter indicated that it is difficult to trace systematic use of the 
FCNM as a benchmark in relation to minority policies between 2001 and 2005 
period through the EU and national documents. Furthermore, while all 
stakeholders agreed on the potential of the FCNM as a source of benchmarking in 
the area of minority policies, it was argued that this has not materialised. 
Although with the evolution of the conditionality instruments it can be reasonably 
expected that the European Commission will attempt to use the FCNM, in the 
post-2005 period, the EU documents on Macedonia or Croatia do not make more 
specific use of the Convention for setting any benchmarks or conditions.  
The ratification of the FCNM by Macedonia is only noted in the 2005 
Analytical report as factual information without any further follow-up (EC, 2005a). 
A general reference to the FCNM is also found in the European Partnership of 
2006 which puts forward the following short-term priority: “promote respect for 
and protection of minorities in accordance with the ECHR and the principles laid 
out in the Council of Europe’s FCNM, in line with best practice in EU member 
states” (Council, 2006b p.61). The wording in the 2008 Accession Partnership is 
similar, although in this case the Council calls upon Macedonia to fully comply 
with the FCNM (Council, 2008b). The use of the FCNM in this case has resulted in 
expectations in literature it could be the basis to “more systematic Commission’s 
references to the FCNM monitoring reports” (Hillion, 2008 p.6). Among the 
stakeholders, however, the broad framing of this priority was highly criticised by 
my interlocutors at the national level “as vague and as difficult to be 
operationalised through the bureaucratic mechanisms of the enlargement 
process”.114 Hence, the sporadic mention of the FCNM in the European 
Commission documents was considered as insufficient by my interlocutors, 
especially the civil servants at the national level, responsible for the 
implementation of the EU conditionality.  
In response to these fleeting references to the FCNM in the EU 
documents, the first  Macedonian national document which refers to this 
Convention is the 2006 NPAA which underlines that: “in addition to the 
obligations arising from this Convention, the basic framework for the minority 
protection policy in the Republic of Macedonia is the implementation of the 
Framework Agreement, which largely exceeds the standards laid down by the 
                                            
114 Author’s interview with senior civil servant in the Mission of the Republic of 
Macedonia to the EU, Brussels, 18 November 2010. 
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FCNM” (Government of the Republic of Macedonia, 2006a p.33). With this 
statement, as was confirmed by my interviewees, the national government 
questioned the usefulness of the FCNM as a reference point for minority 
protection due to the advanced national legislation.115 This is clearly also 
demonstrated in the largely formal approach mentioning the  submissions of the 
regular reports for the implementation of the FCNM in the EU accession 
documents, without specific use of the Convention or its reports. This national 
approach therefore confirms the suspicion of Kymlicka who has argued that “the 
new norms that have been developed by the Council of Europe [i.e. FCNM] and 
the OSCE do not in fact address the distinctive challenges raised by national 
minorities” (Kymlicka, 2006 p.42). 
The interview data in relation to the FCNM as a reference point or 
benchmarking for minority rights also provided contradictory opinions. These 
differences were especially prevalent among the Commission officials in Brussels 
and in the European Commission Delegations at the national level. In the words of 
an interlocutor in Brussels, “the FCNM was “useful” and as an instrument used in 
the preparation of the Progress Report”.116 Quite contrary, the European 
Commission Delegation staff at the national level in general considered that “the 
FCNM was not a source of reference for the structuring of EU conditionality”.117 
This disparity which will appear on several other policy areas was illustrated by 
one of my interviewees from the Delegation of the European Commission in 
Skopje who highlighted that “the Delegation is just a monitor which gives an 
account to the Commission services in Brussels, without involving itself in policy 
making”.118 Overall, it was clear from my contacts with the European Commission 
that there is no common stance on this point, which largely can explain the 
differences in the progress reports examined earlier.  
Interviewees both from the national level and the European Commission 
pointed to the FCNM as a source of reference in this area, but at the same time 
also expressed their doubts about its applicability since the national framework in 
Macedonia exceeds the requirements of the FCNM. National civil servants in 
Macedonia highlighted that the European Commission Reports were much less 
                                            
115 Author’s interview with senior civil servant in the Secretariat for European 
Affairs, Skopje, 22 December 2010. 
116 Author’s interview with senior European Commission official, Brussels, October 
2010. 
117 Author’s interview with European Commission official, Skopje 21 January 2011. 
118 Author’s interview with European Commission official, Skopje 21 January 2011. 
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detailed than the FCNM and that in the end it is not clear how the issues are 
picked up from one to the other. Similarly, while one official considered the CoE 
to be the primary organisation in relation to minority areas, others differed.  
Hence, it was also argued that “while in the past the Council of Europe was clearly 
chef d'file, today there is more complementarity and information exchange”.119 
Quite contrary to this opinion, another Commission official stressed: “I am not 
sure that the EU has much to offer Macedonia in this respect”.120 Lastly, it was 
argued that “the capacity of the European Commission in the area of minority 
policy is generally weak and that they could use the CoE expertise more 
thoroughly”.121 
Representatives of external actors engaged in this policy area such as 
think tanks at the EU level commented that “this discrepancy is likely to go on 
until the EU develops specific rules in this area”.122 Moreover, studies have been 
conducted by NGOs which have compared the EU reports and the FCNM reports 
which have pointed to inconsistencies, like for example the 2007 FCNM report 
warning of serious deficiencies in instruction of and in minority languages in 
Macedonia, which the EU Report omitted completely (Bokulid and Kostadinova, 
2008). It was clear from my interviews with the European Commission that there 
is no common stance on this point, which can largely explain the differences in 
the progress reports examined earlier. This specificity connected to the 
Macedonian context creates problems in the usage and ultimately usefulness of 
the FCNM as a tool for benchmarking for minority protection in the context of EU 
conditionality. 
While in the previous chapter it was shown that in the pre-2004 period 
the European Commission did not use the FCNM extensively in reference with 
Croatia, in the 2006 Accession partnership for the first time it included a priority 
with a reference to the FCNM, which was same as in all other countries of the 
region at the time: 
“Promote respect for and protection of minorities in accordance with the 
European Convention on Human Rights and the principles laid down in the 
                                            
119 Author’s interview with European Commission official, Brussels, 8 October 
2010. 
120 Author’s interview with senior European Commission official, Brussels, 5 
October 2010. 
121 Author’s interview with senior civil servant in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
Skopje, 07 March 2011. 
122 Author’s interview with senior think tank analyst, Brussels, 5 October 2010. 
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Council of Europe’s Framework Convention for the Protection of National 
Minorities and in line with best practice in EU Member States” (Council, 
2006a p.33).  
On the basis of the inclusion of such priorities in the accession related documents, 
Hillion (2008) argues that the FCNM has become part of the normative basis of EU 
enlargement on minority policies. Two years after this Council priority, however, 
the FCNM is excluded from the Accession partnership on Croatia, questioning this 
assessment. Hence, in 2008, the new priority for Croatia was framed in the 
following manner: “promote respect for and protection of minorities in 
accordance with international law and best practice in EU Member States” 
(Council, 2008a p.54). At the same time, as explained in the previous chapter, 
terms like European standards and best practice in the EU member states were 
considered largely problematic by the national stakeholders in my interviews. 
Overall, having in mind that the protection of minorities was one of the core 
conditions for EU accession of Croatia and at the time the country was launching 
its negotiations, the non-inclusion of the FCNM in the priorities of the Accession 
Partnerships was criticised by my interlocutors as a “missed opportunity for the 
EU to substantiate its requirements”.123 
At the national level, the Croatian 2005 NPAA refers solely to the 
submission of the FCNM report  with respect to the work of the Office for national 
minorities (Government of the Republic of Croatia, 2005). The same approach is 
noticeable in the NPAA in the following year when the FCNM is referenced solely 
since the aforementioned office prepared “the Second Report of the Republic of 
Croatia on the Implementation of the Framework Convention for the Protection 
of National Minorities *… and …+ prepared its response to the opinion of the 
Council of Europe Advisory Committee” (Government of the Republic of Croatia, 
2006 p.49). Similarly, the 2008, 2009 and 2011 NPAA in relation to the FCNM 
mention seminars that the Government Office for National Minorities organised 
on the implementation this Convention (Government of the Republic of Croatia, 
2008b, 2009, 2011c).  The trainings and seminars as part of the national responses 
to conditionality were underlined as a “benign way of tackling conditionality when 
                                            
123 Author’s interview with senior civil servant in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
Zagreb, 2 June 2011. 
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there is no will for real implementation” or “when the requirements from the EU 
are not clear”.124  
While the FCNM was not used in the Progress Report systematically, the 
screening process was the primary possibility in which the Commission was in a 
position to use the FCNM.125 According to the Commission the screening is a 
process in which “the Commission carries out a detailed examination, together 
with the candidate country, of each policy field (chapter), to determine how well 
the country is prepared” (EC, 2012d). In its screening report of 2007, the 
European Commission does refer to the FCNM:  
“Article 1 of the Framework Convention for the Protection of 
National Minorities confirms that human rights include minority rights. 
The latter include the right to non-discrimination of a person belonging to 
a national minority; the freedom of association, to assembly, of 
expression; the freedom of religion; the right to use one's language; and 
the effective participation in public affairs” (EC, 2007b p.3).  
However, in the substantial negotiating documents, most notably in the Interim 
report that the Commission published on the progress and the outstanding 
benchmarks on chapter 23 there is no mention of the FCNM (EC, 2011d). 
European Commission officials explained this lack of use of the FCNM with the 
lengthier periods of assessments that the CoE undertakes. “The cycle of their 
reporting is quite long and drawn out, it’s every four years or so when they do a 
report”.126 Civil servants which participated directly in the negotiations highlighted 
that “I can only expect that the European Commission used the FCNM reports, 
however it is very difficult for me to assess the level of knowledge because the 
communication we had was largely based on them asking questions and us 
replying to those questions”.127 MEPs working on Croatia and the accession of the 
                                            
124 Author’s interview with high level civil servant in the Ministry of Justice, 
Skopje, 18 January 2011, Author’s interview with representative of the Ministry of 
administration, Zagreb, 02 May 2011. 
125 Author’s interview with senior civil servant in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
Skopje, 07 March 2011, Author’s interview with senior civil servant in the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs, Zagreb, 2 June 2011.  
126 Author’s interview with European Commission official, Brussels, 08 December 
2010. 
127  Author’s interview with representative of the Ministry of administration, 
Zagreb, 02 May 2011. 
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Western Balkans, on the other hand, highlighted that “there is not enough inter-
linkage and connection between the EU and CoE on minority issues”.128 
The trend of not using the FCNM in the accession negotiations continued 
until the end of this process, as the Convention is not mentioned in the most 
detailed document submitted from the Croatian government in May 2011. At the 
same time, other relevant conventions of the CoE and UN with respect to the 
protection of human rights are referenced, thereby illustrating the lack of 
inclusion of the FCNM and its reporting system in the EU accession process 
(Government of the Republic of Croatia, 2011b). Representatives of the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs which were involved in working with both organisations had the 
most defining view on this issue. Namely, it was highlighted that “whereas in the 
previous enlargement the European Commission used references to the FCNM, 
today they [i.e. the Commission] are the focal point which collects the data on this 
issue and deliver an assessment”. 129 It was similarly underlined that the process is 
rather different than in the previous enlargement, when they were drawing upon 
information from the CoE directly”.130 It was also mentioned that “the EU did not 
use the FCNM in peer missions and similar and most of the measures were ad hoc 
measures”.131 At the same time, as will be demonstrated in the following chapter, 
remarks stemming from the European Commission were adopted by the FCNM 
Advisory Committee, illustrating the evolving nature of the EU in national minority 
issues.132 
External actors such as NGOs which monitored the negotiations and were 
invited by the European Commission to give inputs on the progress of Croatia in 
the negotiations on chapter 23 shared this opinion largely. Several (albeit 
different) reasons were given behind this tendency. On the one hand, it was 
pointed that “the European Commission did not deal with the advisory committee 
opinions, because the latter deals with the topic in a much wider manner than the 
European Commission itself”.133 The dominant view, however, was that the “the 
FCNM was rarely mentioned. Concrete benchmarks from the screening process on 
                                            
128 Author’s interview with Member of European Parliament, Brussels, 09 
December 2010. 
129 Author’s interview with Croatian diplomat, Brussels, 26 November 2010. 
130 Author’s interview with Croatian diplomat, Brussels, 26 November 2010. 
131 Author’s interview with senior civil servant in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
Zagreb, 2 June 2011. 
132 See Chapter seven: Representation of minorities in the public sector. 
133 Author’s interview with minorities’ expert, Zagreb, 21 April 2011. 
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chapter 23 formed the basis for the negotiations”.134 According to a CSO activist, 
“these benchmarks were stipulated on the basis of national legislation, rather 
than international mechanisms”.135 Thus, it was summarised that the European 
Commission conditionality acted foremost as a reinforcement mechanism of 
national legislation which is examined in the following section.  
Overall, the analysis of the use of FCNM as a benchmarking tool for 
minority policies points to a set of different conclusions both in terms of the 
“formal” story based on the official documents and the interview data. The 
European Commission fleetingly mentions the FCNM in its reports and the 
European/Accession partnerships without consistency and this is reflected both in 
the national documents and stakeholders’ understandings. National documents in 
Macedonia have underlined that the national framework for minority protection 
is much more detailed than the FCNM thereby minimising its potential to be used 
as a benchmarking tool. The same inconsistent conclusions are to be drawn from 
the interviews both at the national and European level in Brussels since the FCNM 
is seen as useful in principle, but without any operationalisation in the accession 
process. In Croatia, although the negotiations were an opportunity for using the 
FCNM as a benchmark because of the nature of the screening process and the 
new negotiations mechanisms, they do not seem to have been linked to an 
increasing use of the FCNM as a benchmarking tool by the Commission.  
 
6.3.2 National legislation as an element of EU conditionality  
Law on the use of languages in Macedonia  
As was demonstrated in the previous chapter, the European Commission 
in the case of Macedonia supported the adoption and implementation of 
legislation, considered as part of the OFA. In the analytical report of 2005 the 
European Commission concludes that “the OFA legislative programme was 
completed *…+ and the remaining task is to ensure continued and effective 
implementation, thereby further strengthening the climate of confidence and 
stability” (EC, 2005a p.12). In the post-2005 period the reports deal with various 
minority related issues, but mostly focus on the use of languages and the 
representation of national minorities in the administration. Since, the latter policy 
is dealt with in detail in the following chapter; this chapter examines the adoption 
of the law on languages and its evolution to an element of EU conditionality.  
                                            
134 Author’s interview with CSO representative, Zagreb, 6 June 2011. 
135 Author’s interview with CSO representative, Zagreb, 19 April 2011. 
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The use of minority languages was a contested issue in the previous 
enlargement as well. According to Kymlicka, “government decisions about the 
language of public schooling and public administration are in effect decisions 
about which language groups will survive” (Kymlicka, 2002c p.18). Schöpflin has 
argued that “the role of language as an ethnic marker has been particularly salient 
in Central and Eastern Europe and cultural communities in the region use 
language in this way with great emphasis” (Schöpflin, 1996 p.101). At the same 
time, Csergő (2007) has shown that the diversity of European rules in this area has 
not assisted the success of EU in the Eastern enlargement, specifically the cases of 
Romania and Slovakia. In a more recent study, she goes on to argue that 
“international incentives, especially the prospect of EU accession, played a role in 
shaping these changes, but the influence was indirect and unpredictable” (Csergő 
and Deegan-Krause, 2011 p.103). 
Specifically in Macedonia, language “strikes a sensitive note with ethnic 
Macedonians” (Koneska, 2012 p.36). The Macedonian language was first 
recognised with the establishment of first Macedonian state in the framework of 
the Yugoslav federation in 1945. The codification of the language was subject to 
internal divisions and external contestations. Internally, there were contestations 
over the alphabet and the region on which the official language would be based 
(For a discussion see Rossos, 2008). Externally, the language has been contested 
foremost by Bulgaria with the argument that the “the Macedonian language was 
in reality a Bulgarian dialect” (Rossos, 2008 p.74).  In fact, although Bulgaria was 
the first country to recognise Macedonia, it does not recognise the existence of a 
Macedonian language. Similar stance has been taken by Greece which supports 
the view that the language is a variant of Bulgarian or Serbian, but not a language 
in its own right (For a discussion see Danforth, 1997).  
As a result, the calls from the Albanian community for increased use of 
the Albanian language were not welcomed among the Macedonian political elite 
and the stance of the EU on the issue has been rather ambiguous. In the EU 
documents the law on languages for the first time is directly mentioned in the 
Analytical report 2005 when the European Commission notes that “the coalition 
partners [DUI and SDSM] have agreed that, although not formally required by the 
Framework Agreement, a law on the use of languages should be adopted to 
complement the substantial number of existing sectoral laws specifying use of the 
Albanian language” (EC, 2005a p.30). Hence, formally the European Commission 
left the issue to be decided at the national level. Thus, the European/Accession 
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partnerships and Progress Reports between 2006 and 2008 do not contain a 
direct reference to this law, indicating that the European Commission did not 
include this requirement formally as a condition in the case of Macedonia.  
While the issue of the law on languages was left formally to the national 
level, national officials highlighted that informally there was pressure from the 
European Commission for the adoption of such a law. According an interviewee of 
mine, “the EU representatives in Macedonia insisted that we make a list of laws to 
be adopted for the OFA implementation and one of the big differences between 
the coalition partners was whether we need a separate law on languages”.136 This 
difference as was highlighted by my interviewees is clearly visible in the EU and 
national strategic documents for EU accession which show a mixed record with 
respect to the inclusion/non-inclusion of the law on languages for the purposes of 
EU accession. Contrary to the European Commission stance in the analytical 
report, in the answers to the Questionnaire for membership, the government at 
the time identifies that “the only remaining Law to be adopted in accordance with 
Section 6 [of the OFA] is the Law on Use of Languages of Communities in the 
Republic of Macedonia, which will be adopted in the first half of 2005” 
(Government of the Republic of Macedonia, 2005). Hence, while the European 
Commission in its report does not consider this law as an obligation of the OFA, 
the government had a different opinion in 2005.  
Following the granting of the candidate status in December 2005, in the 
2006 NPAA retained the obligation of adopting such a law, even though according 
to this document by the same government the law on languages is not an OFA 
obligation (Government of the Republic of Macedonia, 2006a). The references to 
the law as an obligation of the OFA are a result of the peculiar role assigned to the 
EU in the post-Ohrid Macedonia, as a monitor of its implementation which has 
been noted in literature and was also confirmed by my interlocutors.137 As a 
result, all of the requirements/laws foreseen by the OFA were automatically 
considered as an element of EU conditionality.138 Anecdotally, the role of the 
European Commission in this sense is illustrated in the reference used by many 
European Commission /EU officials: ‘the road to Brussels leads through Ohrid’ 
(Solana, 2004). 
                                            
136 Author’s interview with Member of Parliament, Skopje, 23 December 2010. 
137 See section on context in Macedonia in chapter three. 
138 Author’s interview with high level civil servant from the Secretariat for 
European Affairs, 22 December 2010. 
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Despite the differences on whether or not it was an OFA obligation, until 
2006 this law was mentioned in the national strategic documents. Thus, the 
Action Plan for the European Partnership prepared at the same time as the 2006 
NPAA foresaw the adoption of such a law in the first half of 2006 (Government of 
the Republic of Macedonia, 2006b). This is the only official document where the 
adoption of a law on the use of languages appears as an official obligation by the 
government with a specific deadline and was explained by my interlocutors as a 
“self-imposed obligation”.139 Bearing in mind that in 2006 there was no draft text 
prepared of this law and the parliamentary elections were already scheduled for 
the summer the same year “it is likely that the outgoing government formally 
undertook this obligation, knowing that it would not be able to fulfil it before the 
end of its term of office”.140  
Following the change of government in the summer of 2006, the law on 
the use of languages does not appear in the subsequent planning documents, i.e. 
the NPAA 2007 and 2008 (See Government of the Republic of Macedonia, 2007a, 
2008b). The non-inclusion of the Law on languages in the primary planning 
document for EU accession indicates that the law was not accepted by the new 
coalition government [VMRO-DPMNE and DPA] as an obligation for the EU 
integration purposes. This was confirmed by my interviewees who have 
underlined that “the strategic documents for EU accession are also very political 
in their essence having in mind that in non-acquis areas they also represent the 
government will”.141 In practice, the new government was attempting to resolve 
the language issue solely in terms of the use of the Albanian language in the 
Parliament, by amending the rulebook of the Parliament (Mehmeti, 2007). 
However, in the summer of 2008 following a change of the Albanian party 
in government a breakthrough occurred when the Parliament adopted such a law 
upon a proposal from the DUI, the Albanian party that replaced DPA in 
government after the 2008 elections.142 The Law on the Use of Language Spoken 
by at least 20% of citizens in the Republic of Macedonia and in the Local Self-
government Units (hereinafter law on the use of languages) was swiftly placed on 
                                            
139 Author’s interview with high level civil servant from the Secretariat for 
European Affairs, 22 December 2010. 
140 Author’s interview with high level civil servant from the Secretariat for 
European Affairs, 22 December 2010. 
141 Author’s interview with high level civil servant from the Secretariat for 
European Affairs, 22 December 2010. 
142 For more details see chapter three on contextual background.   
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the agenda without going through the regular consultation procedures.143  The 
adoption of such a law was actually a part of a previous agreement between the 
ruling party VMRO-DPMNE and DUI, so-called May Agreement - an informal 
arrangement made for the return of the DUI in Parliament following several 
months of boycott in 2007. As was reported by a local newspaper, the preparation 
and adoption of the law on the use of languages was a part of this 
understanding.144 Recent studies on EU involvement in Macedonia have argued 
that “the May agreement case can be perceived as some sort of a turning point 
for EU involvement in ethnic conflict management in Macedonia as this process 
has been marked by the increasing persuasive role of the EU” (Markovic et al., 
2011 p.22).  An interviewee of mine explained that the law was significant 
because “the Albanians, DUI especially, since the signing of the OFA needed a 
symbol that this issue was resolved”.145 At the same time, DUI was a coalition 
partner in the 2005 government which initially included the law as an obligation 
for EU accession purposes, thereby illustrating the dynamic nature of 
conditionality and its dependence on the domestic actors and their agendas.  
Even though the European Commission and the government in power in 
2006 and 2007 did not consider the law to be an element of EU accession 
conditionality prior to its adoption, the regular progress reports and the national 
documents for European integration have nevertheless covered the progress in its 
implementation since 2008. The 2008 Progress Report from the European 
Commission acknowledges its adoption and considers that “it clarifies and extends 
the scope for the use of non-majority languages at all levels of state and local self-
government *…+” (EC, 2008b p.19). However, the European Commission also notes 
that “the law does not sufficiently address the use of languages of the smaller 
ethnic communities” (EC, 2008b p.19). A year later, the European Commission 
notes that there has been some progress in implementing this law as some 
chairpersons of parliamentary committees began using Albanian, however little 
progress can be reported regarding the use of the languages of the smaller ethnic 
communities (EC, 2009b). Hence, after its adoption the European Commission has 
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a newspaper article at the time, VMRO-DPMNE and DUI hide the Agreement 
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<http://www.dnevnik.com.mk/?itemID=C13A64D422158841A5A52709A2C06E08
&arc=1> [Accessed 22 June 2010] 
145 Author’s interview with Member of Parliament, Skopje, 23 December 2010. 
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begun monitoring the implementation of this law, although originally the issue 
was not part of the EU conditions.  
Similarly as in the case of the official European documents, following its 
adoption, the national documents such as the NPAA and the national 
contributions to the progress reports consider the law on the use of languages as 
an element of EU conditionality and reflect upon the plans and progress in its 
implementation. Although the 2009 NPAA does not undertake any specific 
obligations directed towards its implementation and does not address the issue of 
use of languages of the smaller ethnic communities, the law is included as an 
element on which the country reported in the context of its EU accession process 
(Government of the Republic of Macedonia, 2009a). The 2010 NPAA underlines 
that efforts will be made to obtain extend the use of this law to state institutions 
where this was not possible due to the lack of technical equipment, thereby in a 
way ‘justifying’ its feeble implementation to Brussels (Government of the Republic 
of Macedonia, 2010). Nevertheless, both documents mention the law on the use 
of languages as an element which is being monitored in relation to the country’s 
EU accession. 
National and European Commission officials interviewed for this research 
had contrasting views on the role of this law as an element of the EU accession 
conditionality. For national officials “the law has become part of conditionality”, 
and they stressed “the change of the European Commission approach from 
considering the issue to be outside of its competences to its gradual inclusion in 
conditionality”.146 On the one hand, European Commission interviewees in 
Brussels highlighted that “they expect this law to be one of the main issues which 
will be included in the benchmarks in the accession negotiations”, thereby 
illustrating that the issue has firmly entered the array of EU political criteria.147 On 
the other hand, European Commission interviewees in Skopje stressed that “the 
law is not an issue of interest to the Commission in the accession process”.148 This 
conflict within the Commission itself underlines the problems of stipulating 
conditionality in absence of clear EU rules. This case therefore illustrates the 
vertical rather than horizontal competition of competences in the Commission. 
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Academic research has recognized the Commission is a fragmented organisation 
primarily in relation to different DGs (Nugent, 1997, Morth, 2000), however this 
example also illustrates the prevalence of different opinions within the various 
DGs in terms of their offices in Brussels and the representation in the respective 
countries.  
Having in mind the mixed record of EU and national documents as well as 
the interview data regarding the adoption and implementation of this specific law 
it is very difficult to draw a precise conclusion on the role EU conditionality. 
Whereas the law was not a specific obligation according to the Progress Reports 
and the European/Accession Partnerships before 2008, following its adoption it 
became an element of EU conditionality blurring the distinction between the 
impetus for change coming from the European and the national level. This case 
clearly illustrates the role domestic politics plays in the operation of 
conditionality, illustrating its bottom-up dimension, which has important 
implications for its analysis. It also highlights the significance of the informal 
pressures of the European Commission and the lack of a common understanding 
between actors at the EU and national levels as to what constitutes EU 
conditionality.  
With this conclusion, the analysis largely confirms the findings of authors 
such as Brusis that emphasize the importance of domestic factors in the outcomes 
of conditionality in areas not regulated by the acquis (Brusis, 2005b). The support 
for adopting the law in the case analysed was in fact dependent on the minority 
party and its participation in government, i.e. ability to realise its own agenda. 
Moreover, the actors involved both at the EU level and national authorities had 
differing views of the inclusion/non-inclusion of this law as a condition of EU 
accession, illustrating clearly the existing lack of consensus between and within 
these two groups of stakeholders. Lastly, the law on languages illustrates the 
largely informal channels the European Commission used in its communication on 
conditionality and the informal processes taking place which determined the 
outcome of the policy. 
 
National minority councils in Croatia 
One of the most important elements of the Croatian CLNM was the 
introduction of the national minority councils in the direction of improving 
minority participation in public life, which is amplified in the conditions of post-
conflict. According to the CLNM, these councils are foreseen as a form of minority 
147 
 
local self government. Among other competences, they have the right to make 
proposals to local governments on improving the position of minorities as well as 
propose candidates for local office positions.149 However, their establishment and 
functioning has been burdened with problems. The first election for minority 
councils held on 18 May 2003, were “called at short notice and held in the 
immediate aftermath of a long period of vacation connected with the Catholic and 
Orthodox Easter” (Zanotti, 2008 p.241). As a result, Serbs and Roma were among 
the minorities that had the lowest rate of participation. In this direction, a study 
of the openness of Croatian society in 2006 in this vein concluded that the 
“functioning of the local authority level is the weakest link of minority protection 
with respect to the exercise and protection of minority rights” (Gjenero, 2006a 
p.75).  
Hence, the Councils are not surprisingly in the focus of the European 
Commission in Croatia in the post-2005 period. The European Commission in this 
period deals with aspects of implementation of the CLNM at the national level in 
terms of drafting a plan for the implementation of the CLNM, establishment and 
functioning of the Councils for national minorities at the local level and the 
employment of minorities in state administrative, judicial bodies and the police. 
Since the next chapter deals with the employment of minorities in the public 
sector in both countries, this section will deal with the former policy. In terms of 
the functioning of the local minority councils in 2005, the Commission notes that 
“misunderstandings and a lack of awareness among both the local authorities and 
the minority groups are widespread with respect to the role of the local minority 
councils” (EC, 2005b p.21).  In the next year, the Commission notes that “the 
capacity of CNMs to advise local government in relation to minority issues [...] 
continues to go unrecognised by the majority of local authorities” (EC, 2006a 
p.11). The same remark is repeated in the 2007 progress report which underlines 
that “the capacity of the CNMs to advise local government in relation to minority 
issues – as provided for under the CLNM – goes unrecognised by the majority of 
local authorities and many local councils struggle to obtain premises and funding” 
(EC, 2007a p.13). Similarly, the OSCE at the time also remarked that the “local 
Councils of National Minorities established by the CLNM as advisory bodies to 
                                            
149 Constitutional Law on the Rights of National Minorities, Official Gazette no. 
155/2002, available at: 
<http://www.vsrh.hr/CustomPages/Static/HRV/Files/Legislation__Constitutional-
Law-on-the-Rights-NM.pdf> [Accessed 04 May 2010] 
148 
 
local and regional self-government units are, with a few positive exceptions, still 
struggling to be recognized as institutional partners” (OSCE, 2006 p.7).  
Despite these continuous criticisms from the European Commission, the 
national authorities between 2006 and 2008 do not foresee any specific activities 
for advancing the role of the councils. The 2006 NPAA reports on the number of 
councils registered (272), noting that 124 of them are councils of the Serbian 
national minority (Government of the Republic of Croatia, 2006). Similarly, the 
2007 NPAA reports that in by that year 274 councils and all national minority 
representatives had been registered, and measures were being taken to keep the 
system functioning, without elaborating on the measures undertaken 
(Government of the Republic of Croatia, 2007). As of 2007 the government starts 
reporting as well on the seminars which were delivered to the Councils and also 
(Government of the Republic of Croatia, 2007).150 As was argued by my 
interviewees and discussed in the previous chapter, “training has been the 
immediate and generally least effective common response to dealing with EU 
requirements on capacity building”.151   
In the same period, the European Commission also supported the 
Councils with a CARDS project in the regions which were most affected by the 
war, i.e. areas of special state concern. The support to the minority councils in the 
areas of special concern is a result of the numerous difficulties linked to the 
implementation of the CLNM in the regions which were not peacefully 
reintegrated in the Croatian state following the wars of the 1990s.152 In the 
following year, the government reports on the “elections for members of national 
minority councils in local and regional self-government units were held on 17 June 
2007 *…+ for 308 national minority councils and 228 national minority 
representatives, with a turnout of 12.76 %” (Government of the Republic of 
Croatia, 2008b p.67). The low turnout was remarked in the European Commission 
Progress Report which underlined that “the government financed the 
organisation of the elections but made a limited effort to promote them” (EC, 
2007a p.13). Overall, prior to the launching of the official negotiations on chapter 
23, it can be concluded that despite the European Commission’s remarks, there 
was no significant response at the national level.   
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151 Author’s interview with CSO representative , Zagreb 5 June 2011. 
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In relation to the pre-negotiations period, the interviewees stressed that 
“these bodies seem as very important because they were established by the 
CLNM, but have no specific competences, nor obligations”.153 A European 
Commission interlocutor in the Delegation in Zagreb confirmed that “the minority 
councils are an ornament and until they become part of the political life there is 
no point in their operation, although the EU supports them”.154 A CSO 
representative from Zagreb highlighted that because of these critiques from the 
EU, the NGOs often “react to these formal changes through applying for funds to 
assist the implementation of these activities that the EU tends to support”.155 The 
situation was described in the following manner by the same interviewee:  
“A lot of effort was put into the educating of the members of these 
councils, while recognising that the role and function of these bodies is not 
clear.  Hence, when I asked the European Commission why they allocate a 
lot of money enabling these bodies that ultimately do not have a clear 
function; I received an open and cynical reply. The European Commission 
confirmed that these bodies are decorum, but as it tried so hard to make 
the Croatian government to adopt the CLNM, it is expected that we take 
them seriously. Thus, there is double pretence in this case, both on the side 
of the EU and the national authorities.156 
Even though prior to the official launching of the negotiations on chapter 
23 the European Commission deals with the functioning of the councils, in the 
post-2008 period when the negotiations for EU accession started the issue was 
sidelined. At the same time, the opening of the negotiations has been assessed in 
literature as  “probably the most significant of the different stages of the 
accession process *….+ *which+ creates new situations and new expectations, as 
both sides begin to take accession seriously and examine all its practical 
consequences” (Avery and Cameron, 1998 p.27). In the screening report of 2007 
on chapter 23 the European Commission repeats the same remark as in the 
progress report of the same year in terms of the unrecognised role  of these 
Councils by the majority of local authorities and that many of them struggle to 
obtain premises and funding (EC, 2007b). Even though the screening report 
mentions them, the European Commission and the authorities did not deal with 
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the issue in the negotiations, as was highlighted by my interviewees. At the same 
time, the issue was not included in the benchmarks in the interim report on the 
negotiations of chapter 23 issued in March 2011, highlighting the lack of 
consistency in the requirements (See EC, 2011d).  The national strategic 
documents also do not deal specifically with the role of the local minority councils 
in the post-2008 period. The 2011 NPAA only mentions the intention to organise 
seminars for the improvement of the work of minority councils and 
representatives of national minorities (Government of the Republic of Croatia, 
2011c). Overall, the issue was not dealt with in a structured way in the 
negotiations process, although it was a subject of EU interest and also was 
supported by substantial financial assistance.  
While the European Commission did not streamline the work of the CNMs 
in the documents related to the negotiations, in the Progress Reports in the post-
2008 period the European Commission deals with these bodies. Hence, in 2008 
and 2009 the Commission notes that “CNMs are not sufficiently recognised yet as 
advisory bodies by the majority of local authorities. Moreover, their 
independence and influence is affected by the fact that they depend on the 
budget of the town authority or council” (EC, 2008a p.13, EC, 2009a p.14). The 
Shadow report to the FCNM convention highlights that these institutions did not 
succeed in the course of their second mandate to position themselves in any of 
the segments related to decision-making (Center for Peace, 2010). The Shadow 
Report relying upon reports from members of these councils reiterates the need 
to amend the legislation for their functioning, however, this is not supported in 
the European Commission reports. In 2011 the European Commission mentions 
therefore that support to the local CNMs increased and training was provided for 
local authorities and the new July 2011 elections which took place with very low 
turnout (EC, 2011a). Hence, although dealing with the issue formally through the 
reports, the negotiations for accession were not used for advancing the 
implementation of the CLNM at the local level through these bodies. Hence, the 
analysis points to the evident discordance between the progress reports and the 
negotiating documents although they’re both prepared by the Commission 
officials, once more highlighting the problem of stipulating clear conditionality in 
the absence of the acquis.  
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6.4  Negotiating national minority policies in chapter 23  
As explained in the introduction of this chapter, the negotiating structure 
for EU accession was amended in 2005 to include formally the issues related to 
judiciary and fundamental rights in the negotiations. The expectation of the 
Commission at the time was among other results, for this chapter to increase the 
consistency of conditionality in this policy area.157 Hence, the chapter 23 in the 
negotiations process was introduced as a result of the lessons learnt in the 
previous enlargement and in order to set clear standards and benchmarks in 
relation to the political criteria. Thus, the assessment of its success in achieving 
these objectives is significant for tackling the research questions of the thesis. This 
section therefore studies whether this chapter contributed to the development of 
“clear cut benchmarking” and a common consensus among the stakeholders on 
conditionality. The potential of this chapter which deals with issues outside of the 
acquis at the time of its launching was not clear due to the former European 
Commission position that the political criteria (i.e. minority policies) need to be 
fulfilled prior to the beginning of the negotiations (See Sasse, 2005). Hence, it was 
argued that on the one hand, the inclusion of this chapter could lower s the 
“threshold for the beginning of accession negotiations *...+ in contrast to the one 
for membership” (Spernbauer, 2007 p.280).  It could be the case, on the other 
hand that the tasks for opening of negotiations remain the same while the 
conclusion of negotiations would assessed more strictly (Spernbauer, 2007).  
Croatia was the first country that formally negotiated this chapter and is 
therefore instructive and sets lessons to be learnt both for the other candidate 
countries and the European Commission. The process of negotiating this chapter 
in the case of Croatia was quite drawn out because there were delays in the 
screening of the chapter as well as the opening of the negotiations. The 
Commission published its screening report in late 2007 and a year later in 
December 2008 it presented a positive assessment regarding the fulfilment of the 
opening benchmarks for this chapter. However, in the course of 2008 and 2009 
the negotiations on this chapter were not pursued due to Croatia’s insufficient 
cooperation with the ICTY as well as the bilateral dispute with Slovenia.158 The 
negotiations were open in February 2010 and effectively lasted less than one and 
a half year until the closing of the negotiations in June 2011. Thus, the chapter 
                                            
157 Author’s interview with European Commission official, Brussels, 8 December 
2010.  
158 See chapter four for background. 
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was among the last ones to be opened for negotiations and the fulfilment of the 
benchmarks in relation to this chapter was under substantial pressure before the 
official target of June 2011, declared by the Croatian government at the time. 
The most important opening benchmark in relation to minorities in the 
chapter 23 was the adoption of an Action Plan for the implementation of the 
CLNM, which was already recommended in the Progress Report of 2006 and 
2007.159 The 2006 report states “the establishment of an action plan covering all 
bodies concerned by the CLNM is recommended to ensure the CLNM can be fully 
implemented” (EC, 2006a). In the next year, the European Commission remarks 
that there is still no overarching action plan for the CLNM (EC, 2007a). The Action 
Plan which was delayed since the adoption of the CLNM in 2002 was finally 
prepared in 2008 as a result of the screening report and the launching of the 
negotiations (See Government of the Republic of Croatia, 2008a). In this case, 
“the EU pressure materialised in the adoption of a strategic document; however, 
it was later shown that the problems in the implementation remained”.160 
The foremost problem with the Action Plan was its preparation and 
adoption without informing the national minorities. Interviewed stakeholders 
have highlighted that “the Plan was prepared in the Government as an act to 
satisfy the demands of the EU, but not the minorities”.161 Furthermore, the Plan 
was considered confidential until the end of 2009 when it was announced to the 
public (Center for Peace, 2010). The European Commission officials interviewed 
on the other hand considered that “the action plan on the CLNM went a little bit 
wider than what was requested from the EU”.162 Still, although much demanded, 
the Action Plan did not bring about tangible results in its implementation in the 
most problematic areas such as the minority councils, as explained above and the 
representation of minorities in the administration, which is dealt with in the 
following chapter. For the concluding of the negotiations the government 
presented a further Action plan for the period 2011-2013 which deals mostly with 
issues in relation to the employment of the national minorities discussed in the 
following chapter (See Government of the Republic of Croatia, 2011a). 
                                            
159 This was also confirmed to me by my interviewees in the EC. 
160 Author’s interview with CSO representative, Zagreb, 19 April 2011. 
161 Author’s interview with CSO representative, Zagreb, 20 May 2011, Author’s 
interview with CSO representative, Zagreb, June 21 June 2011.  
162 Author’s interview with European Commission official, Brussels, 8 December 
2010.  
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 The role of the new chapter dealing with minority policies chapter and the 
further “benchmarking” of the process were not considered as significantly 
assisting in the consistency of conditionality by the stakeholders. The European 
Commission officials interviewed considered that “it is difficult to pinpoint specific 
improvement”, though it was argued that “it has possibly led to a more 
responsible attitude at the highest level of Government”.163 The national officials 
working directly on chapter 23 considered that “the work on this chapter was one 
of trials and errors - the European Commission waited for us to come up with a 
solution, present it and if we guessed it fine, if not we had to re-do the 
exercise”.164  Stakeholders that participated in the negotiations also argued that 
“the European Commission was not going as far as advising Croatia on how to 
implement certain policies. It just showed problematic areas and then the 
government office would produce a document which obliges the state 
administration bodies to take actions”.165 In this manner, the negotiating 
documents were compared to the progress reports, since “they share the same 
problem as they only touch the surface and are not substantial”.166 These 
conclusions therefore confirm the findings of a recent analysis of the progress 
reports in relation to minority policies in the region which concluded that “while 
the space allocated to minority rights in the Reports has progressively increased, 
this has generally not been reflected in the quality of its content” (Bokulid and 
Kostadinova, 2008 p.18).  
This conclusion is also supported when examining the benchmarks 
presented by the European Commission in the interim report on the negotiations 
with respect to the protection of minorities (EC, 2011d). These for example have 
included requirements that Croatia improves the protection of human rights or 
strengthens the protection of minorities (EC, 2011d).  The benchmarks therefore 
confirm my interviewees’ remarks that “the European Commission influence is 
still limited to policy documents and there is no genuine interest among the EU to 
deal with implementation of minority legislation”.167 These assessments are not 
surprising having in mind that in the course of the negotiations in Croatia two 
                                            
163 Author’s interview with European Commission official, Brussels, 8 December 
2010.  
164 Author’s interview with a representative of the Ministry of Justice and a  
member of the negotiating team, Zagreb, 24 May 2011. 
165 Author’s interview with researcher, Zagreb, 21 April 2011. 
166 Author’s interview with civil servant in the Ministry of administration, Zagreb, 
02 May 2011. 
167 Author’s interview with researcher, Zagreb, 21 April 2011. 
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action plans were prepared on the implementation of the CLNM, which were not 
accompanied by substantive changes in the most difficult policies such as the 
functioning of the councils, or the representation of minorities in the public 
sector, the latter of which is the focus of the following chapter. Similarly, it was 
highlighted that the negotiations touched only the formal level of legislative 
change, institutional set up and the endless institutional capacity building through 
trainings etc.  
 The CSOs were most critical of the way the negotiations were managed in 
terms of the late opening of the negotiations and the lack of transparency in the 
negotiations. First, “the late opening of the negotiations in this chapter was 
considered to be a mistake” by CSO representatives.168 It was commonly argued 
that if the European Commission considered that the Copenhagen criteria need to 
be fulfilled for the launching of the negotiations, “then this criterion should have 
been upheld and the negotiations should have been opened when the 
benchmarks for chapter 23 would have been met”. 169 At the same time, the late 
opening of this chapter in the negotiations had significant implications over the 
possibility of bringing about substantial results in terms of implementation. Even 
though the European Commission announced that the implementation would be 
monitored in the case of Croatia, it was pointed that “for many of these policies 
implementation cannot be monitored because the mechanisms were set up in the 
last 8 months, thus, it is impossible to expect results”.170 Lastly, the opening of the 
negotiations in this chapter a year and a half in advance of the announced end of 
the negotiations increased the political pressure for concluding the negotiations 
and therefore one of my interviewees claimed that “for numerous indicators 
implementation cannot be discussed”. 171 
The second element, subject to criticism in terms of the impact of the 
negotiations on the enforcement and application of conditionality, was the lack of 
access of the public and especially CSOs to the negotiating positions and the EU 
benchmarks. “Minority issues were not visible sufficiently in chapter 23 – the 
positions were not public and this was supposedly at the request of the 
Commission”. 172 This was a practice noticeable in the Eastern enlargement as 
well, especially in the cases of Poland and Hungary (Brusis and Emmanoulidis, 
                                            
168 Author’s interview with CSO representative, Zagreb, 06 June 2011. 
169 Author’s interview with CSO representative, Zagreb, 06 June 2011. 
170 Author’s interview with CSO representative, Zagreb 06 June 2011. 
171 Author’s interview with CSO representative, Zagreb 06 June 2011. 
172 Author’s interview with CSO representative, Zagreb, 19 April 2011. 
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2000). Some of my interviewees also linked the lack of access to the negotiating 
documents as to the role that minorities had in the negotiations. “The minorities 
stayed on the side and are not too much in the public – the minority segment is 
isolated from the mainstream.” 173 Similar conclusions have been made in relation 
to the last enlargement, for example in terms of the involvement of local self-
government in the negotiations of regional policy by Hughes et al (2005). In light 
of these criticisms of the management of the negotiations CSOs in Croatia in the 
first half of 2011 put forward two opinions on the negotiations with reference to 
chapter 23 in which it was argued that Croatia has not successfully conducted the 
reforms in this chapter for the ending of the negotiations process (2011a, 2011b). 
In February 2011 the CSOs publicly and in discussions with the European 
Commission demanded that “the results of the negotiation process with the EU be 
urgently publicized, with emphasis on negotiated exemptions and adjustment 
periods”(2011a). The negotiating positions and the benchmarks were made public 
after the end of the negotiations in the summer of 2011, when there was no 
possibility for consultation.  
 
6.5  Conclusion  
This chapter has examined the minority conditionality in Macedonia and 
Croatia in the post-2005 period. Building upon the discussion from the previous 
chapter which dealt with the period between 1997 and 2005 and identified the 
lack of consistency in the European Commission conditions, the objective of this 
chapter was to examine whether we can trace a more structured and consistent 
approach in EU conditionality in relation to minority policies post-2005. In 
2004/2005 both countries became candidates for EU accession and the European 
Commission launched its new approach with the chapter 23, streamlining 
minority policies in the accession negotiations, rather than treating them as a part 
of the political criteria for accession. At the same time, the European Commission 
introduced the benchmarking process in the relations with the candidate 
countries with the purpose of improving the clarity of the conditionality. The 
expectation of this new approach was a more thorough application of 
conditionality in relation to minority policies, among other elements.174 Hence, 
this chapter evaluated whether in the post-2005 period these new instruments 
contributed to overcoming some of the problems identified in the previous 
                                            
173 Author’s interview with researcher, Zagreb, 21 April 2011. 
174 This was confirmed by all of the EC officials interviewed.  
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chapter, with special relevance of the case of Croatia which is the first country 
that negotiated under this new framework. The chapter therefore studied all the 
research questions presented in the introduction by looking at the development 
and consistency of conditionality in the two case studies as well as the 
implications for the democratic consolidation.  
The empirical analysis of the chapter was divided in two sections: 
examination of the use of the FCNM as a benchmarking tool by the European 
Commission and the use of national legislation in the benchmarking for minority 
policies. In relation to the former, the chapter showed that in the post-2005 
period there is still no consistent use of the FCNM as a benchmark by the 
European Commission. In the case of Macedonia, it has been denounced by the 
national government in terms of its usefulness because the national legislation 
provides more advanced protection of national minorities than the protection by 
the FCNM. In the case of Croatia, the European Commission fleetingly uses the 
FCNM and although there was potential to use it in the negotiations for EU 
accession this was not the case.  As a result, both on the basis of the findings of 
the previous chapter and the analysis of the post-2005 period, it can be concluded 
the EU, especially the European Commission has not moved in the direction of 
structured use of the FCNM in substantiating EU conditionality.  
In terms of the use of national legislation as a tool of EU conditionality the 
chapter dealt with two major policies in both countries – the law on languages in 
Macedonia and the establishment and functioning of the local Councils for 
national minorities in Croatia. The law on languages in Macedonia illustrates the 
role domestic politics plays in conditionality and its bottom-up dimension, which 
has important implications for its analysis and the theoretical contribution of the 
thesis, discussed in the conclusion. It also highlights the way in which national 
actors can choose to introduce legislation and policies at the national level, which 
at a later stage can become part of EU conditions.  Moreover, the actors involved 
both at the EU level and national authorities had differing views of the 
inclusion/non-inclusion of this law as a condition of EU accession, highlighting 
clearly the existing lack of consensus between and within these two groups of 
stakeholders. 
The analysis of the establishment and functioning of the local minority 
councils in the case of Croatia illustrated the lack of consistency in the EU’s 
approach to minority conditionality in this specific policy. While prior to the start 
of the negotiations the European Commission dealt in detail with the functioning 
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of the councils, in the negotiations this issue was not tackled. At the same time, 
there is an evident discordance between the regular Progress Reports and the 
negotiating documents in relation to dealing with the functioning of the Councils 
for national minorities. Thus, the negotiations were in a way a missed opportunity 
for advancing this specific policy, although literature has commonly shown that 
the EU’s influence in supporting policy change and implementation is the highest 
during the accession negotiations.  
Lastly, the chapter examined whether the further formalisation of 
minority policies has contributed to the consistency of the conditions and the 
requirements for their fulfilment. The analysis of the benchmarks in relation to 
minority policies in the European Commission screening documents and 
negotiation reports shows that they share the same lack of follow up identified in 
the previous chapter. It may be too early to assess, but the stakeholders at the 
national level both from the state institutions and the CSOs were highly critical of 
the chapter. First, the late opening of the negotiations in this chapter did not 
provide sufficient time for dealing with the issues concerned and the benchmarks 
and indicators were not considered to have added clarity to the minority 
conditionality. Second, the confidentiality of the negotiations process was 
considered as an impediment for the effective participation of minority 
organisations and external stakeholders in the negotiations.  
These criticisms of the conditionality process could have potentially been 
recognised within the European Commission itself since, following the end of the 
Croatian accession negotiations in October 2011, the European Commission 
announced  that the first and the last chapter to be opened and closed in the 
upcoming accession negotiations will be Chapter 23 - Judiciary and Fundamental 
Rights and Chapter 24 - Justice, Freedom and Security, which will be continuously 
monitored based on specific benchmarks and action plans (EC, 2011b). The next 
chapter however will deal with a policy in which there were specific benchmarks 
and action plans for fulfilment, the representation of minorities in the public 
sector and highlight the potential caveats of this approach as well.  
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7. Case study: representation of minorities in the public sector  
7.1  Introduction  
This last empirical chapter of the thesis is a case study of the 
representation of minorities in the public sector as an element of EU 
conditionality in Macedonia and Croatia. In the course of the fieldwork, this policy 
was most commonly singled out as an example that stood at the core of EU’s 
conditions in relation to minority policies in both countries. Furthermore, this 
policy was not been an element of EU conditionality in the previous enlargement 
and as such contributes significantly to the originality of the thesis. The analysis 
that follows complements the discussion of the previous two chapters which 
highlighted the lack of consistency, difficulties in stipulating causal relationships 
and the diverse understandings of the conditions is both at the EU and national 
level.  In light of these findings the objective of this chapter is to examine in detail 
a similar policy in both case countries in order to draw more context specific 
conclusions. In this sense, the chapter in part addresses all the research questions 
presented in the introduction, while nevertheless focusing on the consistency of 
conditionality, role of domestic actors and the dynamic relationship between 
conditionality and democratisation. The chapter therefore tests the findings of the 
previous two chapters on a micro-level by looking closely into the operation of the 
same policy in both case studies. 
While representation of minorities from a broad perspective includes 
political participation as well as representation/employment in the 
administration, this chapter deals solely with the latter aspect, which in 
international law is commonly referred to as ‘special measures’ or ‘affirmative 
action’ (See Bokulid and Kostadinova, 2008).175 According to Kymlicka (1995) “in so 
far as these rights are seen as a response to oppression or systemic disadvantage, 
they are most plausibly seen as a temporary measure on the way to a society 
where the need for special representation no longer exists” (p.141). This 
obligation has been supported extensively by EU conditionality in the area making 
this issue one of the most important elements in the accession process of both 
case studies. In addition to its prominence in the EU criteria, this policy is of high 
interest to the domestic actors, specifically organised minority interests. Lastly,  
                                            
175 Political representation of the minorities/non-majority communities in both 
countries is considered relatively well organised and has not been subject to EU 
conditionality. 
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Kis (2002) posits that “access to public institutions is a means for them 
[minorities] to gain symbolic recognition as constitutive members of the political 
community” (p.227). From this perspective, it also carries increased significance 
for the objective of democratic consolidation as was explained in chapter three.  
The under-representation of minorities in the administration has been a 
feature of the post-communist period in the two cases due to a variety of reasons. 
In Macedonia, the non-majority communities, especially the Albanian community 
as the biggest, in the communist period and in the early 90s have been 
underrepresented in the administration (see figures in next section). In fact, 
“Albanians have been forced to channel their energies into this new private sector 
because of their traditional exclusion from jobs in the public administration” 
(Knaus et al., 2004 p.105). In Croatia, the under-representation of minorities has 
been especially prevalent among the largest Serb minority as a result of the war 
and the mass displacement. Since the country’s institutions were re-constituted 
during the 90s when a significant number of the Serb population was displaced, 
the representation of the Serb minority in the administration has been low as 
well.  Thus, in both countries representation in the administration has strong 
implications for the sense of “ownership” that under-represented groups might 
have in the state (Bieber, 2008b).   
Macedonia and Croatia are obliged through national legislation to ensure 
the representation of minorities in their public sectors. In Macedonia, the policy 
was a part of the OFA and in Croatia it was streamlined through the CLNM, both 
of which were examined in the fifth chapter of this thesis. These national legal 
obligations have been a core element of the EU accession process stipulated in 
the EU official documents such as the European Partnerships and Progress 
Reports. Hence, the EU primarily through the documents of the European 
Commission constantly stipulated the proportional representation of minorities in 
the local and regional self-government units, in the State administration and 
judicial bodies and in bodies of public administration as a key priority in 
Macedonia and Croatia (Council, 2004, 2006a, 2006b). Moreover, this policy was a 
key element of the opening and closing benchmarks for the negotiations with 
Croatia in the newly established chapter in the EU negotiations dealing with 
judiciary and fundamental rights, examined in the previous chapter (EC, 2007b). 
As such, it has become one of the core formal conditions for EU membership 
during the negotiations for EU membership.  
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At the same time, the fulfilment of this condition in both countries has 
been hampered by numerous problems. While in Macedonia the policy has been 
formally implemented by increasing the number of almost exclusively Albanian 
employees in the public sector, it has been accompanied by critiques on the 
manner of implementation and neglect of smaller non-majority communities. In 
Croatia, the implementation of this policy was a matter of constant delay and 
critiques especially during the accession negotiations. Even though the 
negotiations were concluded at the end of June 2011 and the Croatian accession 
treaty was signed, the progress on this benchmark remained slow and 
incomplete. In addition to its current significance, the policy is likely to stay on the 
agenda in the forthcoming years in both countries. An interlocutor from the 
European Commission highlighted that in Macedonia this policy will be a core 
element in the upcoming negotiations process, “because the Commission since 
the beginning has been supporting it financially and we [the European 
Commission+ will concentrate on this once the negotiations start”. 176 In the 
accession document on chapter 23 the European Commission recommends that 
“Croatia is *...+ to ensure targets are met and a tangible improvement in the level 
of employment of the national minorities in the public sector achieved” 
(European Union Common Position, 2011 p.17). Hence, the policy is likely to stay 
on the national and EU agenda for the years to come.  
Using representation of minorities/non-majority communities in the 
public sector as an example, this chapter examines the application and evolution 
of EU conditionality in the two case studies. Similarly as the other chapters, the 
analysis is based on process-tracing of official documents and fieldwork interview 
data for the purpose of illustrating the complexity of EU conditionality in relation 
to the political criteria and the significant role domestic politics for the outcome 
of conditionality.177 Studying this policy the chapter underlines the potential for 
increasing politicisation of EU political criteria due to their flexible nature and the 
                                            
176 Author’s interview with European Commission official, Skopje, 21 January 
2011. 
177 The chapter does not take a normative stance on minority representation 
policies, but focuses on the application and problems of the study of EU 
conditionality. For a discussion the justification and potential problems of 
equitable representation policies in democratic consolidation see  DASKALOVSKI, 
Z. The Macedonian Integration Model: Minorities and Affirmative Action Policies 
In: MARIA, G., ed. Inclusion Unaffordable? The Uncertain Fate of Integration 
Policies and the Demonisation of Minorities and Migrants in Central and Eastern 
Europe 2009 Riga. Centre for Public Policy Providus.  
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subjective approach in their evaluation. This is so, because “the political accession 
criteria remain vague and fail to depict what the EU really wants from new 
members when it comes to the functioning of their democracies” (Haukenes and 
Freyberg-Inan, 2012 p.20). The chapter thereby supports Sasse (2009 ) claim that 
“a legal change can hide deeper political or societal problems which might, in fact, 
have become ingrained in the context of the EU’s involvement” (p.28). 
 
7.2  Background to the policy in Macedonia and Croatia  
The equitable representation of communities in the administration in 
Macedonia is guaranteed in the section 4.2 of the OFA. The post-Ohrid amended 
Constitutional article ensures that “equitable representation of persons belonging 
to all communities in public bodies at all levels and in other areas of public life.”178 
In order to implement this provision, it was agreed that: “the Assembly shall 
adopt by the end of the term of the present Assembly amendments to the laws on 
the civil service and public administration to ensure equitable representation of 
communities in accordance with Section 4.2 of the Framework Agreement”.179As 
outlined in former chapter, all of the laws, including the ones necessary for the 
implementation of this policy were adopted in the first couple of years after the 
OFA creating the legal prerequisites for the policy.  
The rationale behind this policy was the evident statistical 
underrepresentation of minorities in the state sector. In 2001, for example 84.5 
per cent of those employed were ethnic Macedonians compared to 7.5 per cent 
Albanians, whereas 20 per cent of those registered as unemployed were 
Albanian.180 Brunnbauer (2002) has stressed that “Albanians remained 
underrepresented in all fields of the formal economy, which cannot be explained 
only by their lower qualifications and their more rural life-styles but is more likely 
the result of ethnically discriminatory recruitment patterns” (p.13). Thus, the OFA 
and the subsequent constitutional amendments in essence required the country 
                                            
178 Text of the Ohrid Framework Agreement available at the website of the Sector 
for implementation of the Ohrid Framework Agreement, Government of the 
Republic of Macedonia www.siofa.gov.mk [Accessed 09 October 2009]. 
179 See GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA 2005. Answers to the 
Questionnaire for the preparation of the European Commission's Opinion on the 
application of the Republic of Macedonia for membership of the European Union - 
Political Criteria. Government of the Republic of Macedonia. 
180 Mirjana Najcevska,  *Манипулација+ Manipulation, 8 May 2001 Utrinski vesnik 
www.utrinski.com.mk. 
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to remedy this situation and achieve equitable and adequate representation of 
non-majority communities at all levels of the administration.  
There was widespread agreement among my interviewees who 
participated in the drafting of the OFA that that even though the equitable 
representation was relatively easy to negotiate in the Agreement, it was expected 
that its implementation would encounter major difficulties. For example, a former 
vice prime Minister for EU affairs interviewed for this thesis pointed out that “at 
the time of negotiating the OFA everyone was aware that this was a not a simple 
political decision, but rather an overhaul of the administration.” 181 In academic 
literature, this policy was also considered as one of the most contentious ones of 
the OFA and was bound to encounter more problems than the political 
representation (Ilievski, 2007, Bieber, 2005a).  The problem is even more evident 
having in mind the high percentage of state employment in Macedonia and the 
general high level of unemployment in the country which is on average around 
32% with youth unemployment at a staggering 53% (ILO, 2012). As a result, 
research has concluded that this policy will need to be implemented “through the 
natural attrition of ethnic Macedonian employees and a program of positive 
discrimination in favour of Albanians in the public sector recruitment over many 
years” (Knaus et al., 2004).  
In Croatia the right to representation of minorities in the administration is 
guaranteed with the 2002 CLNM. The inclusion of such a provision in the CLNM in 
the context of Croatia’s democratisation process is of high importance primarily 
because of the legacy of the overrepresentation of Serbs in the employment 
sector in the Yugoslav times (Petričušid and Žagar, 2007). Article 22 of the CLNM 
foresees that: 
Minority representation shall be ensured in government and judiciary 
bodies in compliance with a special law, with allowance to be made for 
the share of a national minority in the total population in the area where a 
government or a judiciary body has been formed, as well as for the 
acquired rights.182  
                                            
181 Author’s interview with former vice prime minister for EU affairs, Skopje, 23 
December 2010. 
182 Constitutional Law on the Rights of National Minorities, Official Gazette no. 
155/2002, available at: 
<http://www.vsrh.hr/CustomPages/Static/HRV/Files/Legislation__Constitutional-
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The rationale behind this policy is to be found foremost in the practices of the first 
decades of independence, when the majority of public servants of Serb ethnic 
origin were forced to leave their posts (Petričušid 2004 p.6, see also Cohen, 1997). 
Thus, the under-representation of minorities in Croatia is especially prevalent 
among the largest Serb minority as a result of the war and the re-constituting of 
the country’s institutions in 90s when a major part of the Serb population was 
displaced (on legacies of the 1990s see Jovid and Lamont, 2010). This official policy 
of ‘nationalising the state’ “was further reflected in the state administration, 
courts, police, state media, and so on, where priority was given to Croats and 
many Serb employees were removed” (Zakošek, 2008p. 598). A Human Rights 
Watch report in 2003 underlined that “employment discrimination on ethnic 
grounds is difficult to prove since unemployment among [... however...] a number 
of returnees told Human Rights Watch, however, that they were explicitly told 
that they could not get a job because of their ethnicity” (HRW, 2003 p.53). 
Moreover, especially in the areas affected by the war, the employment in the 
state institutions is the only option due to the economic devastation (Gjenero, 
2006b).  
 
7.3  Equitable representation of non-majority communities as an EU 
condition in Macedonia  
The origins of the condition related to the equitable representation are in 
the OFA and the SAA reports, although stronger emphasis to this policy area has 
been given in the Progress Reports since 2005. The need for achieving equitable 
representation was clearly highlighted in the Analytical Report of 2005 and has 
been continuously raised as an issue of concern by the Commission (EC, 2005a). In 
2006, a short-term and mid-term priority was included in the European 
Partnership requiring the adoption and implementation of a medium-term 
strategic plan for equitable representation in the public administration (Council, 
2006b). In 2008, this priority of the European/Accession partnership was repeated 
with an emphasis on the need of its upgrading and implementation (Council, 
2006a). Being a part of the European/Accession partnerships, equitable 
representation was essential for the assessment of the country progress in the 
context of EU conditionality. The document analysis therefore confirms my 
interviewees’ claims, that “despite the likely problems in the implementation, 
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unlike other international organisations, the EU supported this policy from its very 
beginning both financially and institutionally”.183  
The obligations related to equitable representation are also found in 
national documents. The strategy is part of the Action Plan for European 
Partnership 2005 with a deadline of mid-2006 (Government of the Republic of 
Macedonia, 2006b). The 2006 NPAA undertakes the obligation for adoption of a 
Medium-Term Strategy for Adequate and Equitable Representation of the 
members of the Communities in the Public Administration (Government of the 
Republic of Macedonia, 2006a). Bearing in mind the political sensitivity of the 
issue, the likelihood of adopting such a medium-term strategy within half a year 
prior to the parliamentary elections scheduled for July 2006 was unlikely at the 
time. One can compare this case to the law on the use of languages obligation, as 
an activity taken up by an outgoing government largely aware that it would not be 
able to fulfil it by the end of its term, examined in the previous chapter. However, 
unlike the law on languages, which was taken off the national (and EU) agenda for 
a couple of years, this strategy was adopted in January 2007 by the new 
government as an obligation for the country’s accession process (see Government 
of the Republic of Macedonia, 2007c). Thus, in this early period the political 
institutions in Macedonia responded formally with the adoption of the required 
documents for the implementation of this policy.  
In fact, it was argued that “this strategy and the policy of representation 
in the administration would have topped the agenda of any of the Albanian 
parties in the government”.184 The EU supported the preparation of this strategic 
document with an EU funded project of technical assistance; however “the 
preparation was accompanied by problems because of different understanding of 
the policy by international and national stakeholders”.185 One of the members of 
the group preparing the document explained that “an EU member state expert 
was involved in the preparation of the strategy, but, the first draft of the 
document did not correspond with the national legislation, so representatives of 
                                            
183 Author’s interview with former vice prime minister for EU affairs, Skopje, 23 
December 2010. Same is confirmed in LETSCHERT, R. 2005. The Impact of 
Minority Rights Mechanisms. TMC Asser Institute and Cambridge University Press, 
The Hague. P. 271, note 74. 
184 Author’s interview with senior civil servant in the Secretariat for European 
Affairs, Skopje, 22 December 2010 
185 Author’s interview with civil servant from the Secretariat for European Affairs, 
Skopje, 23 December 2010.  
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the national institutions revised the document”.186 However, the strategy was 
adopted and was supported strongly by DPA, the Albanian party in government at 
the time. Despite these encountered problems, since 2008, it has been considered 
as a basis in national documents for the further promotion of equitable 
representation of the non-majority communities (Government of the Republic of 
Macedonia, 2008b). Furthermore, the 2008 NPAA is the first Government 
document which refers to the allocation of funds for the implementation of the 
strategy and undertakes an obligation to report on its implementation on a 
quarterly basis (Government of the Republic of Macedonia, 2008b). Overall, it is 
clear that through the EU and national documents the policy was formally 
implemented at the national level, since the Strategy was adopted and supported 
by financial means.  
 
7.3.1 Representation in the police – relative success  
From 2008 and onwards, the European Commission pressure in 
Macedonia with respect to the equitable representation was primarily directed on 
the police and the armed forces. This is illustrated both in the EU and national 
strategic documents which set targets exclusively in relation to police reform 
following the adoption of the new Law on police. The adoption of this Law was 
also an element of EU conditionality since the country was granted a candidate 
status and was also part of the 2006 Accession Partnership (Council, 2006b) which 
in the following Accession Partnership was transformed in a priority to ensure the 
implementation of the Law on Police (Council, 2008b). Moreover, in the 2008-
2009 period the communication between the country and the European 
Commission focused solely on the so-called “key priorities” of the 2008 Accession 
partnerships which included the police reform, but not equitable representation 
in general (Council, 2008b), further confirming the focus on the equitable 
representation in the police.187  
In response to these EU ‘stimuli’ in 2008, the Government adopted a 
document with activities for the implementation of the most important 
                                            
186 Author’s interview with civil servant from the Secretariat for European Affairs, 
Skopje, 23 December 2010. 
187 There were activities directed towards equitable representation in the police 
prior to 2006, through trainings conducted by OSCE and European Agency for 
Reconstruction (EAR), see RAGARU, N. 2008. The Former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia: Between Ohrid and Brussels. In: BATT, J. (ed.) Is there an Albanian 
Question. 
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recommendations from the Progress Report immediately after its publication. 
This document, called Blueprint on the Realisation of the Recommendations in the 
European Commission Progress Report on the Republic of Macedonia 2008 was 
assessed positively by the Commission.188 In terms of the equitable representation 
it puts forward specific targets for minority representation in the police forces for 
2008, 2009 and 2010 through the increase of 1.5% in 2008 and 1% in the following 
two years (Government of the Republic of Macedonia, 2008a). These targets are 
the most precise benchmarks in relation to equitable representation which are to 
be found in any of the European or national documents. My interviews with EU 
officials confirmed this by underlining that “the equitable representation was 
chosen as a suitable benchmark due to its potential of quantification”.189 Due to 
this focus on the police forces it is not surprising that the Contribution to the 
Progress Report which the Macedonian government adopted in June 2009 also 
focuses solely on the equitable representation in the police structures 
(Government of the Republic of Macedonia, 2009b). As a result, by 2009 the 
number of minority employees in the Ministry of Interior had risen to 20.33% in 
comparison to 2006 when it was 14.9% and 2000 when it was 8% (Ragaru, 2008, 
Daskalovski, 2009).  
In addition, interviews with European officials in Brussels have pointed to 
the equitable representation in the police as “one of the success stories of the 
impact of the EU in Macedonia”.190 My interlocutors at the national level largely 
confirmed this observation and considered that the EU pressure brought results in 
relation to the equitable representation in the police.191 The latter have 
emphasised that the main reasons behind the relative success in this area have 
been clear benchmarks which were given to Macedonia as well as the parallel 
reforms taking place for the purposes of the visa liberalisation process (On the 
police reform as part of the visa liberalisation process see Trauner, 2011). The 
same remark was made by a representative of a think tank working on these 
issues underlining that “the visa liberalisation process assisted in the police 
                                            
188 Author’s interview with European Commission official, Brussels, 11 October 
2010. 
189 Author’s interview with European Commission official, Brussels, 11 October 
2010. 
190 Author’s interview with European Commission official, Brussels, 11 October 
2010. 
191 Author’s interview with CSO representative, Skopje, 23 December 2010. 
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reforms, including the minority representation”.192 The link with the visa 
liberalisation process in relation to the effectiveness of conditionality largely 
confirms the findings of recent research. Trauner argues that “the key to 
understanding the compliance of Macedonia, whose membership prospect is less 
certain or even questionable, is to take into account policy conditionality in 
addition to membership conditionality” (Trauner, 2009b  p.777). His conclusions 
however, are limited to the justice and home affairs sector, where the 
Commission has at its disposal clear rules and acquis.  
Still, the equitable representation in the police has not been immune to 
critiques. Research has  argued that in this field, the efficiency of international 
programmes was prioritised and the people that joined police ranks as minority 
police officers were extremely badly trained (Ioannides and Collantes-Celador, 
2011). At the same time, the question also remains as to the potential 
discriminatory nature of these provisions, which have already been noticed in the 
EU, notably in Northern Ireland, as the common EU reference point on these 
policies. According to the Recommendations of the Patten Commission on 
Recruitment in the police in Northern Ireland, a pool of qualified candidates was 
to be created, out of which an equal number of Catholics and Protestants should 
be employed (Patten, 1999). Due to potential clash between these mechanisms 
and the Employment Equality Directive, the UK has negotiated an exemption from 
the latter, although it allows for positive action measures. According to De 
Schutter (2010), “this illustrates how, unless EU anti-discrimination law is 
reformed, policies aimed at the inclusion of certain minorities may be 
discouraged, or even made impossible, under the existing legal framework” 
(p.31). The situation in Macedonia on many levels mirrors these problems, 
furthermore, as will be shown later it has resulted in neglect of the other smaller 
communities and has amplified the importance of ethnicity as the sole cleavage.  
 
7.3.2 Implementation of the policy at the central level – burdened with 
problems   
Lack of transparency and party appropriation of the policy 
The dominant assessment of a “success story” of the representation in 
the police, however, is not widely shared in relation to the overall project of 
equitable representation. My interlocutors highlighted that these were in essence 
                                            
192 Author’s interview with CSO representative, Brussels, 13 October 2010. 
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separate processes managed by different institutions – while the police reform 
was managed through the Ministry of Interior; the overall policy was 
implemented by the Secretariat for the implementation of the OFA at the central 
level in the Government. Since its establishment the latter has been headed by an 
Albanian vice prime minister in charge of the policy and was allocated funds for 
managing the hiring process for the purposes of equitable representation. The 
significance of the Secretariat in the hiring process was constantly emphasized 
during the interviews for this thesis. An EU official in Skopje called it “the biggest 
employment agency in the country with approximately 300-400 employments per 
year. The Employment Agency can’t do what this Secretariat is doing.”193 The 
figures reflect this progress, as a  briefing paper from a local think tank has 
recently highlighted that data from the Central Registry of Civil Servants depict a 
commendable increase in the number of ethnic Albanians in the civil service from 
5.61% in 2004 to 24.18% in 2012 (Risteska, 2012).  
Despite this statistical increase, the policy at the same time has been 
criticized for the lack of transparency in its implementation and neglecting the 
needs of the smaller communities. In terms of the former, the lack of reliable 
information on the number and nature of employments has been of primary 
significance. In a commentary on the effective participation of minorities in the 
public life, the Advisory Committee of the CoE highlighted that “comprehensive 
data and statistics are crucial to evaluate the impact of recruitment, promotion 
and other related practices on minority participation in public services. They are 
instrumental to devise adequate legislative and policy measures to address the 
shortcomings identified” (CoE, 2008). The national government in 2007 had 
already highlighted that “the adopted Strategy *...+ envisages the possibility for 
setting up a state authority in charge for processing data on the employees in the 
public sector. Presumably the State Statistical Office will be in charge” 
(Government of the Republic of Macedonia, 2007b  p.29).  
 In addition, a significant number of employees hired for the purposes of 
the equitable representation policy have been paid from the state budget, while 
not working in practice. The media reported on this phenomenon extensively and 
in 2009, the Vice Prime Minister responsible for these recruitments recognised 
the problem (Trajkovska, 2009).  In my interviews it was estimated that around 
1,000 people have been hired to boost statistics, and are paid from the state 
                                            
193 Author’s interview with European Commission official, Skopje, 21 January 
2011. 
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budget, but are not formally working. A report of the International crisis Group in 
2010 highlighted that “hiring ethnic Albanians also risks becoming a box ticking 
exercise in which many new employees have no clearly defined job description, 
office or equipment” (ICG, 2011 emphasis added). In addition, the Brussels 
correspondent for Macedonia has argued that the European condition for 
equitable representation has been turned into a farce (Jovanovska, 2009). The 
problem has also been recognised by the European Commission underlining that 
“a large number of newly recruited civil servants received salaries, even though 
they were not assigned any tasks or responsibilities” (EC, 2011c p.20). Recently, 
the Committee of Ministers in its Resolution on the FCNM implementation 
warned that the manner in which this policy is implemented  
does not help to increase the effective participation of persons belonging 
to national minorities in the public sector [... and...] could have a negative 
impact on the quality and consistency of services provided by the civil 
service and foster resentment in society (CoE, 2012). 
Furthermore, the Secretariat, as the responsible institution for this policy 
has been headed by Albanian political parties in power enforcing party 
membership as an additional criterion for these recruitments. A University 
professor interviewed for this research explained that Albanians who are not 
members of the ruling Albanian party could not get into the administration.194 
Bieber has argued that the dominance of political parties in the interethnic 
relations marginalizes any non-party based interests, and also results in party, 
rather than ethnic representation, ultimately leading to inter-ethnic 
discrimination (Bieber, 2008b). The party-based appointments in the civil service 
have been a general feature of the development of the Macedonian state and of 
the Western Balkans in general.  As a result, in 2010 the Ombudsman concluded 
that while discrimination is practiced on the basis of gender, national, religious 
and political orientation, the last one is the most prevalent and difficult  
(Ombudsman, 2010). In response, in its latest priorities and benchmarks to the 
Government, the European Commission has recommended “systemic co-
ordination [which] should ensure that the Programme does not favour principle of 
equal representation, over the principle of merit based recruitment and that it will 
respond to real staffing needs identified by the respective administrative bodies” 
(Government of the Republic of Macedonia, 2011a p.5).  
                                            
194 Author’s interview with University professor and former governmental 
minister, Skopje, 22 February 2011. 
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The problems accompanying the policy on the ground have been mirrored 
in the delays in reporting on the implementation of the Strategy as highlighted by 
national and EU interviewees.195 Solely conducted on the basis of statistical 
increase in employment at the central level, the reporting on the Strategy has not 
been accompanied by a thorough assessment of its impact.  In any case, “the EU 
assesses the success in relation to minorities through numbers and mainly 
through employments", highlighted a senior civil servant. 196 An official directly 
working on this issue also mentioned that “for years there have been no sanctions 
against the state bodies which do not respect the equal representation 
principle”.197 Lastly, criticism was put on the requirement to complete targets 
within a short period of time. An official working on the issue stated that “they 
(read: the EU) put pressure on the Government and later they stepped back and 
required a merit based approach – it is impossible to bring about such results in 
just two years”.198 A representative of the Commission, on the other hand, argued 
that “we (i.e. the Commission) have been waiting for a report on the measures 
taken for years, however, have not received one, despite the high numbers of 
formally employed members of the communities”.199 
Thus, the manner in which the policy has been implemented contradicts 
the objective for creating a strong and functioning bureaucracy, which has been 
another aspect of EU conditionality, more recently included in the context of EU 
accession. The 2009 report of the SIGMA/OECD explains that “this well-intended 
tool, developed for putting into practice the principle of equal representation of 
the various minorities, quite often enters into contradiction with the merit 
system, because it provides additional room for partisan-influenced recruitment” 
(SIGMA, 2009 p.2).  The 2012 Progress Report underlined that “respect for the 
principle of merit-based recruitment together with the principle of equitable 
representation needs to be ensured” (EC, 2012b p.10). At the same time, the EU 
in its dialogue with Macedonia established a separate working committee on the 
                                            
195 Author’s interview with civil servant from the Secretariat for European Affairs, 
Skopje, 23 December 2010, Author’s interview with European Commission official, 
Skopje, 21 January 2011. 
196  Author’s interview with senior civil servant in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
Skopje, 07 March 2011. 
197 Author’s interview with civil servant from the Secretariat for European affairs, 
Skopje, 23 December 2010. 
198 Author’s interview with senior civil servant in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
Skopje, 07 March 2011. 
199 Author’s interview with civil servant from the Delegation of the European 
Commission in Skopje, 27 January 2011 
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reform of the public administration in which these issues were being discussed; 
however “in practice there has not been a major breakthrough in terms of 
reconciling the two objectives”. 200  
European officials interviewed for this study agreed that “the pressure for 
equitable representation had been instrumentalised in the domestic context, but 
underlined that the manner of implementation was dependent on the national 
authorities”.201 OSCE employees who are highly involved in this issue were critical 
of the implementation of this policy, still recognising that “the institutional system 
which has been put in place cannot be stopped immediately”.202 National officials, 
on the other hand, linked the problems to the European Commission’s 
requirements for statistical increase in the representation. It was argued that 
“there is abuse of conditionality in this specific policy area”.203 The policy which 
before 2005 contributed to getting a positive avis has been misused and has had 
negative by-products such as excessive hiring based on party affiliation.204 Overall, 
all the stakeholders recognised the problem, however, the European Commission 
and the national officials mutually found the other side responsible for the 
perpetuation of this policy.  
The differences in the understanding of the policy escalated in 2011 when 
the European Commission assessed in its report for the first time that the overall 
number of civil servants from the non-majority ethnic communities matches the 
demographic structure, however “the trend of recruiting employees from these 
communities on a quantitative basis without regard to the real needs of the 
institutions continued” (EC, 2011c p.10).The recognition at the EU level of the 
largely completed process of equitable representation in the  Progress report of 
2011 stirred a lot of debate at the national level, since the policy could no longer 
be interpreted as a requirement for EU accession. The Vice Prime Minister 
responsible of the policy dismissed the data from the EU and announced new 
employments as part of the equitable representation policy (Popovska and 
Trajkovska, 2011). Similarly, the activities for the fulfilment of this policy have 
                                            
200 Author’s interview with civil servant from the Secretariat for European Affairs, 
Skopje, 23 December 2010. 
201 Author’s interview with  Commission official, Brussels, 11 October 2010. 
202 Author’s interview with OSCE representative, Skopje, 19 January 2011. 
203 Author’s interview with senior civil servant in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
Skopje, 07 March 2011. 
204 Author’s interview with high level civil servant from the Secretariat for 
European Affairs, Skopje, 22 December 2010. 
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remained part of the NPAA in 2012 and the policy is interpreted in the light of the 
EU accession process (Government of the Republic of Macedonia, 2012).  
Although in 2011 the Commission determined that the number of civil 
servants matches the demographic structure, because of the evident discontent 
among the Albanian ruling parties, the assessment in 2012 was toned down. In 
2012, the Commission noted that “the overall proportion of civil servants from 
non-majority communities is satisfactory”, underlining that there is a problem in 
distribution among ministries and at various levels in the civil service (EC, 2012b 
p.17). At the same time, in July 2012, the Committee of Ministers on the 
implementation  of the FCNM assessed that  “persons belonging to the Albanian, 
Bosniak, Serb, Turkish, Vlach and Roma minorities are still underrepresented” 
(CoE, 2012 ). In this sense, the differing assessments between the EU and the CoE 
on the same issue further create space for various interpretations of the 
conditionality at the local level which has been the case with this policy.  
 
Neglecting the smaller communities  
The second major shortcoming of the implementation of this policy comes 
from the lack of attention to the smaller communities in Macedonia. A 2012 
policy brief of a local think tank analysing this policy put forward the following 
numbers: the Turks and the Roma who represent 3.85% and 2.66 % of the 
population participate with 1.49% or 0.64% in the civil service respectively 
(Risteska, 2012). In the Progress Reports, the European Commission highlights 
that the representation of the smaller communities, particularly the Turks and 
Roma, in the civil service still remains low (EC, 2010b). In response to this problem 
and upon pressure from minority MPs in 2008, the Government established an 
Agency for protection of the rights of the smaller communities.  The Agency was 
not recommended in European Commission documents and Commission officials 
argued that it was not an element of EU conditionality, however, after its 
establishment it became a regular element of the national reporting on the EU 
affairs (Government of the Republic of Macedonia, 2009a). The origin of the policy 
and its introduction in the EU accession process are similar as the case of the law 
on languages examined in the previous chapter, illustrating the domestic origins 
of policies which later become part of EU conditionality.  
To illustrate this discrepancy, an EU official highlighted that: “the 
European Commission did not recommend the setting up of a new Agency, but 
that the current structures needed to change in their mode of work and take the 
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smaller communities into consideration”.205 At the same time, the interviewed 
employees of the Agency considered that “the institution was set up in response 
to EU recommendations”.206  Hence, at  the national level the activities of the 
Agency have become part of the NPAA and activities undertaken for EU accession 
(Government of the Republic of Macedonia, 2011b). The European Commission 
officials explained this development as “using the Commission’s remarks for 
populist goals. The appearance of the Agency can be seen partly as a result of the 
commitment to the EU, but it was not in the spirit of the recommendation”.207 
The functioning of this institution has generally been wrought with 
difficulties, as it “does not have a clear mandate or competences”.208 In addition, 
its operation was delayed extensively by the lack of funds, late appointment of 
the director and staff. An OSCE official working on a feasibility study of the Agency 
for smaller communities has concluded that “it is clear it has not been 
strengthened enough to become really relevant in terms of staff or budget or 
clear mandate, as it does not have enough funding or human resources.”209 
Similarly, in the 2011 report, the Commission highlights that “due to an unclear 
mandate and significant reduction of the budget in 2011, the Agency is unable to 
accomplish most of its tasks defined by the law” (EC, 2011c p.20). The weakness 
of this institution is specifically evident in the implementation of the equitable 
representation policy, as the Agency legally has no say in the employment 
procedures for this purpose. An official from the Agency highlighted that “on 
meetings with the Secretariat210 we insisted to at least conduct monitoring in the 
committees for employment – we thought that they should allow this although 
according to the Law they do not have such an obligation”.211 This requirement 
was however, not fulfilled. In the 2011 Progress report an improvement was 
noted since “in 2010 there was a 46% increase of members of Roma and a 12% 
increase in the Turkish community. However, more efforts are needed in order to 
                                            
205 Author’s interview with European Commission official, Skopje, 21 January 
2011. 
206 Author’s interview with an official of the Agency for the protection of the rights 
of the smaller communities, Skopje, 17 January 2011. 
207 Author’s interview with European Commission official, Skopje, 21 January 
2011. 
208 Author’s interview with European Commission official, Skopje, 21 January 
2011, Author’s interview with OSCE representative, Skopje, 19 January 2011 
209 Author’s interview with OSCE representative, Skopje, 19 January 2011. 
210 Meaning Secretariat for implementation of the Ohrid Framework Agreement. 
211 Author’s interview with an official of the Agency for the protection of the rights 
of the smaller communities, Skopje, 17 January 2011. 
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improve the quality of the recruitment process” (EC, 2011c p.20). Still, the 
numbers remain miniscule, which has led a local think tank to conclude the 
implementation of this principle had important long-term impact on the civil 
service that resulted in injustice and inequality (Risteska, 2012). 
The weak progress in the employments of the smaller communities stands 
in sharp contrast with the progress in terms of the Albanian community. Most of 
my interlocutors concluded that the EU and consequently the national authorities 
did not express any continued interest in realising this policy for the non-Albanian 
community. While the European Commission mentions the underrepresentation 
of the smaller communities, most of the interviewees highlighted there was no 
increased involvement of the EU on this issue in addition to the reference in the 
reports. Similarly, the Agency officials argued that “the EU Delegation conducts 
solely monitoring of our work and we do not see more interest from them, 
although we hope in the future things will change”.212 Generally, at the national 
level, both national officials and representatives of CSOs underlined that the EU 
has not put increasing pressure despite the evident “appropriation of this policy 
by the Albanian community”.213 There was a widespread opinion that while the 
Commission considered the employment of this community as a priority, the 
other communities were neglected. 
Overall, the analysis of the role EU conditionality has played in the 
equitable representation policy in Macedonia points to a set of divergent 
conclusions. The study of the EU documents and the interviews indicates that this 
issue was at the forefront of EU conditionality and was also supported by EU 
funds and assistance. At the same time, the Government responded formally with 
Action Plans and employment of non-majority communities (primarily Albanian). 
Even though with these results, the role of EU conditionality in supporting the 
domestic policy makers in this field could be considered as positive, on a 
substantive level the policy has been accompanied by numerous problems. The 
domestic actors and the interaction with the context resulted in mixed results of 
the policy and highlighted the need for re-examination of the methods of its 
implementation. Moreover, the strict benchmarking in relation to the equitable 
representation in the police brought about effective implementation in this 
                                            
212 Author’s interview with an official of the Agency for the protection of the rights 
of the smaller communities, Skopje, 17 January 2011. 
213 Author’s interviews with civil servant from the Ministry of Justice, Skopje, 18 
January 2011. 
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specific sector. At a more general level, although there was no major domestic 
opposition to equitable representation, the policy was not put into practice as 
expected. The employment in many cases has been only on paper, violating merit 
principles and disregarding the needs of the smaller communities. Subsequently, 
it has become a subject of increasing criticism from both European and national 
officials and administration. In the last report, the European Commission stated 
that: the recruitment procedure remains vulnerable to undue political influence 
(EC, 2011c p.10).  
This example confirms the findings in literature over the potential of the 
EU conditionality to facilitate policies which can lead to polarisation at the local 
level. In addition, it sheds light on the conflict between the objective of achieving 
representation in the administration and the merit principle also supported by the 
EU conditionality. These conflicting objectives also raise concerns over the 
dynamic relationship between Europeanisation by conditionality and democratic 
consolidation. In this direction, similarly, Przeworski (1995) highlights that in the 
absence of a usable bureaucracy, the state is unable to implement either 
economic or political reforms. As such, the functioning administration becomes a 
condition for democratic consolidation as well as an element of EU conditionality, 
which is being undermined by the local usage of the set of conditions related to 
the representation of minorities in the administration. As such this example 
confirms the potential for retrenchment through Europeanisation, as one of the 
outcomes of this process identified by Radaelli (2000). Lastly, the analysis 
highlights the need to consider the EU conditionality in light of the domestic 
actors and context in order to be able to account for its outcomes, but also the 
process of its application.  
  
7.4  Representation of minorities in the administration as an EU condition in 
Croatia  
7.4.1 Reticence prior to the official negotiations on Chapter 23: judiciary 
and fundamental rights  
Representation of minorities in the local and regional self-government 
units, the state administration, judicial bodies and the public administration is a 
recurring  key priority in the Accession Partnerships for Croatia (Council, 2004, 
Council, 2006a). Similarly, in the 2004 Opinion on Croatia’s application for 
membership in the EU, the European Commission notes that the minorities are 
still underrepresented in state administrative and judicial bodies, as envisaged by 
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the CLNM (EC, 2004b). Stakeholders at the national level confirmed the 
significance assigned to this condition highlighting that “the EU concentrated 
primarily on the proportional representation in the state administration”.214 At 
the same time, in the national documents prepared for the purposes of European 
integration there is little mention of the activities undertaken for the realisation of 
this EU condition. For example, even though Croatia had been preparing National 
Plans for Integration in the EU (NPIEU) since 1999, and the legal obligation for 
representation is dated since later 2002, until 2007/8 (see next section) there is 
no mention of any activities directed for the implementation of this policy.215  
Stakeholders at the national level have confirmed that in the first years 
after the adoption of the law “most of the activities were focused on finding 
reasons why not to implement this law”.216 It was stressed that in this segment 
the European Commission and the representatives of the minorities have 
achieved less precisely because of the persisting resistance among the political 
elites to implement the constitutional and legal obligation for the application of 
article 22 of the CLNM.217  This is confirmed in a 2004 report on the 
implementation of the FCNM, in which the government acknowledged the 
obstacles that limit the realisation of the right to employment (Government of the 
Republic of Croatia, 2004). The report namely underlines problems that “are 
primarily the consequence of certain economic difficulties which affect all 
Croatian citizens, including members of national minorities. This assessment 
especially concerns the exercise of national minority rights in the war-devastated 
areas (employment, reconstruction)” (Government of the Republic of Croatia, 
2004 p.3). In relation to this report, in 2004 the Advisory Committee Opinion on 
Croatia highlights that it “has not been informed of any positive, targeted 
Government programmes launched to counter the impact of the past 
discriminatory measures that Serbs in particular experienced in various fields of 
employment” (CoE, 2004 p.16). Similar assessments have been made in the 
shadow Reports submitted to the CoE on the FCNM implementation in Croatia 
(Center for Peace, 2004).   
                                            
214 Author’s interview with civil servant in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Brussels, 
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216 Author’s interview with CSO representative, Zagreb, 14 June 2011. 
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The lack of progress in this policy area has been noted by the EU in the 
2006 Progress Report, where the Commission employed stronger language 
highlighting that “the political will to develop a long term strategy to implement 
the CLNM’s minority employment provisions is lacking” (EC, 2006a p.11). Since the 
implementation of these provisions was dependent upon changes in area 
legislation, in the same report the European Commission criticizes the newly 
adopted legislation also for only mirroring the provisions of CLNM without 
providing for more detailed regulation (EC, 2006a).218 The EU’s critique in relation 
to the newly adopted legislation is a response to the common ‘justification’ in 
Croatian political discourse on the difficulties in the implementation of the 
provision of the Constitutional Law as being too ‘vague’.219 In fact, local NGOs 
such as the Serbian democratic Forum expected that the representation should be 
ensured through laws, implementation acts and statutes of local and regional 
governments (Gjenero, 2006b). As a result, in 2006 the European Commission 
highlighted that “concrete action is now required to develop recruitment plans at 
all levels of state administration and, to set up civil servants registry to allow for 
systematic statistics collection. The Government needs to issue clear instructions 
on how to proceed” (EC, 2006a p.11).   
The 2007 NPIEU is the first national strategic documents which mentions 
the employment of the minorities and foresees the “adoption of a mid-term 
employment plan in the state administration for a two-year period” as a priority 
for 2008-2009 (Government of the Republic of Croatia, 2007 p.32). Having in mind 
that Croatia has been preparing strategic documents for EU accession since the 
late 1990s, the mention in 2007 comes at a very late stage and without specific 
obligations on employment. The continuous weak enforcement of this provision is 
further criticized by the Commission in the course of 2007 both in the screening 
report for the Chapter 23: Judiciary and fundamental rights and in the 2007 
Progress report. In the former, the Commission highlights that “in February 2007 a 
plan for recruitment to the state administration included for the first time global 
targets for the recruitment of national minorities. While the plan does not go into 
detail, it is a positive first step” (EC, 2007b p.26). In the Progress report of the 
same year it is noted that “a long-term strategy to implement the CLNM's 
                                            
218 These entail the Law on Civil Service and the Law on Local and Regional Self-
Government, as well as in the Law on Courts and Law on State Judicial Council. 
219 Author’s interview with a representative of the Ministry of Justice and a  
member of the negotiating team, Zagreb, 24 May 2011. 
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minority employment provisions is lacking [and] that detailed recruitment plans 
are missing at all levels of state administration” (EC, 2007a p.13). In response to 
this criticism, “the Central Office for Public Administration adopted the Plan of 
Admittance to the Civil Service for 2007 *…+ *which+ lays down the obligation of 
state administration bodies to abide in their employment policies by the 
provisions of the CLNM” (Government of the Republic of Croatia, 2008b p.66). 
Following the adoption of this document, the Commission assessed that “the plan 
for employment in the administration at County, Town and Municipality level is 
still not adequate” (EC, 2008a p.13). Before 2008 therefore the progress is to be 
considered as limited to the formal adoption of just one document with no 
effective signs of implementation confirming the notions of the ‘fake’ compliance 
with conditionality generally in the region (Noutcheva, 2007).  
Stakeholders at the EU and national level including officials and civil 
society representatives confirmed this weak implementation record by 
highlighting that “there was no evident mobilisation of resources or any activities 
undertaken for the realisation of this legislative provision until late 2008”.220 In 
fact,   a civil society sector representative stressed that “prior to 2008 the policy 
was largely ignored as it was expected that it would stir a lot of political 
problems”.221 The reluctance to deal with this provision has also been noted in 
local CSO studies. Research conducted in the war affected areas in 2006, where 
20-30% of the population belong to the Serb community, shows that they 
represented around 9% of the employees in the public services (Gjenero, 2006b). 
Lastly, similarly as in Macedonia, a study on the application of the CLNM 
conducted in 2007 concludes that five years after the adoption of the CLNM a 
database of reliable official data has not been established which is an obstacle to 
the assessment of the application of the legal provisions of proportional 
representation of national minorities in the administration (Serbian Democratic 
Forum, 2007).222  
 
                                            
220 Author’s interview with European Commission Official,  Brussels 8 December 
2010. . 
221 Author’s interview with CSO representative, Zagreb, 14 June 2011;  
222 The lack of data is further examined in the following section.  
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7.4.2 Post-2008: The accession negotiations as an impetus for “formal” 
fulfilment with weak implementation 
Since 2008 and the launching of the accession negotiations, 
representation of minorities in the public sector has been placed formally on the 
agenda in Croatia. In 2008, the first plan for the implementation of the CLNM was 
adopted, which was required as an opening benchmark for the negotiations from 
the EU.223 An official from the Commission argued that “this Action Plan was one 
of the opening benchmarks for chapter 23 precisely because of the mixed records 
of implementation of this law, in particular its employment provisions”.224 For the 
CSOs, “the inclusion of the implementation of the CLNM in the negotiations 
opening benchmarks instigated the government to start looking for ways to 
implement the policy on proportional representation of minorities”.225 This 
assessment is substantiated in the 2009 NPIEU in which the Croatian government 
for the first time provides information on recruitment numbers and current state 
of employment of national minorities in the civil service (See Government of the 
Republic of Croatia, 2009). Still, in the negotiating position of Croatia on chapter 
23 prepared in February 2010 solely the legal provisions on the policy are cited, 
without any information on the plans or record of implementation (Government 
of the Republic of Croatia, 2010b). Thus, not surprisingly, European Commission 
interviewees have pointed that this has been one of the “weakest elements of the 
Croatia’s negotiations without evident progress”.226   
The problems in the implementation have been related to two major 
reasons: lack of reliable data and different understandings on the scope of the 
provision at the EU and national level. In relation to the former, official arguments 
were grounded in potential violation of data protection. However, other sources 
strongly indicate that Serbs and Roma are excluded from the state administration 
at all levels.227 “In particular in areas where Serb refugees have returned they are 
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totally excluded from access to posts in the administration” (Marko, 2005 p.18). 
The EU noted the lack of reliable data in the 2007 screening report by underlining 
that detailed recruitment plans at all levels of state administration and a civil 
servants' registry to allow for systematic statistics collection are missing (EC, 
2007b). In response, the Croatian government in the commentary to the third 
Opinion of the Advisory Committee of the FCNM the Croatian Government 
announced the establishment of Register of Persons Employed in Civil and Public 
Services by 31 March 2011 (Government of the Republic of Croatia, 2010a). 
Nevertheless, in its 2011 Action Plan for the implementation of the CLNM, the 
Government confirmed that the establishment of the centralised statistical 
database for the monitoring of the minority employments has not been realised 
(Government of the Republic of Croatia, 2011a) although later it announced that 
the Register is in a pilot-phase (Government of the Republic of Croatia, 2011b).   
In this context of data availability, the EU’s focus on numbers has also 
been subject to criticism by stakeholders at the national level. On the one hand, 
Commission representatives considered the possibility of quantification as an 
advantage for the overall transparency of this process.228 Staff of the Croatian 
ombudsman, however, questioned the focus on statistics “due to the lack of 
disaggregated data on the local level”.229 Research on Croatia has explained the 
problems of policy enforcement at the local level through the clientelistic 
networks created in these areas by the political parties in power in which local 
groups displayed resistance to minority participation in decision making or 
employment. Hence, these links “put a limit on how far the central government 
*….+ could guarantee the exercise of minority rights, without sparking political 
instability” (Djuric, 2010 p.1646).  Generally in Croatia, administrative obstruction 
was particularly acute at the local level (Fisher, 2006). Thus, the analysis confirms 
the ongoing problem of the enlargement process and accession negotiations in 
general of excluding regional and local elites which were in the case of this policy 
key stakeholders (Hughes et al., 2005). 
The differences in the on-the-ground situation between the regions that 
were reintegrated peacefully and by the operations Flash and Storm confirms this 
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assessment. In the areas reintegrated peacefully on the basis of the Erdut 
agreement of 1995, the representation of the Serb national community in the 
public services matches their representation in the population (30,8% of the 
population and 26,5% in the public sector), while in other areas they represent 3-
4% of the employees in the public sector (Serbian Democratic Forum, 2008). A 
Serbian MP explained this discrepancy in the following way:  
One is the case of Eastern Slavonia, where there was peaceful 
reintegration of the Serb community and with support from international 
community a high level of participation was ensured. This is not the case in 
other parts of the country where people return and the employment in the 
administration, police and judiciary is much slower with a lot of resistance, 
thus, the results are much more modest.230   
Lastly, the lack of available data is also aggravated by the debates on the 
standard against which the proportional representation is to be ensured. This was 
an on-going problem encountered in previous research on Croatia as well and is 
linked to the demographic changes that occurred in the country between 1991 
and 2001 (Smoljan, 2003). The results of the April 2001 census showed that 7.47% 
of Croatia’s population identify as national minorities noting a decrease of 50% in 
comparison to 1991. At the same time the total population of Croatia decreased 
7.25%, while the share of the majority Croatian nation in the total population 
increased for 11.53% (for a detailed overview see Tatalovid, 2006). The Serb 
community in Croatia did not recognise the data of the 2001 census as it 
considered the census did not register 64.000 people which were in Serbia at the 
time and 2000 which were in Bosnia as they were not on their registered 
residences (Jovanovid, 2010). Some of these people also did not feel safe enough 
to declare as Serbs, which is an additional problem since many of the minority 
rights depend on the number of citizens which will declare as belonging to a 
specific minority (Jovid, 2011, Mikic, 2006 ). Overall, all “official records on ethnic 
affiliation that are available in the Republic of Croatia are either not updated 
(voters’ lists), or are insufficiently detailed (statistics on minority representation in 
judicial bodies), or their reliability is questioned by certain minorities (2001 census 
results)” (Mikic, 2006  p.3). Thus, the Commission has asked to the government to 
present statistics on judiciary and state administration which needs to be 
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correlated with the latest census.231 As a result of the difficulty in statistics, recent 
assessments of the EU’s financial assistance in the region has recommended to 
the candidate countries to “ensure that national statistics bureaus build capacity 
to collect ethnic and gender disaggregated data systematically in all key sectors” 
(Ferrari and Liaquat Ali Khan, 2010 p.32). Moreover, research has shown that “the 
lack of even basic systematic data on levels of minority inclusion” is a common 
trait of the new members of the EU from the Eastern enlargement as well (Protsyk 
and Sachariew, 2008 p.3). 
In addition to the data reliability, the condition of ensuring representation 
of minorities in the public sector was contested in relation to its scope and 
reference to the “wider public sector”.232 This EU benchmark was debated at the 
national level in Croatia since the expression ‘wider public sector’ was not 
considered to be in accordance with the legislative requirements in Croatia.233 
While the civil service encompasses the employees in the state administrative 
bodies such as ministries and employs approximately 65 000 people, the wider 
public sector consists of the approximately 200 000 employees in schools, 
hospitals etc (Koprid, 2009). European Commission officials explain the wording of 
this condition in the following way: “looking beyond there was discrimination in 
the wider public sector, because the CLNM only covers the judiciary, the police 
and the central state government bodies and some local authorities”.234 In 
response, for the closing benchmarks, “the Commission recommended the 
preparation of a study on the participation of national minorities in the wider 
public sector in order to determine the extent of the problem”.235 The national 
authorities, however, contested this request arguing that the “representation in 
the wider public sector is foreseen neither in international legislation nor in 
national legislation such as the CLNM”.236 The limited scope of the existing legal 
provision was confirmed for example already in 2003 in a Human Rights Watch 
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Report which considered that “the obligation to ensure proportional 
representation does not extend to public institutions, such as schools, 
universities, and hospitals, or to the police” (HRW, 2003 p.55). Hence, at the 
national level it has been argued that “the benchmark should have been 
narrowed down to the civil service which encompasses a much smaller number of 
employees”.237  
Stakeholders linked the origin of this condition “to a visit of the OSCE 
HCNM which in a letter expressed concerns over the issue of equal representation 
broadly, which was then turned into a benchmark”.238 The same was confirmed by 
the interviewees in the EU Delegation in Zagreb.239 Moreover, “after the 
introduction of this benchmark from the EU, the FCNM Advisory Committee on 
national minorities accepted the terminology in its report and used it, although it 
is not an obligation from the Convention”.240 The 2010 report of the Advisory 
Committee of the Framework Convention of National Minorities further reiterates 
its deep concern that effective measures to redress the significant 
underrepresentation of persons belonging to national minorities in the 
administration and the judiciary have not been taken (CoE, 2010). This example 
illustrates the dynamic nature of these processes and the multi-directional nature 
of the link between the OSCE, EU and the CoE. Because of its contested nature 
however, national interviewees still considered that “the stipulation of this 
benchmark on representation in the wider public sector was illegitimate, as it is 
not foreseen either in international legislation, such as the FCNM, or national 
legislation in art.22 of the CLNM”.241  
Despite the questioning of the legitimacy of this condition at the national 
level, in order to deal with this benchmark, the Croatian government contracted a 
local research institute to conduct an analysis of the employment of national 
minorities in the public sector in Croatia in early 2011. The results of this research 
based on a survey indicated ‘over-representation’ of minorities in the public 
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sector.242 On the basis of this study, which is not publicly available, in the report 
on the fulfilment of the benchmarks for chapter 23 the Croatian officials argued 
that there is no under-representation of minorities in the public sector 
(Government of the Republic of Croatia, 2011b) which led to further contestation 
of the way in which the Commission puts forward the accession benchmarks in an 
area such as minority policies.243 Among other stakeholders such as minority 
NGOs, however, the study was subject to criticisms, in terms of the selection of 
the regions surveyed, as well as the survey method itself (Jovanovid, 2011). 
Furthermore, the non-transparent procedure for preparation of the study and the 
fact that the study was not made public also aroused controversies among the 
minority organisations and representatives.244  
In the March 2011 interim report on the accession negotiations the 
Commission notes the study, but at the same time highlights that “Croatia will 
need to set out long term plans, backed by statistics, for fully meeting its 
obligations *… and…+ adopt a plan to tackle the shortcomings identified by the 
study on the under-representation of minorities in the wider public sector” (EC, 
2011d p.5 emphasis added). This recommendation stands in sharp contrast with 
the position of the negotiating team that argued “the problem in this policy area 
was non-existent”.245 The discussions in relation to this specific condition 
therefore highlight the difficulty in determining common benchmarks in areas 
outside of the acquis such as minority policies. This is a commonly recognized 
problem among European Commission and national officials who stress that “the 
achieving of a common understanding on what are the expectations is the most 
difficult segment in relation to minority policies”.246 Hence, the example of 
minority representation in the administration underlines the potential for 
increasing politicisation of EU political criteria due to their flexible nature and the 
subjective approach in their evaluation. With this conclusion, this chapter largely 
confirms the salience of domestic factors for the outcome of conditionality in 
areas not regulated by the acquis (Brusis, 2005b).  
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The slow progress in the implementation of this policy was reflected in 
the public debates at the time of the conclusion of the accession negotiations. 
Croatian NGOs prepared an opinion challenging the ending of the EU accession 
negotiations due to unfulfilled obligations. The NGOs argued for the need to 
provide “evidence of real-life and real-time employment of members of national 
minorities in 2011 and the listing of targets over the upcoming two years, 
specified by region and state and local institutions, with accompanying financial 
plan and description of supportive measures” (2011b p.3). The CSOs criticism has 
been confirmed in the EU reports for closing the negotiations and also the last 
Progress Report of 2011, issued just two months before the signing of the 
accession treaty. The accession document of June 2011 concluding the 
negotiations confirmed that “the EU notes the adoption of an action plan on 
minority employment under the CARNM, which includes a target of 5.5% by 2014” 
(European Union Common Position, 2011 p.17). Subsequent EU reports in late 
2011 and CSO monitoring report issued in mid-2012 have both confirmed that 
there was no tangible progress on the issue, questioning the targets put forward 
and the potential of the EU conditionality to bring about change in this specific  
area (EC, 2011a, 2012).247  
 
7.4.3  Representation in the police – statistics and reality  
The police representation in Croatia, like in Macedonia, has been a 
separate case from the general story of representation of minorities. 
Representation in the police in the Croatia was of primary significance since, “HDZ 
pledged that perceived historical imbalances would be redressed – such as fixing 
the disproportional representation of the Serbs who made up thirteen per cent of 
Croatia’s 4.7 million population in the police and media” (Silber and Little, 1996 
p.87).248 One of my interviewees argued that “there is a collective trauma among 
the Croatians partly justified from the fact that the police was in the hands of the 
Serbs in the Yugoslav period”.249 As a result of the war in the early 1990s and the 
occupation by the Serb authorities, the representation of Serbs in the police 
carries exceptional significance in Croatia.  
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248 For more on this see chapter four.  
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In the 2005 Progress Report, the European Commission  assesses that the 
implementation of the CLNM has also been particularly limited with respect to 
those provisions on minority representation in State administrative and judicial 
bodies and in the police, where there is clear under-representation of minorities, 
especially Serbs (EC, 2005b). This corresponds with  the conclusion that 
“notwithstanding international pressure, the Ministry of Interior did not make its 
first priority proportionality of representation in the police force throughout the 
Croatian territory” (Zanotti, 2008 p.248). For example, in 2005 minorities 
represented two per cent of the police force as compared to 7.5 per cent of the 
population (OSCE, 2005). Already in 2006, the Commission notes that “there are 
signs of improvement with regard to the police. Out of the 300 trainees for the 
position of a police officer with the Basic Police School in 2006, 22 trainees, i.e. 
7.3% were members of national minorities. This almost corresponds to the share 
of minority population, according to the 2001 census” (7.5%) (EC, 2006a p.11). 
In 2010, the Ombudsman office announced that the percentage of 
representation matches the percentage of minorities in the population even 
though this was not the case in all parts of the country.250 An interviewee 
highlighted as well that “the percentage of Serbs in the police which matches the 
Serbs percentage but because they are represented with 30% in the Vukovar 
district since there was no one else in that area”.251 However, “in the areas of 
special state concern the police officers would come from places 50 km far, while 
in the specific town there are Serb people that have the necessary qualifications 
and were not employed, disregarding the costs of such actions”.252 The 
International Helsinki Federation highlighted this already in 2007, reporting that 
“in some cases, ethnic Croats who lived outside of the regions in question were 
hired and reimbursed for daily commuting costs, although the registers of local 
employment agencies featured ethnic minority candidates with adequate 
qualifications” (IHF, 2007 p.45). At the same time, in the last shadow report for 
the implementation of the Framework Convention on National minorities it is 
argued that there are numerous cases of Serb nationals who are being rejected 
for positions in the police and are subject to substantial questioning as to their 
role in the war or political engagement (Center for Peace, 2010). Similarly, the 
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European Commission in its more recent reports confirms the on-going 
discrimination and under-representation in the police, although no data is used  
(EC, 2009a, EC, 2010a). In fact in the first half of 2013, right before accession in 
Croatia the target number of 5% representation of minorities was reached with 
the employment of 400 border police officers (EC, 2013). In the police, therefore, 
the situation is similar to the Macedonian case where data on an aggregate level 
match the representation, however, looking below in regions there are major 
disparities in terms of the structure of the population and the representation of 
minorities in the police forces.  
Overall, the case of Croatia shows that despite the EU formal insistence 
on the implementation of the principle of representation of minorities, at the 
national level very little has been done, yet with the exception of the statistical 
increase in the police forces. Tracing the development of the EU conditions and 
the national responses, the section has shown the increasing scope for different 
interpretation at the EU and national level of conditions in relation to minority 
policies, as was the case with the equitable representation. The contestation of 
this condition, despite its inclusion in the national legislation stems from two 
perspectives. First, the framing of the condition in terms of the representation of 
minorities in the public sector was contested in terms of its “legitimacy” 
highlighting the problems of stipulating and monitoring non-acquis related 
conditionality. Second, due to the delay in setting up representative data on the 
minorities, the fulfilment of this condition was subject to further disagreement 
between the European Commission and the national authorities.  
 
7.5  Conclusion  
This chapter has examined how the EU and national documents, as well as 
stakeholders have understood and applied conditionality in relation to 
representation of national minorities in the administration in Macedonia and 
Croatia. This policy topped the agenda of EU conditionality in relation to minority 
policies in both case studies and is a novel addition to the EU accession criteria. 
Through process tracing, the chapter highlighted how the EU conditionality is 
used by actors at the national level and how the involvement of the EU can 
become engrained in the domestic politics. The chapter foremost studied the 
consistency in the application of conditionality focusing on this specific policy, its 
dependence on domestic actors and looked into the implications of the 
application of conditionality for the process of democratic consolidation. Through 
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the two cases of Macedonia and Croatia, it illustrated how a similar EU condition 
can result in diverging outcomes due to the differentiated responses/non-
responses at the national level. 
In Macedonia, the analysis showed that this policy was part of the OFA 
obligations and was also a formal element of the EU Progress Reports and the 
European/Accession Partnerships. In addition, the policy was supported by funds 
and by policy entrepreneurs at the national level (read: the minority party in 
Government). However, even in these conditions, substantial policy results were 
not accomplished due to the party capture of the policy and the violation of the 
merit principle. The domestic actors and the interaction with the context resulted 
in mixed results of the policy and highlighted the need for re-examination of the 
methods of its implementation. Thus, with the exception of the equal 
representation in the police, this reform at the national level has been 
encountered with discontent on the manner of its implementation. The outcome 
has primarily been statistical increase of the Albanian minority and the policy has 
become associated with party based employments, leading to marginalisation of 
the smaller communities. Subsequently, this policy has become a subject which 
has received increasing criticism from both European and national officials and 
administration, highlighting that even more specific benchmarks are not a 
guarantee of success, as expected in conditionality literature.  
At the same time, the EU recommendations were broadly interpreted and 
used in substantiating the establishment of new minority institutions such as the 
Agency for the rights of the smaller communities. This example, as the case of the 
law of languages in Macedonia examined in the previous chapter illustrates how 
the national actors feed into the EU conditionality mechanism. The establishment 
of this Agency however, is widely presented as non-conditionality by the EU 
officials illustrating the increasing scope for interpretation in areas not regulated 
by the acquis. In this direction, literature has commonly warned against the 
increasing scope for political assessments by the EU institutions, foremost the 
Commission (Hughes et al., 2005). This example however, underlines the potential 
for interpretation left to the national actors in relation to the political criteria, 
specifically minority policies.  
The case of Croatia is similar to Macedonia since the representation has 
been an element of EU conditionality as of the early 2000s, as shown from the 
analysis of the EU documents and interview data. However, the response at the 
national level has been almost non-existent until the later phases of the accession 
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negotiations. In the last couple of years and with the stipulation of this condition 
as a key element of EU accession in the negotiations, the issue has been put 
formally higher on the national agenda. Nevertheless, in general most of the 
stakeholders have confirmed that this has been one of the weakest elements of 
Croatia’s accession process, characterised by weak compliance and highly 
contested at the national level. Furthermore, the focus on statistical increase of 
the administration has been also questioned in terms of its effectiveness due to 
the lack of focus on real participation in decision making. Ultimately, the lack of 
progress on this policy was included in the opinion of the Croatian CSOs, which 
opposed the end of the accession negotiations with Croatia, as one of the weakest 
areas of EU conditionality. The Croatian example therefore confirms the potential 
for shallow Europeanisation as coined by Goetz (2005) and underlines the 
significance of the domestic actors for the success of conditionality. 
The analysis highlighted the lack of reliable data on the employees and 
minority-disaggregated data as a common problem in both countries. In turn, the 
lack of reliable data has contributed to blurring the potential for consistent 
evaluation of the policy by the European Commission and stipulating more precise 
benchmarks. On the other hand, both case studies show the divergent directions 
the implementation of EU conditionality can take due to the role of domestic 
actors. While in Macedonia formally the policy is being implemented it has 
resulted in stimulating non-merit employment and marginalising smaller 
communities. The policy has in a way been captured by the organised minority 
interests and the EU support for its implementation has been used in this process. 
In Croatia, despite the formal progress in the negotiations and the pressure from 
the EU, the national level opposition to the implementation of this policy has 
severely hindered its implementation. This example therefore confirms the 
significance of domestic actors, but also the contextual nature of their operation.  
As a result, both cases present a challenge to the study of EU 
conditionality in several aspects. In the case of Macedonia, the further and clear 
benchmarking on this policy has been associated with formal implementation 
accompanied with significant difficulties. In this respect, the example of 
Macedonia questions the success of EU conditionality in minority policies even in 
the circumstances when the EU would employ clear benchmarks as was the case 
with this policy. On a different note, the Croatian example questions the 
likelihood of success of conditionality in politically sensitive areas even under the 
shadow of the formal EU negotiations. In fact, since 2009 European think tanks 
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such as the European Stability Initiative have called for launching of negotiations 
with all the countries of the Western Balkans to speed up their reform processes 
(European Stability Initiative, 2012). The lag in the implementation of the 
representation policy in the case of Croatia nevertheless severely questions such 
recommendations as well as the conclusions from the previous enlargement 
which have argued that the negotiations are a type of a guarantee against 
backtracking in the response to EU conditionality.  
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8. Conclusions: Shaping national minority in Croatia and Macedonia – the 
EU and domestic actors at play  
 
8.1  Introduction 
This thesis has studied the role of EU conditionality in shaping national 
minority policies in Croatia and Macedonia in the EU accession process. As 
outlined in the introduction, the dissertation had two major objectives. First, 
building upon the findings of the 2004 and 2007 enlargement, it extended the 
research on the study of the role of EU conditionality in the domestic context and 
its relationship with democratisation processes to the new candidates for EU 
accession. Second, it contributed to filling a gap in literature in the study of the 
accession process of the Western Balkans. Both objectives responded to findings 
of the literature review. In fact, research on pre-accession conditionality and 
minority policies has been limited to countries of the 2004 and 2007 Eastern 
enlargement which concluded with their membership in the Union. After 
accession, research on the new member states has evolved in the direction of 
post-accession compliance showing a decline in positive developments in the 
policy area (Schwellnus et al., 2009, Epstein and Sedelmeier, 2008).  
 The pre-accession conditionality was further developed and applied in 
the Western Balkans, as the region next in line for EU accession. As explained in 
the introduction of this thesis, the academic literature in relation to the minority 
question in the Balkans has focused on the origins of the wars and conflicts, 
whereas the international actors’ role has mainly been studied in reference with 
their respective significance for the peacemaking and peacekeeping. 
Nevertheless, the Western Balkans countries have been in the accession pipeline 
since 2004 and therefore provide a fertile ground for the study of the role of the 
EU conditionality. Studying this region, Braniff (2009) argues that the EU “has 
conformed to a policy learning model” which has resulted in extending the 
political conditionality and the timeframe for accession (p.547). In a similar vein, it 
has been put forward that “the EU is adding further, yet necessary, political 
conditions and criteria to weaker or more reluctant partners and emphasizes the 
‘journey’ rather than the outcome of accession” in the Western Balkans 
(Anastasakis, 2008 p.365). Building upon the research from the previous 
enlargement round, while underlining the contextual specificities of the Balkans, 
this thesis provided an in depth overview of the operation of conditionality in 
Croatia and Macedonia. 
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Macedonia and Croatia were the first candidates for EU accession in the 
Balkans and in both of these cases minority policies carry increasing relevance. In 
the former, minorities represent around 35% of the total population. Since 2001, 
and a largely consociational model has been established in the country with 
increasing EU involvement. In addition, in the early 2000s Macedonia has been 
hailed as a success of EU conditionality and as a case of best practice 
demonstrating the successful cooperation between the EU and different 
international actors in the Balkans (See Ilievski and Taleski, 2009). In Croatia, the 
national minorities are a much smaller percent of the population (around 10% 
according to the last census)253, but due to the legacy of the wars of the 1990s, 
their integration is crucial for the democratic consolidation. The country has also 
been praised as an example of the success of EU conditionality and is the first one 
from the region to have acceded to the Union in mid-2013. As a result, the 
presented study of the role of EU conditionality in these two cases carries 
implications for the rest of the region and also illustrates the evolution of EU pre-
accession conditionality. 
Theoretically, this dissertation built upon the findings of the study of 
Europeanisation by conditionality in relation to national minority policies in 
candidate countries, foremost the 2004 and 2007 Eastern enlargement. As 
outlined in the introduction and chapter three of the dissertation, the research on 
the role of EU conditionality in relation to minority policies has been characterised 
by disagreements on meaning and impact, making its analysis increasingly 
context-specific. The terms conditionality and national minorities are contested 
on a general level and in the EU accession literature, as elaborated in chapter 
three. In relation to the former, the research on the previous enlargement 
predominantly framed the study of conditionality within an external incentives 
model linking the success of conditionality to the low adoption costs and the high 
credibility of the membership perspective (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 
2005b).254 This model is nevertheless directed towards studying the outcome of 
conditionality, thereby neglecting the intricacies of the process of its application, 
which is of interest to this study. In addition, the model does not provide for the 
interference and use of conditionality by domestic actors. Hence, “political 
practices are likely to remain unrecognized when the range of empirical 
                                            
253 For a detailed overview see Annex II. 
254 For more see Introduction and Chapter three.  
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observations is framed as mere results of the impact of EU conditions” (Brusis, 
2005b p.300).  
In response, conditionality has been understood “by the process of its 
application rather than by an ideal-type assumed power relationship” (Hughes et 
al., 2005 p.3), a definition which underpins this dissertation, as explained in detail 
in chapter three. Understanding conditionality as a process necessitates an 
examination of both the supply and response side of the mechanism. Hence, the 
response and implementation of the conditions at the national level become an 
integral part of the conditionality instrument. As was argued by Hughes et al, “if 
the logic of conditionality works in practice, we should be able to track clear 
causal relationships between the Commission’s use of conditionality and the 
compliance of the candidate countries through policy, or institutional adjustments 
and normative change” (Hughes et al., 2005 p.2). By looking at the application and 
consistency of conditionality, this thesis sheds light on the practical every day 
operation of this mechanism.  
Besides conditionality, national minority policies are contested as to both 
who constitutes a minority as well as in terms of the standards for these policies. 
In relation to the former, the research operated with national definitions of 
national minorities, which are also used by the EU in their assessments. Second, 
as there is no acquis in this policy area the European Commission had to find a 
way around and devise standards in relation to the specific on-the ground 
situation in the candidate countries. In the absence of its own standards on 
minority policies, the EU has been using standards on minority protection 
developed by the OSCE HCNM and CoE, as was in detail explained in the 
introduction and chapter three. As a result, the application and study of  EU 
conditionality in this policy area has been confronted with the problem of 
‘attribution’ (Rechel, 2009a). Nevertheless, in the Western Balkans, most of the 
international monitoring of implementation in relation to minority policies was 
channelled through the EU mechanisms of enlargement. In light of this a high 
level official of the OSCE in Macedonia confirmed in a discussion that “the only 
report that the prime minister will pay attention to is the Progress Report” 
through which the demands of both the OSCE and CoE (albeit in some cases 
selectively) are channelled.255 Similar arguments were posited in the research on 
the Eastern enlargement, by noting that many recommendations of these 
                                            
255 Author’s interview with OSCE representative, Skopje, February 2011  
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international organisations remained ignored until the EU included them in their 
monitoring mechanisms (Rechel, 2009a). In this set of standards and 
organisations, “the FCNM *as the only binding instrument+ has served as the EU’s 
shorthand for a measurable commitment to minority protection” (Sasse, 2009 
p.26). For this purpose the research focused on the EU, while taking into 
consideration how the EU uses international instruments such as the FCNM in its 
conditionality exercise.  
While using international instruments, foremost the FCNM, the EU has 
also been relying on national legislation in stipulating criteria in this policy area. In 
the Eastern enlargement, these have included citizenship and language rights, as 
well as specific policies for the Roma. This approach has been replicated in the 
Balkans where the EU has been deeply involved in the devising and implementing 
national policies and agreements on national minorities, confirming the largely 
contextual nature of EU conditionality. The country by country differences, have 
given rise to discussions about double standards in the EU and definitions of the 
minority condition as a “political and social construct”, recognised in this 
dissertation (Sasse, 2009 p.17). 
Putting aside the theoretical and conceptual debates over conditionality 
and national minorities, the study of the role of EU in shaping national minority 
policies has implications for understanding several interlinked processes. First, it is 
relevant for grasping the process of Europeanisation of candidate countries and 
more widely the role of external actors in the democratisation processes in post-
communism. Second, it is significant the democratic consolidation of the countries 
studied, as literature has concluded that this process in the region especially 
depends on the management of minority issues (Gordon et al., 2008). In such 
circumstances, the EU through its policy of conditionality affects the democratic 
consolidation from the perspective of shaping national minority policies. From this 
perspective, the case of the EU accession of the post-communist world provides a 
laboratory for the study of these phenomena and the relationship between them. 
The project of EU accession provides extensive leverage to the EU for influencing 
and shaping the minority policies of the candidate countries, both in the Eastern 
enlargement and in the Balkans today. In this sense, Dimitrova and Pridham 
(2004) discussing the Eastern Europe accession highlight that the “perception that 
the European Union and its ongoing enlargement *…+ are central factors in the 
process of democratisation in the region is so widespread among policy makers, 
elites and the epistemic community, that it is almost impossible to question it” 
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(p.105). This thesis has questioned this claim by looking closely at the everyday 
operation of conditionality in two of the candidate countries of the Western 
Balkans. 
Recognising these theoretical challenges and the significance of the EU in 
shaping national minority policies for the democratic consolidation, this thesis 
focused on the following research questions:  
 
1. How has EU conditionality on national minority policies in Macedonia and 
Croatia been implemented between 1997 and 2004, and post-2005? 
2. How has the EU used the Council of Europe Framework Convention on 
National minorities and the national legislation as elements of EU 
conditionality on national minority policy between 1997 and 2004 and post-
2005? 
3. How consistent has EU conditionality been in relation to national minority 
policies in Croatia and Macedonia been between 1997 and 2004 and post-
2005 within the specific case studies?     
4. What role have domestic actors played in the application of conditionality in 
relation to national minorities in Croatia and Macedonia between 1997 and 
2012? 
5. What are the implications of the Europeanisation by conditionality in relation 
to minority policies for democratic consolidation of Croatia and Macedonia? 
 
In order to respond to these questions, the dissertation used process tracing 
of official EU and national documents, as well as interviews with 70 stakeholders 
at the EU and national level, including officials, civil society representatives as well 
as other international. The data collected through archive and field work were 
analysed at three levels. First, the research examined the devising of the EU 
priority through the formal Commission documents and interviews with the EU 
officials in Brussels. Second, the study looked at the domestic response of the 
national governments to the EU conditionality through the national strategic 
documents, adoption of legislation and policies and their implementation. Lastly, 
the interview data from the national level provided insight into the local 
understanding of conditionality. The reports on the FCNM and the Opinions from 
the Advisory Committee were analysed in relation to their specific time of 
publication and their relationship with the priorities in the EU documents. Overall, 
the thesis engaged in a study of the “document dialogue” between the EU and the 
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national level and triangulates these findings with the interview data. As to the 
latter, Hall (2012) has argued that when the decisions or actions of key 
participants are crucial to the outcome, by comparing the statements and actions 
of those participants, the process analyst can often establish the relative influence 
various factors had over them” for explanation purposes (p.314). The objective of 
this approach was to recreate as closely as possible the intricacies and the flow of 
information in the process of EU accession. 
The dissertation adopted a before and after approach (See George and 
Bennett, 2005) in relation 2005 when analysing the period between 1997 and 
2012.256 Whereas until 2005 the countries studied were in the portfolio of the 
Directorate General for External relations, post-2005 they were both candidate 
countries for accession transferred to the Directorate General for Enlargement. As 
a result, different mechanisms and tools of EU engagement were used in both 
periods. Whereas in the former the European Commission presented general 
reports on the countries in the region, since 2005 and the publication of the 
opinions on membership these countries become subject to more detailed 
monitoring of their general progress including minority policies foremost due to 
the establishment of a new chapter in the negotiations process. Thus, in two 
separate chapters, the thesis examined the implementation of EU conditionality 
and the consistency in the use of FCNM and specific national legislation and 
policies as elements of EU conditionality. In addition to examining the consistency 
and application of the EU conditionality over time both before and post-2005 
horizontally, this thesis in chapter seven has also looked into the representation 
of minorities in the public sector. This is a specific policy which has been a novelty 
in the Western Balkans’ enlargement process. By looking both at the consistency 
of conditionality at a general level and examining closely a specific policy this 
thesis looks both at the macro and micro dimensions of the conditionality 
mechanism. In this way, the study responded to with literature’s 
recommendations for tracking the impact on specific policy-making area, unlike 
majority studies which emphasize “the salience of conditionality at the macro-
political level” (Hughes et al., 2005 p.11). The following sections present the 
findings on each of the separate research questions, how they fit or challenge the 
literature on conditionality and provide recommendations for further research.  
 
                                            
256 For more on methodology see chapter two.  
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8.2   Findings of the thesis  
8.2.1 EU conditionality between 1997 and 2012 
In the period 1997-2005, examined in chapter five of the thesis, EU 
conditionality towards the countries studied was streamlined through two 
initiatives: the 1997 Regional Approach and the 2001 Stabilisation and Association 
approach. Although the Regional Approach formally considered minority policies 
of primary importance for the relationship with the region at this point in time, 
the analysis pointed that there was no consistent approach in the EU and national 
documents. The European Commission reports did not monitor the specific 
conditions in relation to minorities stipulated in the Conclusions of the General 
Council in 1997 which set the framework for the relations between the EU and the 
countries. Overall, prior to the launching of the SAA process in 2001, the 
Commission has fleetingly addressed selected minority issues at the country level 
at different points in time. Hence, there was no consistent approach on the issues 
addressed in both countries, or within one country chronologically. Second, there 
is no attempt to go beyond the legislative dimensions of minority policy and the 
assessments are repeated from one year to another. The approach of the EU in 
this period highlights the difficulties of employing conditionality without the 
objective of membership, as has been confirmed in literature as well. 
The launching of the SAP is the main turning point in the first period 
studied which introduced the more detailed reports on the SAA which the 
Commission prepared until 2004/2005. In general, the SAA reports are more 
detailed and extensive than the Regional Approach reports. In addition, in this 
period, the national governments responded by preparing their action plans for 
implementation of the SAA. However, the analysis does not indicate a link 
between the further structuring and elaboration of the documents with the 
improved consistency of conditionality on minority policies. Moreover, as 
explained in chapter five of the thesis there is virtually no follow up or similarity of 
obligations between the reports of the first two years (1997-1998) and the last 
two years (1999-2000). The lack of progress in terms of structuring the conditions 
on minority policies is also reflected in the national strategic documents (Action 
Plans for implementation of the SAA), which were prepared by the respective 
administrations of the countries in response to EU conditionality. 
In 2004/2005 qualitative changes occurred both in terms of the status of 
the two countries in terms of their EU accession and the treatment of national 
minority policies in the context of EU enlargement. In this period, both countries 
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became candidates for EU accession and the European Commission launched its 
new approach with the chapter 23: Judiciary and fundamental rights, streamlining 
minority policies in the accession negotiations, rather than dealing with them as a 
part of the political criteria. Since 2005, new instruments of EU monitoring and 
conditionality were introduced, such as the regular Progress Reports, the 
European partnerships, as well as the European Commission Enlargement 
Strategies. In addition, the countries’ governments started preparing more 
detailed documents as the National Action Plans for the Adoption of the Acquis 
and (national) Regular Progress reports. Furthermore, in this period the European 
Commission started negotiations with Croatia providing more detailed 
benchmarks on every aspect of EU accession, including minority policies. In 
Macedonia, there were also several benchmarking experiences, including the key 
priorities and visa liberalisation roadmap. The study of this period therefore 
provided for this research tools to assess whether in the post-2005 period these 
new instruments contributed to overcoming some of the problems identified for 
the pre-2005 period. 
 
8.2.2 Use of FCNM and national legislation as elements of EU 
conditionality pre and post-2005: consistency still missing  
Use of FCNM 
In relation to the use of international instruments, the research focused 
on the use of the FCNM as the only relevant regional instrument dealing solely 
with minority issues and to which both countries are signatories. The focus on the 
FCNM originated also from the expectations in literature as to the need for 
formal/structured incorporation of this convention in the EU accession process 
and the experience of the previous enlargement (See Hillion, 2008, Kochenov, 
2006).  As a result of its importance, studies on the EU enlargement at the time 
have stressed the need for a shift for incorporating the FCNM monitoring in the 
EU accession (Kochenov, 2006). The analysis indicated that whereas the 
Commission during 2002-2004 made fleeting references to the FCNM in relation 
to Macedonia, the FCNM is referred to only in the Opinion on the application for 
membership of Croatia in 2004. Moreover, besides the occasional use of the 
FCNM occasionally there are no direct references to the Reports of the Advisory 
Opinions on the implementation of the FCNM in both countries which would have 
provided a more consistent approach to conditionality The interview data indicate 
that the FCNM was referenced and used more as a benchmark in the discussions 
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between the European Commission and national level stakeholders than is the 
case in the formal EU documents, highlighting the distinction between formal and 
informal conditionality, discussed in chapter three of the thesis. Still, the tracing 
of the process of the EU, national documents and interviews did not point to any 
consistent use of the Convention.  
The analysis of the post-2005 period in chapter six pointed that there is 
still no consistent use of the FCNM as a benchmark by the European Commission. 
In Macedonia, in fact, the national government denounced the FCNM in terms of 
its usefulness because the national legislation provides more advanced protection 
of national minorities than the protection by Convention, once it had obtained the 
status of a candidate country.257 In Croatia, the European Commission fleetingly 
used the FCNM in its documents and although there was potential to use it in the 
negotiations, as underlined in literature and in my interviews this was not the 
case. The document analysis showed that the EU did not use the FCNM 
consistently in either of the case studies over time. The interviews with all the 
target groups were also quite illustrative that there has been no single approach 
on the role of the FCNM and its use by stakeholders over time and between the 
various groups of interviewees. Overall, the study of the use of the FCNM in EU 
conditionality in the Macedonia and Croatia in the periods analysed in chapter 
five and six highlighted that the EU still uses this convention fleetingly and without 
consistency,  confirming the persistence of the similar findings on the Eastern 
enlargement (See Kochenov, 2006).  
 
EU and national legislation 
The second element of analysis in chapters five and six was how the EU 
used national legislation and agreements in Macedonia and Croatia. The use of 
national legislation as a reference point for EU conditionality was present in the 
previous enlargement and even more so in the Western Balkans having in mind 
the very detailed minority rights regimes in these countries and the EU influence 
over them.258 Hence, the issues with which the Commission dealt were country 
specific. In the pre-2005 period, in Croatia, this entailed the adoption of the 
Constitutional law on national minorities. While the Commission notes in its first 
reports (1998-1999) the delay in the adoption of this law, in the following two 
years it solely lists its formal provisions, rather than focusing on the 
                                            
257 See chapter six for more details. 
258 See chapter four for more details. 
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implementation. In relation to Macedonia between 2002 and 2004 the European 
Commission focuses generally on the broad task of “implementing the Ohrid 
Framework Agreement”, as highlighted in chapter six. There were attempts to 
follow up on the implementation in relation to the equitable representation of 
minorities. Only in the case of Macedonia, the European Commission in the last 
report of 2004 refers to the Government plans and targets for realisation of the 
equitable representation strategy, which is separately examined in chapter seven. 
In the other cases, there is no evident tendency towards tracing a follow up of the 
activities. Furthermore, the Commission reports pay very little attention to any 
implementation and are focused on the adoption of legislation and strategies, 
which is reflected in the national programmes as well and was supported by the 
thesis’ interview data. 
Post-2005, in terms of the use of national legislation as a tool of EU 
conditionality two major policies topped the agenda in both countries – the law 
on languages in Macedonia and the establishment and functioning of the local 
councils for national minorities in Croatia, which were studied in chapter six. The 
law on languages in Macedonia illustrates the role domestic actors and politics 
play in the creation and implementation of conditionality, i.e. its bottom-up 
dimension. In this case namely, an issue which was initially not a part of 
conditionality, after its adoption at the national level became subject of 
monitoring of the EU and one of the key elements of the EU accession criteria. 
This example therefore confirms that conditionality in this policy area cannot be 
considered as a clear-cut variable due to its changes over time, thus supporting 
the use of process-based approaches in its study. At the same time it also shows 
the bottom-up dimension of conditionality, discussed in the following section. 
The analysis of the establishment and functioning of the local minority 
councils in Croatia illustrated the lack of consistency and follow up in the EU’s 
approach to minority conditionality in this specific policy. While prior to the start 
of the accession negotiations the European Commission dealt in detail with the 
functioning of the councils, during the accession negotiations this issue was not 
tackled, as was illustrated by the document analysis and stakeholders views in 
chapter six. The analysis also showed discordance between the progress reports 
and the negotiating documents although they’re both prepared by the 
Commission officials, once more highlighting the problem of stipulating consistent 
conditionality in the absence of the acquis. Moreover, although experience from 
the last enlargement concludes that the EU influence is highest during the 
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negotiations, the functioning of the councils has not advanced as a result of the 
EU negotiations, despite the financial support from the Union through the pre-
accession assistance.  
In light of these findings on the post-2005 period, this thesis largely 
questions the role of the new chapter 23 dealing with judiciary and fundamental 
rights, including national minority rights in the EU negotiating framework. Even 
though the chapter 23 dealing with judiciary and fundamental rights introduced in 
2005 was presented by the EU commission as a step towards setting standards, 
the analysis does not confirm this. In fact, the examination of the benchmarks in 
relation to minority policies in the European Commission screening documents 
and negotiation reports shows that they share the same lack of consistency  
identified in studies on the previous enlargement. The stakeholders at the 
national level both from the state institutions and the CSOs were highly critical of 
the chapter as it did not offer further “structuring” of minority conditionality. 
Hence, criticisms on the vagueness of the EU requirements and describing the 
negotiations as a guessing exercise were not uncommon.  These findings largely 
confirm the assessment of research on the Eastern enlargement which underlined 
the problem of setting standards in non-acquis areas. The primary critique in 
literature in relation to minority policies conditionality is that “while the EU 
conditionality has anchored minority issues in the political rhetoric of the 
candidate states, the EU had little to offer in terms of substantive guidance”, as is 
generally the case with the political criteria (Sasse, 2009 p.24, see also Haukenes 
and Freyberg-Inan, 2012). The empirical analysis showed that despite attempts at 
setting standards with the new chapter 23 in the negotiating process, this critique 
is largely still valid.  
 
8.2.3  Domestic Actors – more than a receiving end of conditionality  
The study of several of the policies examined in this thesis has pointed to the 
decisive nature of the domestic actors for the process of application of 
conditionality and its outcome. All of the studied policies highlighted the role of 
domestic actors from different perspectives. First, the example of the law on 
languages in Macedonia illustrated the role domestic actors in the operation of 
conditionality, i.e. emphasizing its bottom-up dimension. It also highlighted the 
way in which national actors can choose to introduce legislation and policies at 
the national level that can become part of EU conditions at a later stage. With this 
conclusion, the analysis largely confirms the findings of authors such as Brusis that 
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emphasize the importance of domestic factors in the outcomes of conditionality 
in areas not regulated by the acquis (Brusis, 2005b).  The support for adopting the 
law in fact in the case analysed was dependent on the minority party and its 
participation in government, i.e. ability to realise its own agenda. In this case 
namely, an issue which was initially not a part of conditionality, after its adoption 
at the national level became subject of monitoring of the EU and one of the key 
elements of the EU accession criteria.  
Chapter seven dealing with the representation of the national minorities in 
the administration, also clearly illustrated the decisive role of domestic actors in 
the operation of conditionality. Analysing the application of EU conditionality in 
relation to equitable representation, it underlined the dependence of the success 
of conditionality on the domestic actors, even in cases where the EU set clear 
guidelines. Through the two cases of Macedonia and Croatia, it illustrated how a 
similar EU condition can result in diverging outcomes at due to the differentiated 
responses/non-responses at the national level. In Macedonia, despite the support 
for this policy at the EU and national level, its implementation has been met with 
discontent due to the political party capture of the policy and its violation of the 
merit principle. The violation of the merit principle, as was shown stands in sharp 
contrast with the requirements of the EU for a functioning and effective 
administration, which also according to literature is an indispensable element of 
democratic consolidation (See Przeworski, 1995). At the same time, the EU 
recommendations were broadly interpreted and used in substantiating the 
establishment of new minority institutions such as the Agency for the rights of the 
smaller communities. The establishment of this Agency however, is widely 
presented as non-conditionality by the EU officials illustrating the increasing scope 
for interpretation in areas not regulated by the acquis. This example however, 
underlines the potential for interpretation left to the national actors in relation to 
the political criteria, specifically minority policies.  
In the Croatian case, the representation of national minorities in the local 
and regional self-government units, the state administration, judicial bodies and 
the public administration is a recurring  key priority in the Accession Partnerships 
for Croatia (Council, 2004, Council, 2006a). Stakeholders at the national level 
confirmed the significance assigned to this condition highlighting that “the 
primary EU condition in relation to the national minorities in Croatia was the 
203 
 
representation in the administration”.259 However, the response at the national 
level has been almost non-existent until the later phases of the accession 
negotiations. In the last couple of years and the stipulation of this condition as a 
key element of EU accession in the negotiations, the issue has been put formally 
higher on the national agenda. Nevertheless, in general most of the stakeholders 
have confirmed that this has been one of the weakest elements of Croatia’s 
accession process, met with weak compliance and highly contested at the national 
level. The Croatian example therefore confirms the potential for shallow 
Europeanisation as coined by Goetz (2005) and underlines the significance of the 
domestic actors for the success of conditionality. 
 
8.2.4 Europeanisation and democratic consolidation – a dynamic 
relationship  
On the basis of the findings of this dissertation on the role of the EU in 
shaping national minority policies, the last research question aimed to reflect on 
the implications of these processes for the democratic consolidation of the 
countries studied. In academic literature, there have been contrasting 
assessments on the role of the EU in minority policies in the candidates for 
accession, as the policy area of primary interest of this study. On the one hand, 
more theoretically oriented research has considered that the EU through its 
mechanisms has had positive influence on minority policies as a reinforcement or 
lock-in mechanism (Schimmelfennig, 2002, Vachudova, 2005). Empirical studies, 
however, have been inconclusive and have questioned the possibility of isolating 
the effects of the international actors and warned against the tendency to 
overestimate their influence (Sasse, 2009, Rechel, 2008, Grabbe, 2003). This latter 
strand of research has brought contrasting results by arguing that while in some 
cases the EU has fostered inter-ethnic cooperation, in others it has increased 
polarisation (Tesser, 2003, Schwellnus et al., 2009). Hence, the “Europeanising 
effect of EU conditionality has so far been generally assumed rather than 
empirically proven, while deep divergences across national and policy contexts 
persist” (Rechel, 2008 p.171). Later on, Rechel (2009a) argues that “contrary to 
what could have been expected in the context of EU accession, there does not 
seem to have been a general trend towards improved protection of minorities” 
(p.10). 
                                            
259 Author’s interview with civil servant in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Brussels, 
5 December 2010. 
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Overall, the analysis of Macedonia and Croatia confirms the already 
identified potential for shallow Europeanisation (Goetz, 2005) through fake 
compliance in political conditionality  which has specifically been raised in the 
literature on the Western Balkans (Noutcheva, 2007). The disagreement over the 
conditions increases the scope for use of conditionality by domestic actors for 
their own agendas and also for locking in polarisation through supporting 
contentious policies (Brusis, 2003, Sasse, 2009). Hence, the process based 
approach necessitates further emphasis on the decisive nature of the domestic 
actors. Both cases illustrate that “domestic actors justify their decision as driven 
by EU conditionality”, especially in areas of context-specific standards such as 
minority policies (Brusis, 2005b p.297).  
The problem of compliance in this policy area was specifically 
demonstrated in the case of the operation of the local councils as well as the 
representation of minorities in the administration. In both cases the weak 
compliance has not advanced national minority policies at the domestic level. The 
case of the local councils in Croatia illustrated how policies that have been widely 
recognised as unsuccessful (including by the EU as supported by the interview 
data) perpetuate partly due to their inclusion in EU accession conditionality. The 
conclusion of the accession negotiations of Croatia despite the continuous low 
level of representation of national minorities in the administration in Croatia 
indicates that the policy area despite declarative support was not of primary 
importance to the EU. At the same time, as was highlighted by an interviewee it 
also sent a worrying signal to the governments in Croatia over the interest of the 
EU in the national minority issue.  
While fake compliance has been a common feature identified in the 
Eastern enlargement as well, the case of the representation of minorities in the 
administration in Macedonia showed how a specific EU supported policy can be 
used by domestic actors for advancing their own agendas and lead to polarisation. 
This finding confirms findings of the literature on Europeanisation in relation to 
the potential for retrenchment, i.e. policy backsliding (See Radaelli, 2000). In 
Macedonia, representation of minorities in the public sector was part of the OFA 
obligations and was also a formal element of the EU Progress Reports and the 
European/Accession Partnerships. In response, the national strategic documents 
contain information and planned activities for the adoption of the necessary 
documents and implementing this principle. Hence, it is a case of ‘formal’ 
inclusion and acceptance of conditionality both formally and at the elite level. 
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Still, even though the policy is formally being implemented it has resulted in non-
merit employment and marginalising of the smaller communities. Hence, even 
when there was existing consensus between the EU and national authorities over 
the conditions as in the case of the equitable representation policy where the 
benchmarks were precisely defined, domestic factors at the national level through 
as party capture can use conditionality for advancing their own agendas. In such 
cases the instrumental use of EU conditionality at the national level can lead to 
perpetuation of detrimental policies and can even lead to further polarisation. In 
this sense, conditionality can also ‘lock-in’ deeper structural issues such as 
polarisation and segregation (Sasse, 2009 p.28).  
Whereas this policy illustrated most clearly the potentially conflicting 
relationship between Europeanisation by conditionality and democratic 
consolidation, the negotiating process of chapter 23 in Croatia also raised 
concerns. As explained in chapter six of the dissertation, the late opening of the 
negotiations for this chapter did not provide sufficient time for dealing with the 
issues concerned and the benchmarks and indicators were not considered to have 
added consistency to the minority conditionality.260 Effectively, the negotiations 
for the chapter 23 lasted less than a year and a half, although the entire 
negotiations process with Croatia lasted six years. On a different note, 
stakeholders considered the confidentiality of the negotiations process as an 
impediment for the effective participation of minority organisations and 
representatives. The adoption of strategic documents such as Action Plans for the 
minorities without their participation most clearly illustrated these difficulties.  
 
8.3 Relevance of the thesis for the theoretical understanding of EU 
conditionality 
Whereas at its beginning, this thesis primarily aimed at filling an empirical gap 
in literature in terms of the study of the Europeanisation by conditionality in the 
Western Balkans, its findings also carry broader theoretical significance. Thus, the 
                                            
260 These criticisms of the conditionality process could have potentially been 
recognised within the EC itself since, following the end of the Croatian accession 
negotiations in October 2011, the EC announced  that the first and the last 
chapter to be opened and closed in the upcoming accession. negotiations will be 
Chapter 23 - Judiciary and Fundamental Rights and Chapter 24 - Justice, Freedom 
and Security, which will be continuously monitored based on specific benchmarks 
and action plans EC 2011b. Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges 2011-2012. 
Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council 
Brussels: Commission of the European Communities. 
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research contributes theoretically with insight relevant for the analysis of EU 
conditionality in non-acquis areas and its link with the processes of democratic 
consolidation. In relation to the former, through its empirical examination the 
thesis has highlighted a set of problems of accommodating the study of non-
acquis conditionality in the external incentives model, as the dominant conceptual 
tool for the study of this mechanism. As outlined in chapter three this model 
starts from a premise of clearly stipulated EU criteria, in order to assess the 
likelihood of their acceptance depending on the credibility of the EU and the low 
domestic costs of rule adoption (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2005b). The 
findings of this thesis contest the notion of agreed conditionality in non-acquis 
policy areas on several levels. First, the changes of conditionality over time traced 
and demonstrated in chapters five, six and seven have highlighted the problem of 
treating conditionality as a constant variable. As this research has illustrated, the 
EU conditions change in their content from year to year, thus failing to satisfy the 
requirements of the external incentives model. Hence, the changes over time 
have underlined the need to look at the conditionality as a process over a longer 
period of time, rather than as an agreed condition at the EU level.  
Second, in the specific policy area under examination in this study the reliance 
of the European Commission on assessments of international organisations and 
the use of domestic legislation as elements of conditionality create further 
inconsistencies when studying this phenomenon as an independent variable. By 
tracing the use of the FCNM by the EU as a benchmarking tool in the area of 
national minority policies, the thesis has shown the continuous sporadic 
references to the Convention by the EU, thereby contributing to the lack of 
consistency in the application of conditions. At the same time, the reliance on 
other international organisations, such as the CoE for the assessment of the 
conditions exacerbates the problem of attribution, generally present in 
Europeanisation research. Whereas not dealing strictly with issues of causality, 
the dissertation has shown that the study of EU conditionality in this policy area 
needs to trace the construction and the application of the EU condition in order to 
be able to account for the potential formal and substantive policy change and the 
multitude of actors involved in it.  
Third, the fleeting nature of the conditions was also illustrated through the 
different understandings between the numerous stakeholders involved in their 
application and implementation. The research shed light on the various 
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conceptions of the criteria within the European Commission, as well as between 
the Commission and national authorities. On the one hand, the thesis drew 
attention to the dissimilar expectations of the EU requirements and their 
fulfilment on the side of the Commission directorates in Brussels and the 
Delegations of the EU in the candidate countries. In this sense, in addition to the 
already determined variations of policy approaches horizontally between 
different directorates within the Commission (See Nugent, 1997) it illustrated a 
further dimension of discordance on a vertical level between Brussels and the EU 
representation on the ground in the candidate countries. This form of discordance 
is important as the domestic actors can potentially be subject to varying EU 
requirements, thus complicating the analysis of conditionality. On the other hand, 
the research also illustrated the differences in the understanding of EU 
conditionality between the Commission and the national authorities responsible 
for the implementation of the accession criteria. This latter dimension 
undermines the potential for building a consensus on the outcomes to be fulfilled 
in response to the EU criteria.  In such circumstances the understandings of the 
stakeholders become an integral part of the conditionality mechanism. In turn, 
these varying interpretations of the criteria by the stakeholders exacerbate the 
problem of fitting the study of this phenomenon within the external incentive 
model, which is grounded upon the premise of mutually agreed and clear criteria.  
Fourth, the thesis demonstrated the role of domestic actors as integral 
elements of the conditionality mechanism. Through the analysis of the 
representation of national minorities in the administration as well as the example 
of the law on languages in Macedonia, the thesis illustrated that domestic actors 
are not solely at the receiving end of conditionality, but rather an integral element 
of the processes under examination. As this research has shown, domestic actors 
at many points also set conditions, which have partly afterwards been used by the 
Union and especially the Commission as benchmarks in the accession process. In 
light of these findings, the thesis highlighted that one cannot understand the 
conditionality process predominantly as a top-down phenomenon, since in non-
acquis policy areas which stand at the core of this research the domestic actors 
are an integral part of this mechanism. In this manner, the research emphasises 
the importance of the bottom-up dimension in the construction of the EU 
conditions, as well. The latter segment is often overlooked in the studies of EU 
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conditionality which understand the Europeanisation of candidate countries solely 
through a top-down perspective.  
In addition to the above explained significance for the study of EU 
conditionality, this thesis also carries theoretical insight for the relationship 
between Europeanisation by conditionality and democratic consolidation, linking 
these two strands of academic literature. In this context, the thesis has 
questioned the presupposed positive relationship between EU conditionality and 
democratic consolidation, established in earlier literature on EU enlargement.  In 
fact, by analysing the role of the EU in shaping national minority policies over a 
period of fifteen years and in a multitude of areas, the thesis has highlighted the 
deeply contextual relationship between these phenomena in the countries and 
policies studied. More importantly, by examining a broad set of policies included 
in EU conditionality, it has illustrated the potentially divergent trends of the two 
phenomena. This was especially demonstrated in the last chapter which focused  
on the specific policy of representation of national minorities in the public sector. 
This chapter pointed to the persistent reticence in the fulfilment of the EU 
conditions and the manner in which EU conditionality can contribute to 
embedding polarising policies in relation to national minorities.  
In terms of broader theoretical discussions, by demonstrating these 
potentially divergent trends between conditionality and democratic consolidation 
the thesis confirms the arguments of earlier literature for potential retrenchment 
through Europeanisation. As explained in the third chapter of the thesis, 
retrenchment as a variant of the outcomes of Europeanisation was originally 
defined by Radaelli (2000) in relation to the member states of the EU, implying 
that the “national policy becomes less ‘European’ than it was” (p.15). This thesis 
has uncovered a largely comparable phenomenon in the context of the acceding 
countries and the Europeanisation by conditionality in relation to the national 
minority policies. The involvement of the EU was instrumentally used at several 
points in the accession process by the national actors as a rationale for 
perpetuating polarising policies. In turn, a number of these policies, such as the 
representation of national minorities in the administration, were also conflicting 
with other European norms and had detrimental impact in other policy areas (i.e. 
establishing a functioning administration). 
In light of these theoretical contributions, the thesis carries significance both 
for the study of Europeanisation by conditionality and the study of democratic 
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consolidation in the conditions of post-communism. By examining the role of the 
EU in shaping national minority policies in Macedonia and Croatia, it has shed light 
on the role of international actors in the democratisation and democratic 
consolidation. Overall, it has contributed to demystifying the manner in which the 
EU as the most significant actor in post-communist Europe has influenced and 
shaped national minority policies, as an area of crucial importance for democratic 
consolidation.  
 
 
8.4  Avenues for further research   
Despite the attempt of this thesis to deal with a multitude of actors 
involved in the minority policies in these countries, several aspects have not been 
tackled and remain to be further examined.  While focusing on the minority 
question, this thesis did not examine the role of the kin states in the operation 
and study of conditionality, which has been recently a subject in the wider 
literature on minority policies.  This segment has been most prominent in the 
study of Russia as a kin state in the case of the Russian speaking minority in Latvia 
and Estonia. Respectively, Schulze has argued that Russia’s activism has been a 
key element for the understanding of the “low level of cultural match between 
European and domestic norms on citizenship and language” (Schulze, 2009 p.296). 
Galbreath and McEvoy (2010) further extended the study as to whether the EU 
has had an effect on the wider geopolitical relationship between the host state 
and the kin state over national minorities. These issues have largely been left out 
of the thesis as in the context of the Western Balkans they carry implications for 
the regional cooperation which was also an element of conditionality in this 
region (For an examination on the link between Albania as a kin state and the 
minority policies in Macedonia as a host state see Ortakovski, 2001, see also 
Vasilev, 2011). Moreover, if incorporating at the role of kin states for the 
minorities, Macedonia and Croatia would need to be studied separately with 
Albania for the former, and Serbia and Bosnia as kin states of minorities in the 
latter. While not examined in this thesis, a separate examination of the role of kin 
states in the context of conditionality in relation to national minority policies 
would be a way forward for developing the findings of the dissertation.  
Second, as already explained in the third chapter, due to the specificities 
of the Roma minority it was not dealt with in detail in this dissertation. Although 
partly addressing the Roma issue through the macro and policy analysis in relation 
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to EU conditionality, the research does not deal with the intricacies of the Romani 
question. It considers that the specific forms of mobilisation of Roma in the 
Balkans and in Europe in general would have necessitated focus on an additional 
set of literatures which would have made the thesis unmanageable. Still, in a 
separate project dealing with the process of visa liberalisation and minority 
policies I have found that especially in relation to the Roma, the EU conditionality 
has in fact also brought unwanted consequences in terms of limiting the right to 
the freedom of movement (See Kacarska, 2012).  This research also confirmed the 
largely specific position of the Roma which could not be sufficiently examined in a 
comparative project as this thesis. On the other hand, the design of the 
dissertation could be used for examining the Europeanisation by conditionality of 
the Roma in the regional context, especially in light of various EU initiatives in this 
field, such as the EU Framework for National Roma Integration Strategies (EC, 
2012c).  
Since the writing of this thesis, Montenegro and Serbia have both 
obtained the status of candidate country for EU accession and the former was the 
second country after Croatia to start the accession negotiations in 2012. For 
Montenegro, the Commission has implemented a novel approach by deciding to 
screen and open the chapter 23 on judiciary and fundamental rights in the 
beginning of the negotiations, rather than at the end. Hence, the case of 
Montenegro would be an interesting example to study on two levels. First, to 
examine the issues that the European Commission will include in the negotiating 
framework on this policy area once the screening is finished. Second, upon the 
concluding of the accession negotiations, Montenegro would be an illustrative 
example for research as to whether the criticisms that accompanied the Croatian 
experience would be overcome with this new approach of dealing with these 
topics from the beginning of the negotiations.  
 Lastly, the Eastern enlargement and the post-accession developments 
have shown quite lucidly that enlargement does not put an “end to the minority 
question” (Hillion, 2003). Sasse (2008) in her analysis of post-accession 
compliance in the area of minority rights in the cases of Latvia and Estonia 
indicates that despite formal compliance, serious problems exist in practice 
(p.731). Schwellnus et al (2009) focusing on four countries of the Eastern 
enlargement demonstrate a “marked decline in positive developments after 
accession, but no revocation of minority protection rules” (p.18). Hence, post-
accession, the minority policies are likely to stay and dominate the political 
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agenda as well and in this sense Croatia and its first experience as an EU member 
will shed light in a couple of years as to the issue of sustainability of EU 
conditionality post-accession. Early developments among the public were quite 
worrying with massive protests against the use of the Cyrillic alphabet on street 
signs in Vukovar; however, it is still too early to assess the country’s post-
accession compliance (See EuroNews, 2013, AlJazeera, 2013).  
 
8.5  Looking back at the concepts and methods 
This thesis has shown that study of minority policies in the EU accession 
process in Macedonia and Croatia can be explained and fits a process-based 
approach to conditionality (See Hughes et al., 2005) at the same time emphasizing 
the significance of domestic actors not only for the outcome (See Brusis, 2003), 
but also for the process of applying conditionality. In terms of the methodological 
approach and the framework of analysis, this research has demonstrated that 
conditionality needs to be analysed as a process due to the changes over time and 
the multitude of actors involved in its application. Approaching conditionality over 
time and focusing on its changes, this research has argued that the conditions 
with respect to minority policies as non-acquis areas cannot be studied as an 
independent variable. In this sense, the conditions in minority policies and their 
application are a result of the interactions between the EU and national actors.  
In addition, the changes in conditionality over time point to its flexibility 
and make its analysis dependent on the specific period studied. As the analysis in 
relation to the Law on languages indicates, the conditions can change over time as 
there is no consensus over what conditionality in this policy area entails. Since 
issues and policies can become elements of conditionality at different points in 
time, an examination over a longer period is indispensable for understanding the 
complexities of EU conditionality. This discordance has raised question marks over 
the possibility of enforcing conditionality if the standards are not commonly 
defined and the conditions change extensively over time. While generally this 
thesis confirms the persistence of the “conditionality gap” (Hughes et al., 2005 
p.174),  it also highlights the flexibility of the included criteria, both in the 
documents and among stakeholders.  
On a methodological level, this research has confirmed therefore the 
difficulties of framing conditionality in relation to national minorities within the 
external incentives model as the dominant framework for the study of 
conditionality. The use of both EU and national primary documents coupled with 
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interviews with stakeholders were essential for the analysis to demonstrate the 
flexibility of the conditions and the lack of consensus among the stakeholders. The 
different understandings of conditionality among stakeholders, was at the same 
time a hindrance which necessitated careful reading of documents over time in 
order to trace the period when and whether a certain policy became part or was 
removed from the criteria for EU accession. 
Both cases studied challenge the literature on conditionality in several 
dimensions. First, Croatia disproves previous findings of the negotiations for 
accession being a guarantee for fulfilment of the conditions. Dimitrova and 
Pridham (2004) have argued that “once promising applicants have become locked 
into the process of negotiations, the resultant pressure placed on the candidates 
further guarantees the fulfilment of the required political conditions, since any 
backtracking *...+ could harm the successful outcome” (p.109).  Croatia through 
the weak follow up of the EU conditions especially in relation to employment of 
minorities as well as the example of the local councils of national minorities shows 
that the negotiations despite the further structuring and increase of 
benchmarking are not a guarantee of success.  
Second, the example of the equitable representation policy in Macedonia 
questions whether the ‘specific benchmarks and plans’ in relation to non-acquis 
areas which the European Commission announced would inevitably breed 
effective policies. This was demonstrated in the previous chapter on employment 
of minorities, a policy which was assessed against specific benchmarks and 
quantitative and qualitative targets. Hence, the policy was not vague and was 
supported by policy entrepreneurs at the national level. Whereas at a general 
level of minority policies the conditions have remained vague, in areas such as the 
representation of minorities in the public sector the EU requirements were more 
specific. This contradiction has been identified in literature as a paradox of EU 
democracy promotion policies that fluctuate between detail and ambiguity 
(Haukenes and Freyberg-Inan, 2012). At the same time, the implementation of 
this policy raised substantive concerns regarding its conflict with the merit 
principles in employment and building an effective and functioning 
administration. As such, this policy raises concerns for the prospects of the 
democratic consolidation in the country, both in relation to minorities and the 
functioning administration.  
 Overall, this thesis questions the potential of transforming national 
minority policies by applying conditionality in the context of EU accession. 
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Through a largely empirical study of conditionality and relying on stakeholders’ 
views, it contributes to de-mystifying the EU accession process with respect to 
political conditionality. It has shown that despite calls for further reliance on 
international instruments, the EU in the Balkans has not used systematically the 
FCNM, as the one binding instrument in relation to minority policies. Its findings 
have illustrated that conditionality changes over time and is dependent upon the 
domestic actors and their use of the conditions. The study of Macedonia and 
Croatia has shown the different responses this mechanism can trigger at the 
national level, which can be linked to the increasing scope for interpretation of 
the conditions as well as the agendas of the national actors. By studying countries 
where the minority policies are exceptionally important and the EU has engaged 
substantially in the institutional and policy set-up, this research has confirmed the 
fleeting nature of the EU conditions and their potential for locking in potentially 
polarizing policies. In response, it has shed light on the potentially divergent 
trends of the processes of Europeanisation and democratic consolidation.  
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9. Annex I: Chronology of relations between the two countries and the EU 
Chronology of relations between the Republic of Croatia and the European 
Union261 
 
26 February 1996 The regional approach established a framework for 
relations with the five countries of the region: Bosnia-
Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Albania and the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia 
May 1999 The European Commission proposes the creation of the 
Stabilisation and Association Process for Albania, Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia and the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia  
24 November 2000 The Zagreb Summit – The start of negotiations between 
Croatia and the EU on the conclusion of the Stabilisation 
and Association Agreement. 
14 May 2001 The Stabilisation and Association Agreement was initialled 
in Brussels  
29 October 2001 The Stabilisation and Association Agreement and the 
Interim Agreement signed in Luxembourg   
21 February 2003 Croatia applied for membership of the European Union  
20 June 2003 Member States leaders adopted ‘Thessaloniki Agenda for 
Western Balkans’, thus verifying the European perspective 
of the countries from the region. This document has 
defined the accession instruments in the stabilisation and 
association process; 
10 July 2003 The European Commission handed over to Croatia a 
Questionnaire consisting of 4,560 questions 
9 October 2003 The Republic of Croatia submitted to the European 
Commission the answers to the Questionnaire  
20 April 2004 The European Commission issued a positive opinion (avis) 
on Croatia’s Application for Membership of the European 
Union  
18 June 2004 The Republic of Croatia granted the status of candidate 
                                            
261 Shortened and amended version from www.mvpei.hr.  
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country for membership of the European Union  
13 September 2004 The Council of the European Union adopted the European 
Partnership for the Republic of Croatia  
17 December 2004 The European Council set the start date for accession 
negotiations with the Republic of Croatia  
  
1 February 2005 The Stabilisation and Association Agreement entered into 
force 
3 October 2005 The launching of negotiations between the Republic of 
Croatia and the European Union  
 
20 October 2005 The beginning of screening  
20 February 2006 The Council of the European Union adopted the Accession 
Partnership for the Republic of Croatia.  
18 October 2006 Screening concluded  
12 February 2008 The Council of the European Union accepted the revised 
Accession Partnership for the Republic of Croatia.  
30 June 2010 Intergovernmental Conference; chapters opened: 8 
Competition policy, 23 Judiciary and Fundamental rights, 
31 Foreign, security and defence policy; chapters 
provisionally closed: 5 Public Procurement and 16 
Taxation. 
30 June 2011 Intergovernmental Conference; chapters closed: 8 
Competition Policy, 23 Judiciary and Fundamental Rights, 
33 Financial and Budgetary Provisions, 35. Other Issues. 
Accession Negotiations formally closed. 
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Chronology of relations with the Republic of Macedonia and the European 
Union262 
  
26 February 1996 The regional approach established a framework for 
relations with the five countries of the region: Bosnia-
Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Albania and the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia 
May 1999 The European Commission proposes the creation of the 
Stabilisation and Association Process for Albania, Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia and the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia  
5 April 2000 The first round of negotiations between Republic of 
Macedonia and EU officially commenced relating to the 
SAА.  
24 November 2000 On the margins of the Zagreb Summit the SAА was 
initialled; 
9 April 2001 The SAА with Macedonia was signed. At the same time 
Interim Agreement on Trade and Trade-related Matters 
between the European Communities of the one part, and 
the Republic of Macedonia, of the other part was signed, 
entering into force on 1 June 2001; 
20 June 2003 Member States leaders adopted ‘Thessaloniki Agenda for 
Western Balkans’, thus verifying the European perspective 
of the countries from the region. This document has 
defined the accession instruments in the stabilisation and 
association process; 
1 April  2004 The Stabilisation and Association Agreement entered into 
force; 
22 March 2004 The Government of the Republic of Macedonia submitted 
the application for EU membership; 
1 October 2004 The European Commission submitted the Questionnaire to 
the Government of the Republic of Macedonia; 
14 February 2005 The Republic of Macedonia submitted the Answers to the 
                                            
262 Shortened and amended version 
http://sep.gov.mk/Default.aspx?ContentID=12.  
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European Commission Questionnaire; 
9 November 2005 The European Commission published the opinion on the 
candidacy of the Republic of Macedonia for European 
Union membership. The opinion recommends granting 
candidate status for EU membership; 
17 December 2005 The Presidency of the European Council in Brussels 
granted candidate status to Macedonia for European 
Union membership 
February 2008 The Council adopted the Accession Partnership for 
Republic of Macedonia 
October 2009 The European Commission has recommended start of the 
accession negotiations for full-fledged membership of the 
Republic of Macedonia; 
9 November 2010 The European Commission recommended start of the 
accession negotiations for full-fledged membership of the 
Republic of Macedonia; 
December 2010 The Council broadly shares the Commission's assessment 
of the country's sufficient fulfilment of the political criteria 
and notes that the Commission has reiterated its 
recommendation that accession negotiations should be 
opened with the Republic of Macedonia;  
12 October 2011  
10 October 2012  
The European Commission recommended start of the 
accession negotiations for full-fledged membership of the 
Republic of Macedonia; 
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263 Data from Croatian Bureau of Statistics http://www.dzs.hr/default_e.htm 
10. Annex II: Official census data in both countries according to ethnicity 
  
1981 Census 1991 Census 2001 Census 2011 Census 
Number % Number % Number % Number % 
Republic of Croatia263 4,601,469 100.00 4,784,265 100.00 4,437,460 100.00 4,284,889 100.00 
Croats 3,454,661 75.08 3,736,356 78.10 3,977,171 89.63 3,874,321 90.42 
Albanians 6,006 0.13 12,032 0.25 15,082 0.34 17,513 0.41 
Austrians 267 0.01 214 0.00 247 0.01 297 0.01 
Bosniacs  …  …  …  … 20,755 0.47 31,479 0.73 
Bulgarian 441 0.01 458 0.01 331 0.01 350 0.01 
Montenegrins 9,818 0.21 9,724 0.20 4,926 0.11 4,517 0.11 
Czechs 15,061 0.33 13,086 0.27 10,510 0.24 9,641 0.22 
Hungarians 25,439 0.55 22,355 0.47 16,595 0.37 14,048 0.33 
Macedonians 5,362 0.12 6,280 0.13 4,270 0.10 4,138 0.10 
Germans 2,175 0.05 2,635 0.06 2,902 0.07 2,965 0.07 
Poles 758 0.02 679 0.01 567 0.01 672 0.02 
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Roma 3,858 0.08 6,695 0.14 9,463 0.21 16,975 0.40 
Romanians 609 0.01 810 0.02 475 0.01 435 0.01 
Russians 758 0.02 706 0.01 906 0.02 1,279 0.03 
Ruthenians 3,321 0.07 3,253 0.07 2,337 0.05 1,936 0.05 
Slovaks 6,533 0.14 5,606 0.12 4,712 0.11 4,753 0.11 
Slovenians 25,136 0.55 22,376 0.47 13,173 0.30 10,517 0.25 
Serbs 531,502 11.55 581,663 12.16 201,631 4.54 186,633 4.36 
Italians 11,661 0.25 21,303 0.45 19,636 0.44 17,807 0.42 
Turks 279 0.01 320 0.01 300 0.01 367 0.01 
Ukrainians 2,515 0.05 2,494 0.05 1,977 0.04 1,878 0.04 
Vlachs 16 0.00 22 0.00 12 0.00 29 0.00 
Jews 316 0.01 600 0.01 576 0.01 509 0.01 
Others2) 404,450 8.79 152,803 3.19 21,801 0.49 18,965 0.44 
Regional affiliation 8,657 0.19 45,493 0.95 9,302 0.21 27,225 0.64 
Not declared 17,133 0.37 73,376 1.53 79,828 1.80 26,763 0.62 
Unknown 64,737 1.41 62,926 1.32 17,975 0.41 8,877 0.21 
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264 Data from the State Statistical Office of the Republic of Macedonia http://www.stat.gov.mk/Default_en.aspx 
  
1981 Census 1991 Census 1994 Census 2002 Census 
Number % Number % Number % Number % 
Republic of Macedonia 
total 264 
1,909,136 100 % 2,033,964 100 % 1,945,932 100% 2,022,547 100% 
Macedonians 1,281,195 67.0 1,328,187 65.3 1,295,964 66.6 1,297,981 64.2 
Albanians 377,726 19.8 441,987 21.7 441,104 22.7 509,083 25.2 
Turks 86,691 4.5 77,080 3.8 78,019 4.0 77,959 3.9 
Romani 43,223 2.3 52,103 2.6 43,707 2.2 53,879 2.7 
Serbs 44,613 2.3 42,775 2.1 40,228 2.1 35,939 1.8 
Muslims 39,555 2.1 31,356 1.5 15,418 0.8 2,553 0.1 
Bosniaks     6,829 0.3 17,018 0.8 
Montenegrins 3,940 0.2 3,225 0.1 2,318 0.1 2,003 0.1 
Croats 3,349 0.2 2,878 0.1 2,248 0.1 2.686 0.1 
Yugoslavs 14,240 0.7       
Vlachs 6,392 0.3 7,764 0.4 8,601 0.4 9,695 0.5 
Bulgarians 1,984 0.1 1,370 0.1 1,682 0.1 1.417 0.1 
Others or unspecified 6,228 0.3 45,239 2.2 9,814 0.5 14,8872 0.7 
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11. Annex III: List of negotiation chapters for EU accession pre and post-
2005  
 
Pre-2005 Post-2005  
Chapter 1: Free Movement of Goods Chapter 1: Free Movement of Goods 
Chapter 2: Free Movement for Persons Chapter 2: Freedom of movement of 
workers 
Chapter 3: Freedom to Provide Services Chapter 3: Right to establishment and 
freedom to Provide Services 
Chapter 4: Free Movement of Capital Chapter 4: Free Movement of Capital 
Chapter 5: Company Law Chapter 5: Public procurement 
Chapter 6: Competition Policy Chapter 6: Company Law 
Chapter 7: Agriculture Chapter 7: Intellectual property rights 
Chapter 8: Fisheries Chapter 8: Competition Policy 
Chapter 9: Transport Policy Chapter 9: Financial services 
Chapter 10: Taxation Chapter 10: Information society and 
media 
Chapter 11: EMU Chapter 11: Agriculture and rural 
development 
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policy 
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Policy 
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policy 
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coordination of structural instruments 
Chapter 23: Consumers and Health 
Protection 
Chapter 23: Judiciary and Fundamental 
Rights 
Chapter 24: Justice and Home Affairs Chapter 24: Justice, freedom and 
security 
Chapter 25: Customs Union Chapter 25: Science and research 
Chapter 26: External Relations Chapter 26: Education and culture 
Chapter 27: CFSP Chapter 27: Environment 
Chapter 28: Financial Control Chapter 28: Consumer and health 
protection 
Chapter 29: Finance and Budgetary 
Provisions 
Chapter 29: Customs Union  
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Chapter 31: Other Chapter 31: Foreign, security and 
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 Chapter 32: Financial control 
 Chapter 33: Financial and budgetary 
provisions 
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12. Annex IV: List of interviewees  
1. Rosa Balfour, Senior analyst, European Policy Centre, Brussels 
2. Per Ibold, Macedonia Desk, Directorate for Enlargement, European 
Commission 
3. Nicholas Whyte, Senior Analyst, Independent Diplomat 
4. Martin Dawson, Macedonia Desk, Directorate for Enlargement, European 
Commission 
5. Svetlana Jovanovska, Brussels correspondent 
6. Augustin Palokaj, Brussels correspondent 
7. Alexandra Stiglmayer, European Stability Initiative, Brussels 
8. Dzenk Sejfula, Mission of the Republic of Macedonia to the EU 
9. Fabrice De Kerchove, King Boudain Foundation 
10. Zoran Thaler, Member of the European Parliament 
11. Martin Demirovski, Open Society Institute, Brussels 
12. Gergana Noutcheva, Maastricht University Professor 
13. Jelko Kacin, Member of the European Parliament 
14. Axel Wallden, Directorate for Enlargement, European Commission 
15. Dragan Tilev, Mission of the Republic of Macedonia to the EU 
16. Jonas Jonnson, Council of the European Union 
17. Nelija Vrzina, Embassy of the Republic of Croatia to the Netherlands 
18. Allan Jones, Croatia Desk, Directorate for Enlargement, European 
Commission 
19. Hannes Swoboda, Member of the European Parliament 
20. Blerim Reka, former Ambassador of the Republic of Macedonia to the EU 
21. Malinka Jordanova, Director, European Policy Institute, Skopje 
22. Neda Korunovska, Open Society Institute, Skopje 
23. Julijana Ilievska, Secretariat for European Affairs, Government of the 
Republic of Macedonia 
24. Radmila Sekerinska, Member of Parliament of the Republic of Macedonia, 
President of the Committee for EU integration, former vice Prime Minister 
for EU affairs 
25. Ivica Bocevski, former vice Prime Minister for EU affairs of the Republic of 
Macedonia  
26. Suad Missini, Human rights activist, Civil Society Resource Centre, 
Macedonia 
27. Silva Pesic, UN Human Rights Advisor, Macedonia 
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28. Vladimir Stojanovik, Officer, Agency of the communities representing less 
than 20% of the population, Macedonia 
29. Vesna Babic, Director of the Agency of the communities representing less 
than 20% of the population, Macedonia 
30. Hajrije Ahmed, Human Rights activist, Common Values CSO, Macedonia 
31. Zagorka Tnokovska, Senior civil servant, Ministry of Justice, Head of the 
inter-institutional body for protection and advancement of human rights, 
Macedonia 
32. Arno Van Der Pas, Political Affairs Officer, OSCE Macedonia 
33. Elvis Ali, Delegation of the European Commission to Skopje, Macedonia 
34. Ljupco Gjorgjinski, Head of UN Programme to Enhance Inter-Ethnic 
Dialogue and Collaboration, Macedonia  
35. Ljubomir Frckovski, former Minister of internal affairs and foreign affairs, 
Macedonia 
36. Dragi Celevski, Deputy Ombudsman of the Republic of Macedonia  
37. Xhelal Cajani, Secretariat for the implementation of the Ohrid Framework 
Agreement, Government of the Republic of Macedonia 
38. Mabera Kamberi, Head of Sector, Ministry of Labour and Social Policy, 
Macedonia 
39. Svetlana Geleva, State Counsellor, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Republic 
of Macedonia 
40. Jagoda Novak, Senior Researcher, Human Rights Centre, Croatia 
41. Antonija Petričušid, Researcher, Law Faculty, University of Zagreb, Croatia 
42. Milorad Pupovac, Member of the parliament of Croatia, President of the 
Serbian National Councl  
43. Davor Gjenero, Human Rights expert, Zagreb 
44. Stevo Pendarovski, University Professor and former Advisor to the 
Macedonian President 
45. Dejan Palic, Deputy Ombudsman of the Republic of Croatia 
46. Zoran Pusic, Human Rights Activist, 
47. Mirjana Mikic, Human Rights Activist 
48. Dejan Jovic, University Professor and advisor to the Croatian President 
49. Branko Socanac, Head of the Office of national minorities in the Croatian 
government 
50. Diana Zusmir, Officer, Office of national minorities in the Croatian 
government  
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51. Aleksa Djokic, Officer for EU funds, Office of national minorities in the 
Croatian government 
52. Kristijan Turkalj, Head of Department, Ministry of Justice, Croatia and 
head of negotiating team for chapter 23: Judiciary and Fundamental 
Rights 
53. Dragan Zelic, CSO activist, Zagreb 
54. Srdjan Dvornik, Human rights Expert, Zagreb 
55. Sandra Bencic, CSO activist, Human Rights House, Zagreb 
56. Allesandro Fracasetti, Resident Representative, United Nations 
Development Programme, Zagreb, Croatia 
57. Vjeran Pavlakovic, University Professor, Rijeka, Croatia 
58. Vedran Horvat, Director, Heinrich Boll Stiftung, Zagreb, Croatia  
59. Tin Gazivoda, Open Society Institute, Croatia  
60. Aleksandar Tolnauer, President of the Council of National Minorities, 
Government of the Republic of Croatia  
61. Zarko Puhovski, University Professor and former head of the Croatian 
Helsinki Committee 
62. Marija Pejcinovic – Buric, Member of the Croatian Parliament and head of 
the Council for EU Accession 
63. Viktor Koska, University Researcher, Faculty of Political Science 
64. Ljubo Manojlovic, Executive Director, Serbian Democratic Forum 
65. Jasmina Papa, Social Inclusion Officer, United Nations Development 
Programme, Zagreb, Croatia 
66. Drago Zuparic, Researcher, Institute for Migration and Ethnic Studies 
67. Slobodan Uzelac, Vice Prime Minister of the Republic of Croatia 
responsible for human rights and rights of minorities  
68. Anonymous interviewee, Head of Department of National minorities, 
Ministry of the administration of the Republic of Croatia  
69. Anonymous interviewee, Mission of the Republic of Croatia to the EU 
70. Anonymous interviewees, Delegation of the European Commission to 
Zagreb, Croatia  
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